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RELIABILITY ANALYSIS  OF THE 
F-8 DIGITAL  FLY-BY-WIRE  SYSTEM 
L.D. Brock  and H.A. Goodman 
The Char l e s  S ta rk  Drape r  Labora to ry ,  Inc .  
SUMMARY 
I 
. ,/. - 
The NASA F-8 D i g i t a l  Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) f l i g h t - t e s t  p r o g r a m  i s  
i n t e n d e d  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y  f o r  a d v a n c e d  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m s ,  g i v i n g  
f u t u r e   a i r c r a f t   e n h a n c e d   p e r f o r m a n c e   a n d   o p e r a t i o n a l   c a p a b i l i t y .  A 
d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t a l  s y s t e m  w a s  pe r fo rmed  to  estimate 
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  t w o  s i g n i f i c a n t  s a f e t y - c r i t i c a l  e v e n t s :  
(1) Loss o f   p r i m a r y   d i g i t a l   f l i g h t - c o n t r o l   f u n c t i o n ,   c a u s i n g  
r eve r s ion  to  the  ana log  bypass  sys t em.  
( 2 )  Loss o f   t h e   a i r c r a f t   d u e   t o   f a i l u r e   o f   t h e   e l e c t r o n i c  
f l i g h t - c o n t r o l  s y s t e m .  
The a n a l y s i s  c o v e r s  a p p r a i s a l  o f  r i s k s  d u e  t o  random  equipment 
f a i l u r e s ,  g e n e r i c  f a u l t s  i n  d e s i g n  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  o r  i ts  software,  and 
i n d u c e d   f a i l u r e s   d u e   t o   e x t e r n a l   e v e n t s .  A unique  diagrammatic  tech- 
n ique  was d e v e l o p e d  w h i c h  d e t a i l s  t h e  c o m b i n a t o r i a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  e q u a -  
t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  s y s t e m ,  p r o m o t e s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  s y s t e m  f a i l u r e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  and i d e n t i f i e s   t h e  most l i k e l y  f a i l u r e  modes.  The 
technique  provides  a s y s t e m a t i c  method of  apply ing  bas ic  probabi l i ty  
equat ions  and  i s  augmented by a computer  program wri t ten in  2 modular 
f a s h i o n  t h a t  d u p l i c a t e s  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e s e  e q u a t i o n s .  
R e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  F-8 DFBW sys tem has  a 
v e r y  h i g h  r e l i a b i l i t y  when u s e d  i n  t y p i c a l  1 - h o u r  e x p e r i m e n t a l  f l i g h t s ,  
and  no s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  c a n  c a u s e  a s y s t e m  f a i l u r e .  However, t h e  a n a l y s i s  
shows a r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  f a i l u r e  rate as a func t ion  o f  mis s ion  time. 
The re fo re ,  bas i c  des ign  changes  wou ld  be  needed  fo r  commercial a p p l i -  
c a t i o n s  t o  e i t h e r  i n c r e a s e  levels of redundancy or t o  p rov ide  r econf ig -  
u r a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  r e p l a c e  f a i l e d  e l e m e n t s  a n d  m a i n t a i n  a more 
c o n s t a n t  f a i l u r e  rate.  
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The F-8  Digital  Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) flight  experiment is a  research 
flight-test  program  being  carried out with NASA to  provide  the  technology 
for  implementation of advanced  control  systems  in  future  aircraft,  per- 
mitting  greater  operational  capability  and  increased  performance. The 
program  is  being  carried out using  an  F-8  test  aircraft. 
One of  the  most  critical  requirements  for  a  fly-by-wire  system  is 
that it  be  reliable.  If  an  electronic  system is to  replace  the  mechan- 
ical  connections  between  the pilot's controls and the control  surfaces, 
then  it  must  have  a  reliability  that is equivalent  to  the  mechanical 
links  it is replacing. The  primary  goal of the design, construction, 
and  testing  of  the  F-8  DFBW  system  was  to  ensure  that the electronic 
flight-control  system  did not cause any decrease  in  the  reliability of
the  basic  aircraft. The  effort  expended in meeting  this  goal  has  paid 
off in a  very  successful  flight-test  program,  which  has  achieved 73 
flights  to  date  with no failure  of  the  triplex DFBW system  causing  re- 
version  to  the  backup system. 
The purpose of the  study  reported  here was to supplement  the 
understanding of the  system by performing  a  detailed  reliability  analysis. 
The objective  was  to  predict as accurately  as  practical the probability 
that the aircraft  will  be  lost due to a  failure of the electronic  flight- 
control  system. A further  objective  was  to  predict the probability  of 
losing  the  primary  digital  control m de, which  would  cause  a  reversion 
to the  analog  bypass  mode. 
The outline  of  the  approach  taken  for  the  analysis is given in 
Section 2. The  potential  hazards  are  identified  first. Then, the  flight- 
control  system is analyzed to show  the  effects of random  component 
failure  hazard. The structure  created  to  analyze  random  failures i then 
used  to  identify  and  evaluate  the  contributions  of  other  hazards  that  are 
more  difficult to analyze, such as induced  failures  and  design  mistakes. 
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Section 3 describes the analysis  technique  developed for random 
failures, and Section  4  describes the computer  program that implements 
this  technique. The development of random-failure  rates for the basic 
system  components is given in Section 5, and  in Section 6 those  com- 
ponent  rates  are  inserted  into the system  analysis  technique to produce 
a  prediction of system unreliability.  Section 6 also  gives  the  system 
failure rate as a  function of time and the sensitivity of the  system 
unreliability to the accuracy  of the various  component  failure rates. 
The results  are  interpreted  to  identify the particular  failure  modes 
that  produce the largest  contribution  to  system  unreliability and to 
investigate  system  modifications  that  would  reduce  that unreliability. 
Section 7 refines  the  analysis  to  allow  an  evaluation  of  the  effects 
of factors  that  were  not included  in the basic analysis, and  expands  the 
analysis  for  other hazards. Conclusions,  observations, and  recommen- 
dations  are  given in  Section 8. 
Appendix A gives  a  brief  history of the  F-8  DFBW  program.  In 
Appendix €3, the F-8  DFBW system  is  described  in  sufficient  detail  to 
provide  a  basis  for  understanding  the  reliability  analysis. 
The authdrs  wish  to  acknowledge  the  assistance of Ken Szalai of 
NASA Dryden  Flight  Research  Center  (DFRC)  for  imparting  an  understanding 
of  the  design  and  operation of the system and  for  his  constructive 
criticisms  on  the  final  draft of this  report. We also  wish  to  thank 
Wilt  Lock,  also  of DFRC, for  assisting  our  understanding  of  the  analog 
and  hydraulic  subsystems.  Special  thanks  are  also  expressed  to  Vince 
Megna of The  Charles  Stark  Draper  Laboratory,  Inc.  (CSDL)  fcr  his 
guidance  and  support  as  project  manager. 
This  report was prepared  by  CSDL for N A S A  under  Contract  NAS4-2571. 
Its  publication  does  not  constitute  approval by N A S A  of the  findings 
or conclusions  contained herein. The  report is published  for  the 
exchange and stimulation of ideas. 
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SECTION 2 
OUTLINE OF THE APPROACH  TAKEN  IN THE 
RELIABILITY  ANALYSIS 
Study  Objectives 
The objective of this study was  to  obtain  the  best  estimates of 
the  probabilities  of  two  separate  failure  events:  the l o s s  of  the  pri- 
mary  digital  flight-control  function,  and  the l o s s  of  the  aircraft due 
to  a  failure  of  the  electronic  flight-control  equipment. This study 
emphasizes  the  second  event  and  computes  the  probability  of  the  first 
as a  special  case  within  the  model  that  analyzes  the  complete  system. 
The guidelines  established  for  this  study  defined  the  loss of the 
aircraft as the  complete  loss of either  pitch  control or roll control. 
Complete loss of pitch control is the loss of  both  left  and  right  ele- 
vators. Complete loss of  roll  control is loss of both  left  and  right 
ailerons  and  loss of the rudder.  Loss of control  could  also be caused 
by  the  electronic  flight-control  system by producing  a  "hard  over" 
control  surface  command  during  a  critical  time  such as takeoff  or  land- 
ing when  recovery  is  not  possible. 
The  analysis  in  this  study  is  concerned  only  with  probability  of 
aircraft  loss due to  the  failure  of  equipment  added  to  the  aircraft  for 
the  experimental  program. For example,  the primary  actuators  are not 
included  in the  analysis  since  they  are  a  part of he basic  airplane. 
Original  aircraft  equipment is included  in  the  analysis  only  if  it 
interacts  strongly  with the electronic  system. For example,  the  air- 
craft  hydraulic  systems  are  included  in  the  analysis  because  hydraulic 
system  failures  affect  the  configuration  of  the  flight-control  system 
and thus  the  probability of failure. 
System  Hazards 
The  objective of this study was  to  obtain  the  best  estimate of 
failure by considering  all  sources  of  failure  that  may  occur.  Many 
failure  modes  are  well  understood  and  thus  easy  to  analyze,  while 
others are  very  obscure. The system has been  designed  to  be  very 
tolerant of most  well-understood  hazards,  resulting  in  a  calculated 
4 
system  failure rate. due to these  sources  in  the  range  of lo-' to lo-' 
per  hour. This very  low  failure ratqgreatly increases  the  significance 
of  the  more  obscure  hazards. It is very  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  obtain  credible  quantitative  estimates of the  failure rates for many 
potential  failure  sources or even  to  be  sure  that  all  significant 
sources  have  been'  identified. The. uncertainties  of  these  difficult- 
to-define  sources are large  enough  compared  with e very 1ow.failure 
rates  involved  that  the  significance of the failu're rates that can be 
. estimated  quantitatively is reduced. 'This study  attempts  to  identify 
as many sources  of  failure as practical,  while  keeping in perspective 
the  significance of the  rates  that  are  computed. 
The sources of failure  considered  in  this  study  have  been  divided 
into  three  categories:  random  equipment  failures,  specification  errors, 
and  induced  failures.' These  failure  sources  are  described  briefly  in 
the  following  'subsections. 
Random  Failures 
Random  equipment  failures  include  all of the  possible  failures 
in  the  individual  system  components.  These  failures  are  normally  caused 
by  the  interaction  of  environmental  stress or a  particular  operational 
situation  with  an  inherent  manufacturing  fault  in  that  component or a 
deterioration in capability  after  manufacture.  These  failures  are 
assumed  to  be  random,  with  little  correlation.  The  rate of failure 
is  determined  both by the  quality  of  the  original  manufacturing,  the 
extent  of  initial  equipment  burn-in,  and  the  thoroughness of initial 
tests, and  also by the  environmental  experience,  both  accumulated  and 
instantaneous;  The  statistical  failure  rate  for  most  of  the  components 
that  make up the  flight-control  system  are  relatively  well  known  from 
past  experience  with  those, or similar,  components and  from  actual  ex- 
perience  with  the  F-8  system. A discussion  of  the  failures  used  for 
this  analysis is given  in  Section 5. 
The reliability  that can be  achieved  by  individual  electronic  com- 
ponents  normally does not  approach  the  level  required  for  the  system. 
Critical  systems  are  designed  to  be  tolerant of all potential  faults 
in the electronic  hardware.  When  a  failure is detected,  the  system  has 
sufficient  additional  resources and is able to reconfigure so that the 
'essential  functions can continue  to  be performed. Multiple  random 
failures  are thus necessary to cause a  failure in a critical  flight 
function. Analysis is necessary  to  determine the combination of  equip- 
ment failures  that will cause a  flight-critical  functional  failure  and 
the  probability of that failure. 
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Specification  Errors 
Specification  errors  include  generic  faults in the design  of  the 
system  hardware or software,  errors  in  the  manufacturing  process  itself, 
and  errors  in  the  method  specified  to  operate th system.  With  redun- 
dant  channels  used  to  provide  coverage  for  random  failures,  specifica- 
tion  errors  can  become  a  dominant  source  of  failure  because  they  can 
affect  all  redundant  channels  simultaneously  and  cause  a  complete  system 
failure. 
These  faults  are  much  more  difficult to define,  their  probability 
of  occurrence  is  difficult  to  estimate,  and  it  is  not  easy o provide 
protection  against  them.  By  definition,  there  can  be  almost  no  actual 
experience on which to develop  an  understanding of these  failures  or 
estimate  their  rate  of  occurrence.  This  situation  can  be  illustrated 
by  an  example. If a particular  design is accepted  as  a  standard  and is 
used  on  all  commercial  aircraft  for  a  typical  generation  of 15 years, 
the  total  flight  time  is  estimated  to  be  between lo8 and lo9 hours. 
Assuming  a  required  failure  rate  of 10’’ per hour, if there  is  no  failure 
(or  only  one)  during  this  time  period,  it  will  contribute  little  to 
increased  understanding  and  prove  little  about  the  statistics. In any 
case  the  information  would  be  received  too  late,  as  the  risk  would 
already  have  been  taken. It  is thus  necessary to design  the  system 
such  that  it is theoretically  close  to  impossible  to  have  a  life-critical 
failure  in  the  system  due  to  these  causes. 
It is  not  claimed  that  the  analysis  performed  here  provides  de- 
finitive  results  for  these  types of faults.  The  possibility of their 
existence  is  recognized.  However,  an  attempt  is  made to determine  their 
characteristics  and  to  obtain  a  measure  of  their  relative  importance. 
Induced  Failures 
The  third  category  of  hazards  discussed  here  are  those due to
external  events.  The  probability  that  the  flight-control  system  will 
continue  to  provide  critical  functions  after  the  occurrence  of  one  of 
these  events  must  be  proportional  to  the  probability  of  that  event. 
The  external  events  considered  here  are  physical  damage,  fire,  lightning, 
and  extreme  deviation  from  the  design  environment,  including  temperature, 
vibration,  shock,  and  electromagnetic  interference. 
The  probability  that  physical  damage  and  fire  will  affect  the 
flight-control  system  can  be  significant  relative to the  very  low  failure 
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rates  that  are  required.  Physical  damage  can  result  from  collision  with 
other  aircraft or birds,  collision  with  the  ground or other  stationary 
objects,  excessive  aerodynamic  loads  due  to  abrupt  maneuver or turbulence, 
explosion,  massive  failure of the  -engine or other.  equipment,  and  loose 
objects  such as tools. Fire  can  result  from  many  of-  the  same  causes 
as well  as  massive  failure  of  electrical and electronic  equipment,  the 
hydraulic system, etc.  Phy,sical  damage  would  also  include  liquid  damage 
due  to fuel, hydraulic, or cargo ,leaks. 
Physical  damage  is  considered  the  most likely  induced  failure 
source  for  the  F-8  aircraft.  Lightning  would  be a significant  potential 
hazard  to  the  system,  but is not  considered  here  because flightrules 
do not  allow  flights  where a potential  for  lightning  exists.  Faults 
could  be  induced  in  the  system  by  electromagnetic  radiation  produced 
by other  equipment  external or internal  to  the  aircraft or by the 
flight-control  system  itself.  The  susceptibility  of  the  system  to  this 
kind  of  failure  is  not  easily  estimated  without a significant  amount 
of  testing.  Such  testing was accomplished  on  the  F-8  DFBW  aircraft, 
but  the  effects  are  not  considered  in  this  study. 
External  events  can  influence  the  failure  rate  without  directly 
causing a fault.  For  example, an environmental  extreme  such  as  high 
heat or vibration  can  increase  the  incidence  of  component  failures. 
This  environmental  extreme  could  have  happened at some  time  in  the 
past, but  could  significantly  increase  the  probability  of  multiple 
failures  of a particularly  sensitive  part  to a much  higher  level  than 
would  be  predicted by random  analysis  of  parts  of  that  generic  type. 
The  Analysis  Approach 
The  analysis  approach  taken  for  estimating  the  probability of loss 
of  the  aircraft  due  to  an  electronic  flight-control  system  failure  was 
performed  in  two  steps. The first  step was to  estimate  the  probability 
of failure  due to random  failures  of  system  elements.  This  constituted 
a major  part  of  this  study.  The  second  step was to  refine and  extend 
random-failure  analysis  to  other  effects  and  failure  sources. 
This approach was taken  for  several  reasons. First, the  analytical 
techniques and the  required  component  failure-rate  data is much  more 
readily  available  for  random  equipment  failures  than it is  for  other 
types of failure  sources.  By  performing  this  analysis first, one of the 
major  failure  sources  can  be  accounted for, and  quantitative  estimates 
can  be  obtained  with a reasonable  degree  of  confidence.  These  numbers 
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then serve  to  establish a baseline  €or  evaluating  the  importance  of 
the  other  failure sources..  It  may not be  possible  to  obtain a quan- 
titative  estimate  €or  these  other  sources,  but  it  may  be  possible  to 
classify  them  as  either  dominant,  comparable, or insignificant  relative 
to  random  failures  for  which  some  quantitative  estimate  is  possible. 
Performing  the  analysis  for  random  failures  first  can  provide 
another  advantage.  If  this  analysis  is  done  with the proper  fore- 
thought, a structure  can  be  created  which  will  aid  in  the  analysis of 
other  failure  sources.  This  structured  analysis  would  allow  determina- 
tion  of  the  interrelationships  between  failure  sources  and  would  indicate 
the  approximate  numerical  weighting  that  should  be  applied to a particular 
source. 
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SECTION 3 
ANALYSIS OF RANDOM FAILURES 
Techniques  Considered  for  Random-Failure  Analysis 
Several  techniques  were  considered  for  analyzing  random  failures, 
including  the  classical  combinatorial  equations  and  the  related  fault- 
tree  analysis,  Markov  analysis,  and  general-purpose  reliability-analysis 
computer  programs.  These  techniques are discussed  in  reverse  order  in 
the  following  subsections,  which  describe  the  relative  advantages  and 
disadvantaqes of each. This process  has  led  to  the  development of a 
graphical  technique  that  facilitates  the  application f an  essentially 
classical  approach. 
General-Purpose  Reliability-Analysis  Programs 
Several  computer  programs  have  been  developed  that  are  intended 
to  aid  in  estimating  system  reliability.  Three  of these,  known by  the 
acronyms CAST, CARSRA,  and  CARE,  are  described  briefly  in  the  following 
paragraphs. 
The first  program,  the  Complementary  Analytic-Simulation  Technique 
(CAST) , * allows  the  best  features  of  both  analysis  and  simulation  to 
be  used in analyzing  system  reliability.  Analytic  modeling  can be very 
flexible  and  rapid.  However,  for the more  complex  systems, the mathe- 
matical  model can become  very  involved  and  almost  unmanageable.  Simu- 
lation can more  easily  handle  system  details,  but  is  slow  and  expensive. 
These  methods are effectively  combined in CAST by  using  an  engineering 
characterization of the  computer  system  to  provide  input  to  a  fault- 
driven  simulation,  which  minimizes  simulation  costs. The simulation 
produces  modeling  parameters  that  are  used in the analytic  modeling to 
measure the fault  tolerance of the  system. This process  is  shown in 
Figure 1. Results  of  applying CAST to typical  system  configurations is 
shown  in  Figure 2. 
* 
Superscript  numerals  refer to similarly  numbered  items in the  list of 
References. 
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Figure  1. CAST a c t i v i t y   s e q u e n c e  
and  information flow. 
The second analysis  program i s  t h e  Computer  Aided  Redundant  System 
R e l i a b i l i t y  A n a l y s i s  (CARSRA) . ( 2 )  CARSRA i s  a g e n e r a l - p u r p o s e  r e l i a b i l i t y -  
ana lys i s  program tha t  handles  modular - redundant  reconf igurable  sys tems,  
t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  s u c h  f a c t o r s  as f a u l t  c o v e r a g e  a n d  t r a n s i e n t  f a u l t s .  
The complexity of a system i s  overcome  by d i v i d i n g  it i n t o  s t a g e s ,  where 
each   s t age  i s  a set  of ident ica l   redundant   modules .  The r e l i a b i l i t y  
of  each  s tage  i s  desc r ibed  by a Markov model, and a t y p i c a l  Markov model 
f o r  a t r i p l e x  s t a g e  i s  shown i n  F i g u r e  3 ,  w h e r e  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  s t a t e s  
are shown f o r  t h e  s t a g e  e n d i n g  i n  t h e  states of e i t h e r  d e t e c t e d  o r  
u n d e t e c t e d  f a i l u r e .  The  symbol X r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  ra te  a t  which a s t a g e  
t r a n s i t i o n s  from  one s t a t e   t o   a n o t h e r .   F o r   e x a m p l e  h12 i s  the  prob-  
a b i l i t y  t h a t  any  one  module f a i l s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e .  An assumption 
made i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  model i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no t r a n s i t i o n  from s t a t e  1 
t o  a f a i l e d  s t a t e .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  s i n g l e - p o i n t  f a i l u r e  
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Figure 2. Effects  of  computer  system  redundancy and 
adaptability  on  failure probability. 
ONE F A I L U R E  - - - """ 
TWO FA1 LURE 
STAGE  FA I LU_RRE_ - 
"" 
DETECTED  UNDETECTED 
Figure 3. Typical  Markov  stage model. 
1' 1 
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mode. This model  shows  two  possible  transitions  from the one-failure 
state. In the  first case, a  second  failure causes the stage  to  fail, 
and  in the other, the stage  continues to operate on the one remaining 
good  module. The ratio  between  these  two  transition rates is a  function 
of how well  the  system can identify the  failed module by  self-test or 
other techniques. 
The Markov  models  for  the  individual  stages  are  related by a depend- 
ency  tree  as  shown in Figure 4 .  This  dependency  tree  shows  how  the  fail- 
ure of a  module  in  one  stage  will  cause  the  failure of modules in other 
stages. For example,  the  failure of a  multiplexer  and  analog-to-digital 
(A/D) module will cause the loss of one set of modules of all  sensor 
stages  that  provide  information as  analog  signals. The numbers  in  each 
stage  are  the  levels of redundancy.  The circles on the right  side indi- 
cate  functional  elements  needed for the  system  to  survive.  The V indi- 
cates  that  voting is used to  combine  the  redundant signals. When  the 
Markov  models for  each  stage,  the  transition rates, and the dependency 
are  defined as inputs  to  the  CARSRA  program,  the  program  computes  the 
functional  readiness  and  failure  probabilities for the  system. 
The third computer program  considered is the Computer Aided 
Reliability  Estimation (CARE). CARE  refers to a  series of programs 
that  have  evolved as tools  for  estimating  the  reliability of fault- 
tolerant  systems. CARE I was developed  at  the Jet Propulsion  Laboratory, 
and CARE I1 was developed  for  NASA/Langley  by  Raytheon. ( 4 ) CARE 111 is 
now under  development  by  Raytheon. The CARE I1 model  is  shown  in 
Figure 5. 
( 3 )  
The  system is modeled as a  number  of "stages", with  switchable 
spares  available  at  each  stage. CARE I1 allows  two modes of operation. 
In mode 1, a  defined  number of identical  units  must be functioning  at 
each  stage  for  the  system as a  whole  to  be  operational.  Mode 2 defines 
another  set of numbers €or units  that  must  be  operating. 
The  different  categories  of  hardware  failures  are  as  follows.  Cat- 
egory 3 failures  cause  system  failure  even  though  spares  are  available, 
and  are thus  single-point  failures.  Category 2 failures  cause  down- 
grading  to  mode 2 even  though  spares  are  available  for  mode 1. Cate- 
gory 1 failures  will  cause  downgrading or system  failure  if  the  required 
spares  are  exhausted  in  any  particular  stage. 
The CARE  programs  handle  both  permanent  and  transient  failures, 
and account  for  recovery  from  transient failures. These  programs  also 
account  for  imperfect  coverage, i.e., the  inability  to  either  detect 
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Figure 4. Flight-control  system  dependency tree. 
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CATEGORY 3 
FAILURE I 
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Figure  5. CARE I1 model. 
o r  i d e n t i f y  a f a i l u r e  a n d  r e c o v e r  o p e r a t i o n  a f t e r  f a i l u r e .  The coverage 
model i n c l u d e s  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  f a i l u r e  t y p e ,  number o f  s p a r e s  t h a t  m u s t  
be  t e s t ed ,  and  the  dynamic  e f f ec t s  o f  t he  r ecove ry  p rocess .  
CARE and t h e   o t h e r   p r o g r a m s   a r e   i n t e n d e d   f o r   g e n e r a l   u s e .  How- 
e v e r ,  i t  w a s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  and understand 
the  opera t ion  of  the  program w e l l  enough t o  e f f i c i e n t l y  make the  mod i f i -  
c a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  i n e v i t a b l e  when a program i s  a p p l i e d  t o  a r e a l  s y s t e m .  
CARE I11 h a d  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  u s e  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  b u t  w a s  n o t  o p e r a t i o n a l  
a t  t h e  t i m e  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s .  
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Markov  Analys.is 
Markov  analysis was performed in an early  stage of this reliability 
study  using  a  simple  preliminary  model of the system. A  program  that 
had  been  developed  at he Charles  Stark Draper.Laboratory (CSDL) to 
analyze the fault tolerant  multiprocessor  (FTMP) was modified,  and some 
useful  pre1,iminary  results  were  obtained.  However, as the model'for-the 
system was perfected  and  expanded, the magnitude  of  the  Markov  analysis 
became  excessive.  A  representative  model  of  the  total F-8 DFBW  system 
would require thousands of states. The computational  matrix  would  be 
impossibly  large,  and all of  the  required  transitions  would be extremely 
difficult to identify  and  compute. 
The unique  capabilitles  offered by Markov  analysis  were  also 
judged to be nonessential  for an analysis of the F-8 DFBW system. The 
Markov  process  has  the  ability  to  model  the  dynamic  nature of the  failure 
process. This  is  particularly  important in systems  that  reconfigure 
themselves  after  a  failure and thus  become  particularly  vulnerable  to 
second  failures  during  the  reconfiguration process. The F-8 DFBW  sys- 
tem uses  primarily  triple  redundancy  that is always  connected.  There 
is very  little  dynamic  reconfiguration  except  for  the  switch  to  the 
bypass system, which  occurs  after  two  digital  system failures.  In the 
preliminary  analysis  that was done, there  were  few  cases  where  the 
actual  dynamic  nature  of the failure  process was significant. A much 
simpler  static  reliability  analysis  could  thus  be  used. 
Fault-Tree  Analysis 
Fault-tree  analysis,  a  combinatorial  analysis  technique, can be 
a very  powerful  tool  in  analyzing  system  unreliability. (6) It uses  a 
"top-down'' analytical  approach  which can increase  system  visibility 
and significantly  aid in  understanding  the  potential  failure  modes  in 
a  system. 
The fault tree  is  a  graphical  representation  of  the  logical  re- 
lationship  between an undesired  "top  event" (loss of aircraft  in  this 
case) and  basic  failures or "primary  events". The tree is constructed 
with  a  defined set of  logic  symbols  using  system  data  (schematics, 
functional flow diagrams, etc.) to determine  each of the possible 
failures that could  cause the top event. It has the advantage of dis- 
playing  only those failures  that  lead to the top event,  it can facil- 
itate  quantification  of  probabilities of occurrence  of  events, it makes 
subdivision of major'events  into  lower  level  events  easier,  and it is 
flexible as  to the degree of detail that may be used. 
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A fault  tree was used during the preliminary  reliability  analysis 
of the F-8 DFBW system, and the basic  principles of the fault  tree  were 
used  during  this  study to aid in the  understanding of the failure modes. 
Attempts  to  develop  a  complete  fault  tree  for the total  system,  however, 
became  very  involved.  There were two  major  difficulties.  One was 
assuring  that  all  combinations  of  subsystem  failures  that can lead to 
system  failure  were  identified. For example, it is easy  to  identify  the 
failure  of  all  three  inverters o  the  failure  of  the  required  number  of 
actuators  in  a  particular  axis as a  system  failure  mode. It is much  more 
difficult  to  assure  identification  of  all  failure mod s that are  caused 
by inverter  failure in one  channel and  actuator  failures in other  chan- 
nels. This  situation  is  illustrated by the  segment of a  fault  tree 
shown in Figure 6. 
AIRCRAFT 
J I I I f 
ROLL CONTROL 
LOSS OF 
PITCH  CONTROL 
I 
LOSS OF LOSS OF 
RIGHT  PITCH LEFT  PITCH 
Figure 6. Part of a  system  fault  tree. 
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The other major  difficulty was assuring  that  all  dependent  events 
could  be  handled  properly.  Many  primary  events  contribute o system 
failure  by  combining  in  different ways with  other primary  events. 'This 
difficulty is also  illustrated  in  Figure 6 ,  where  the  event  "loss  of 
inverter A" appears twice. (and,  in fact, would  appear  many  times in the 
total diagram). These  multiple  events can be accounted  for:by.  creating 
an  equivalent  fault  tree by  Boolean  manipulation  to  reduce the fault 
tree  to  a  diagram  where  all  primary  events  appear  only  once. . .  
It was assumed  that  with  sufficient  effort  it  would  indeed be 
possible to construct an accurate  fault  tree  for  the F-8 DFBW system. 
However,  it was foreseen as a  formidable  task  to  construct  the  initial 
fault  tree and even  more  difficult o reduce  the  tree to a  form  from 
which  equations  could be written  easily. This situation led to  the 
investigation of other  methods  which  appeared  to be more  effective. 
Conventional  Combinatorial  Analysis 
The  classical  combinatorial  reliability  analysis as described  in 
Appendix A of MIL-HDBK-~~~C (7) was  considered  as  an  alternative  for  the 
F-8 DFBW  analysis.  The  normal  procedure  for  constructing a reliability 
model  using  this  method  is: 
(1)  Define the  requirements  for  mission  success  in  a  mission- 
success diagram. 
(2)  Write  the  probability-of-survival  equation  for  the  system 
based on the  mission-success  diagram. 
( 3 )  Calculate  the probability  of  success  for  each of the  indi- 
vidual  elements of  the  system  identified by the  diagram 
' and equation. 
( 4 )  Insert  these probability numbers  into  the  equation and 
calculate  the  system  reliability. 
The mission-success  diagram is a  serial,  parallel, and  hybrid 
arrangement of basic  system  elements  that  define  all  paths  that  lead 
to  system  success.  Success  diagrams  were  drawn  for  various  parts  of 
the F-8 DFBW system.  However, the  same  kinds of difficulties  were 
encountered in constructing  a  complete and accurate  diagram as were 
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encountered  in  constructing the fault tree. The diagram  became very 
involved,  particularly for elements  that are common to many  different 
success  paths. 
A portion of a  mission  success  diagram is shown in Figure 7. 
This shows  how  the  generator,  batteries,  and  inverters  are  involved  in 
both  the  pitch  and  roll  bypass  systems.  These same elements  are  also 
involved in the  primary  digital  system  and  all of the actuators. The 
complete  diagram  would  thus  become highly unmanageable and  very  difficult 
to  confirm as accurate. 
GENERATOR 
BATTERY  INVERTER 'SENSORH t STICK  PITCH  STICK SENSOR 
BATTERY 
BATTERY BYPASS 
ROLL 
Figure 7. Part of a  mission  success  diagram. 
The development of the  basic  reliability  equation as described  in 
MIL-HDBK-217C  is  reasonably  well  understood,  and is a  particular  case 
of Bayes'  theorem  based on the product  laws  of  probability. It is: 
Ps = Ps (if X is good) RX + Ps (if X is bad) Q, (1) 
where 
P - = reliability  of  mission 
S 
Ps  (if X is good) = reliability  of  mission if X is  good 
Ps (if X is  bad) = reliability  of  mission  if X is bad 
= reliability  of X 
Q, = unreliability of X = 1 - RX 
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In other words, the  reliability of the  mission is equal  to the reli- 
ability of the  mission  given  that  a  specific  portion of the system  works 
times the probability  that  a  portion of the  system  will  work  plus  the , 
reliability  of the mission  given that a specific  portion  of the system 
fails times the probability that that portion  fails. 
This basic  equation was used  in  MIL-HDBX-217C to develop the 
standard  reliability  equations  for  series,  parallel,  and  series-parallel 
combinations of equipment,  but  it  stated  that  for  non-series-parallel 
or complex  configurations,  repeated  use of the  equation  is  required. 
The F-8  DFBW  certainly  falls  in the category of a  complex  system  for 
which no standard  equation can be easily  applied. 
In  many  cases  it  was  found  that  the  equations  being  used  to  check 
the  mission-success  diagram  were  better  understood  than  the  diagram. 
It  was  thus  attempted  to  write  the  equations  for  the  total  system  di- 
rectly. The total  set  of  equations,  however,  covered  many  pages  and 
became  very  cumbersome.  The  notation  for  the  equations  became  awkward 
and  the  interrelationship  among  equations was difficult  to  show.  This 
situation led to the  ideas  that  became  the  basis  for  the  technique  fi- 
nally  used  to  perform  the  analysis. 
This technique  was  a  graphical  presentation  of  the  basic  reliabil- 
ity equations.  This  type of diagram  is  related  to  a  fault-tree  diagram 
or a  mission-success  diagram,  but  is  not  exactly  the  same as either. 
It  does,  however  retain  the  advantage of these  other  diagrams in that 
visibility  and  understanding  of  system  operation is enhanced. The fol- 
lowing  section  gives  a  description f the  technique  developed for 
analyzing  the  reliability  of  the  F-8  DFBW  system. 
Random-Failure  Analysis  Technique 
Basic  Reliability  Equation 
The basic  reliability  equation  used  in  this  analysis is related 
to Bayes’ theorem, and is more  general  than  the one used  in  MIL-HDBK-217C 
(Eq. (1)). The general  form  of  the  equation can handle  redundant 
systems  more  efficiently. It gives the unreliability  of  the  system as 
a sum of  terms  related  to  a  set  of  mutually  exclusive events.  Each 
term  is the product of the  probability  of one of the events and the 
conditional  unreliability of the system  given  the  occurrence of that 
event. The equation is thus: 
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where 
Q(S) = unreliability of the  system 
Q(S1A) = unreliability of the  system  given  event  A 
A,B,C, ... = events  describing  the  state  of the system  relative 
to the operation  of  the  hardware at a  particular 
level. For example: 
A = all  three  hydraulic  systems  working 
B = one system  failed, others working 
C, ... = other  events  that  complete the set 
P(A) = probability of event  A 
Conditions  which  must be met  are 
P(A) + P(B) + P(C) + ... = 1 (exhaustive list of events 
that spans the space) 
P(AB) = P(AC) = P(BC) = ... = 0 (all events are mutually 
exclusive) 
Figure 8 is a  diagram  of Eq. (2). The  equation  could  have  been 
written as easily for  reliability, but  unreliability is used  for  num- 
erical  computation  reasons, as will  be  explained  later. 
QISIC) 
Figure 8. Graphical  equivalent  of  basic  equation. 
2 0  
Equation (1)  (used in MIL-HDRK-217C)  is a  special case, of 
Eq. 4 2 )  as  it  is based on only  one  piece o'f equipment. For example, 
in the  equation  related to the  flight-control  generator,  event A' would 
be  when the generator is good  and  event B would  be  when  generator is 
bad. No other events  would be involved  and thus  the  conditions  are m t. 
The generator  must be either  good or bad with  a  probability  of 1, and  it 
cannot be both  good  and  bad. 
. .  
Steps  in  Applying  the  Equation  to  a  System 
The steps  which  were  used  in  applying  the  equation  to  the  system 
are as follows: 
Step 1: Partition  the  system  into basic  elements. 
The system  must  be  divided  into  a  number  of basic  elements. In 
order  for  the  analysis  to be as simple as possible,  the  number of ele- 
ments  should  be as small as possible as long  as  the  total  system  is 
accurately  represented. The elements  are  essentially  defined by the 
random-failure  containment boundaries.  In  other words, the  boundaries 
are  made as large as possible as long as any  failure  within  the  element 
prevents  any  other  part  of  the  element  from  being  used.  In  general, 
boundaries  must  be  drawn  at  any  point  where  there  is  cross-coupling 
between  channels. 
Step 2: Select  order in which  the  equations  will be  applied 
to  the  basic  elements. 
Once  the  system has been  divided  into  its  basic  elements,  an  order 
must  be  chosen  for  the  application  of Eq. ( 2 ) .  The  order  in  some 
cases can be  somewhat  arbitrary,  but  the  resulting  equations  can  differ 
greatly  in  complexity. The order  essentially  has  to  reflect  the  chain 
of  dependencies. An element  that  depends  on  another  element  should be 
placed after it  in the sequence. The power  sources  will  thus  tend  to 
be first, with  other  elements  arranged  essentially  in  the  order of 
signal  flow. The final  order is based  on  practical  experience  and  trial 
and  error. 
Step 3 :  Construct  diagram  of equations. 
Equation (2) is applied,  element by element, by constructing  a 
diagram  showing  the  interrelationship  between  equations. At each  level, 
the set of events  that  define  the  state of the system  €or  that  element 
must be defined. It must be  assured  that the completeness and  exclusive- 
ness conditions  are  met  for  these v nts. 
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It is also  necessary  that the events  that  create  a  unique  system 
configuration  for  the  remaining  elements  be  differentiated. In many 
cases it  may  not  be  important  which  particular  element  in  a  triplex set 
fails. For example,  the  state  of the system  may  be the same independent 
of  which  ac  power  supply  fails. In this case, an  event can be  defined 
as the  failure  of  any one of  three  power  supplies,  with  the  appropriate 
probability  of  the  event. In other cases, there  may  be  some  distinction 
between  channels. For example, in  determining  the  probability  of  loss 
of  aircraft,  it  makes  a  difference  which  hydraulic  systems  have  failed. 
There  is  also  often  a  need  to  make  a  distinction  between  two  different 
types  of  elements  on  the  basis  of  whether  they  have  failed  in  the  same 
channel or in  different  channels. 
The inputs  to  the  equation at each  level  are  the  unreliabilities 
of  the  system due to  failures in all  following  elements;  this  is  con- 
ditioned  upon  the  state  of the system  as  it  is  defined by preceding 
levels.  The  diagram  thus  grows  geometrically  at  each  level. The 
total  diagram  and  the  equations it represents  would  become  completely 
unmanageable  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  many  of  the  necessary 
conditional  unreliabilities  are  equivalent  and  do  not  need  to  be  com- 
puted  more  than  once.  The  construction  of  the  diagram  and the economies 
that  can  be  achieved  are  more  clearly  understood  within the context  of 
actual  application  to the F-8 system  (see  the  next  subsection). 
Step 4 :  Compute the probabilities  for  each  event. 
At  each  level, the probabilities  for  each  event  must  be  computed. 
These  probabilities  will  be  a  function  of  the  reliability  of  the  basic 
element. For example,  for  a  triplex  element,  the  probability  of  the 
event  "all  three  good"  would  be the reliability  of  the  basic  element 
cubed.  The  probability  of  other  events  would  be  similar  functions  of 
the  reliability or unreliability  of  the  basic  elements. 
The  failure  rate of  each  basic  element  is  obtained  from  the  most 
accurate  sources  available. The best  source  would  be  actual  experience 
on  the  element as long as there was enough  experience  for  it  to  be 
statistically  significant.  Other  sources  of  this  reliability  data  are 
actual  experience  on  similar  parts  and  reliability  predictions  based 
on  procedures  such as those  outlined  in  MIL-HDBK-217C. The development 
of  the  basic  failure  rates  for  the  elements  making  up  the F-8 DFBW  system 
are  given  in  Section 5. 
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Step 5: Compute system unreliability. 
The final step in the system  analysis is to insert  the  basic 
element  failure  rates  into  the  resulting  total  unreliability  equation, 
and  compute the system unreliability. For a  reasonably  sized  system, 
this  computation  could be done manually. For larger  systems,  and  also 
to allow  unreliability  to be computed  many  times  for  different  element 
failure rates and different  system  configurations,  machine  computation 
can be effective. A computer  program  was  written  for  the  F-8  DFBW  system 
analysis. This program is described  in  Section 4 and the  results  are 
given  in  Section 6. 
Application of Analysis  Technique  to  the F-8 DFBW 
Partition  the  System 
The F-8 DFBW  system  was  partitioned  into 19 different  categories 
of elements: all  except the  generator  are  triplex.  Table 1 lists  the 
elements: Figure  9  shows  the  total  system diagram. The  operation  of 
the  system is  described  in  Appendix B. The  F-8  aircraft  does  not 
require  active  stability  augmentation:  thus  inertial  and  air  data  sen- 
sors are not included in the  analysis. 
Table 1. Basic  system  elements  for  the  F-8 DFBW. 
" - . ~ . ~   
Hydraulic  systems 
Generator 
Batteries 
Inverters 
Primary  digital  system (PDS) 
Backup and servo  electronics 
Two primary  and one utility 
One dedicated to  the  flight-control  system 
Three-ne dedicated  to  each  channel 
Three 26-V 400-Hz supplies  for  the  linear 
variable  differential  transformers  (LVDTs) 
Three-includes computer,  interface  unit 
(IFU),  stick  and  pedal sensors,  and  inter- 
face  circuits  in  the  backup  and  servo 
electronics  (BASE) 
Three  each of 14 different  elements 
The hydraulic  power  system is divided  into  three  elements. Two 
primary  hydraulic  systems  supply  power  to  the  primary  hydraulic  actuators 
and  wing  spoiler.  There  is one utility  system  that  supplies  hydraulic 
power  to the landing gear, steering,  speed  brakes, etc. One of  these 
three  hydraulic  systems  supplies  power  to  each  channel of the triplex 
secondary actuator, which was added  to the aircraft as part of the 
flight-control  experiment. The hydraulic  power  system  includes all of 
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the  components  such as pumps,  reservoirs,  tubes,  and  connectors up to 
the 'ION" solenoid for each  channel of the  secondary  actuators. It is 
assumed that  a  failure  in  any one of these  components will cause loss 
of hydraulic  power  to all actuators  connected to that system. 
Electrical  power  has  been  divided  into  three  categories f le- 
ments. There is one qenerator  that was added  to the aircraft  to  supply 
power  to the  electronic  flight-control  system.  The  generator is backed 
up by three  batteries  that are dedicated  to  each  channel.  Another  crit- 
ical  power-supply  element  is  the  inverter.  There  are  three  inverters, 
one dedicated  to  each  channel,  that  provide  26-volt 400-Hz excitation 
for  all LVDTs, both for the  stick  and  pedal  inputs  and  for  the  position 
feedbacks on the  secondary  actuators. 
The primary  digital  system is taken as one  failure  element. It 
combines all the  parts  within  the  dotted  line  labeled  "Primary  Digital 
System"  in  Figure 9, and includes  the  digital  computer,  the I F U ,  the 
stick  and  pedal  sensors,  and  the  signal  conditioning  circuits  within 
the BASE that  receive  the  surface command signals  from  the I F U .  All of 
these  parts  can  be  combined  into  one  element  because,  in  almost  all cases, 
the  failure of one part  prevents  the  use of any  other part. One 
exception is the  first  failure  of  a  pilot  control input.  Sensor  inputs 
are  exchanged  between  channels  through  the I F U .  Thus, the  first  fail- 
ure  of  a  pilot  input  sensor  does  not  prevent  the  rest  of  that  digital 
channel  from  being  used.  However,  the  sensor  inputs  from  each  channel 
are  dependent  on  the  operation of that  digital  channel. If that  digi- 
tal  channel  fails,  the  sensors  associated  with  that  channel  are  lost 
to  all  channels. Thus, a second  failure  either  in  a  pilot  input  sensor 
or  any  other  part of another  digital  channel  will  cause  two  of  three 
sensor  inputs  to  be  lost  to  all  channels,  leading  to loss of  the  digital 
mode. The  effect is thus  essentially  the  same as if  the  first  sensor 
failure  had  caused  the loss of  the  whole  associated  digital  channel. 
The  inclusion  of  pilot  inputs  within  the  digital  channel  failure  element 
thus  simplifies  the  analysis,  while  leading  to  a  slightly  conservative 
system  reliability  estimate. As will  be  seen  in  Section 5, the  contri- 
bution of pilot  inputs  to  the  digital  system  is  numerically  negligible. 
Each BASE unit  was  divided  into 15 different  parts.  One  part  is 
included  within  the  primary  digital  system  element,  and  the  remainder 
adds 14 different  elements to  the  analysis. These  elements  are listed 
in  Table 2. There  are  some  components  that  are  common  to  the  entire 
BASE unit  which  are  assumed  here  to  be  contained  in  the  power  supplies 
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Figure 9. F-8 DFBW system diagram 
Table 2. Backup and servo  electronics  partitioning. 
Common BASE electronics (primarily the  power  supply) 
Computer  bypass  electronics 
Pitch, including  stick  sensor 
Roll, including  stick  sensor 
Yaw, including  pedal  sensor 
Primary  digital system/computer  bypass  system  (PDS/CBS)  switch 
Right and  left  pitch 
Right  and  left  roll 
Yaw 
Servo  electronics and  actuator 
Includes: Midvalue-select circuit 
Comparator 
Logic 
Servo  electronics 
One  selection  of  the  triplex  secondary  actuator 
For  each:  Right  and  left  pitch 
Right  and  left  roll 
Yaw 
If there is a  failure  within the  common  BASE  electronics  element 
(assumed  to  be  primarily  the  power  supplies  common  to  all BASE parts), 
the entire BASE unit  will  be  lost. 
The BASE computer  bypass  electronics is  comprised  of  three  ele- 
ments,  which  provide  a  direct  connection  between h  pilot  control 
sensors  and  the  actuator  commands. The pitch,  roll, and yaw circuits 
are  independent] and  include  input  signal  conditioning,  signal  shaping, 
and synchronization  circuits  to  ensure  a  smooth  transition  when  the sys- 
tem is switched  from  the  primary  digital  system  to  the  bypass  system. 
Five elements are  required  for  the primary-digital-system-to-bypass- 
system  switch.  This  switch is a  small  element,  but  it  plays an important 
role  and  cannot  be  accurately  combined  with  any other element  because 
of the  way in which  the  system is partitioned  and  cross-coupled. The 
remaining  five  elements in the BASE unfts include  the  midvalue-select 
circuit: the  comparator; the servo amplifier:  and the  delta  pressure (A'p) 
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midvalue select, equ i l i za t ion ,   and   compara to r .  A l l  l o g i c   w i t h i n   t h e  
BASE u n i t s  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  e l e m e n t ,  b e c a u s e  a f a i l u r e  i n  
l o g i c  w o u l d  p r i m a r i l y  a f f e c t  t h e  a c t u a t o r  commands. One channel  of t h e  
t r i p l e x  s e c o n d a r y  a c t u a t o r  i s  a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h i s  e l e m e n t .  The ac tua-  
t o r  can  be  inc luded  because  a s e r v o - e l e c t r o n i c s  f a i l u r e  w i l l  c a u s e  l o s s  
o f  t h e  u s e  o f  t h a t  a c t u a t o r ,  m a k i n g  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  u s e l e s s .  
S e l e c t  t h e  O r d e r  of the Elements  
The o r d e r  s e l e c t e d  f o r  e l e m e n t s  is g i v e n   i n   T a b l e  3. In   most  
cases t h e  o r d e r  is determined  by  the  sequence  of   dependencies .   In  
o t h e r  cases, t h e   c h o i c e  is somewhat a r b i t r a r y .   H y d r a u l i c  power w a s  
Table  3 .  Order   s e l ec t ed   €o r   app ly ing   equa t ions  
t o  e l e m e n t s .  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Hydraul ics  
Genera tor  
Batteries 
I n v e r t e r s  
Common  BASE E l e c t r o n i c s  
Pr imary  Dig i ta l  Sys tem 
Pi tch  Bypass  
R igh t  P i t ch  Swi t ch  
R igh t  P i t ch  Ac tua t ion  
L e f t  P i t c h  S w i t c h  
L e f t  P i t c h  A c t u a t i o n  
Roll Bypass 
Right  Rol l  Switch 
Right  Rol l  Actua t ion  
Le f t  Ro l l  Swi t ch  
L e f t  R o l l  A c t u a t i o n  
Yaw Bypass 
Yaw Switch 
Yaw Actua t ion  
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placed first simply  because  it  was  somewhat complex, and  by  putting 
it first,  it  would  have  to  be  written  only once. If it  were  placed 
later  in the sequence,  it would have to be  reproduced  for  each  condi- 
tional  state  that  was  generated by the  previous  elements.  The  generator 
was placed  before  the  batteries  because  if  the  generator is good,  the 
batteries  are not needed. The ac inverter is next as it depends on the 
generator or battery.  All  of  these  power  supplies  are  first  because 
the  rest of the  equipment  depends  on  them. 
The common  BASE  electronics is placed  before  the  primary  digital 
system  because  the loss of  this  element  will  cause  the  output  from  the 
digital  system  to  be  lost from all other  channels, and  will  thus  be 
equivalent to  the  loss  of a  digital  channel.  The  nrimary  digital  system 
is  placed  before  the  bypass  element  of  the  BASE  because,  if  the  digital 
system  is good, the  bypass  is  not  needed. 
The  switch and  then  actuation  elements  for  each  system  axis  are 
placed  together  to  simplify  the  resulting  equations.  All  switches  could 
have  been  ?laced  first  and  followed  by all  actuation,  but he  resulting 
diagram  and  equations  would  have  been  much  more  complex. 
Construct  Diagram of  the Equations 
The total  equation  for  the  unreliability  of  the  system  due  to 
random  component  failures  can  now be  formed  by constructing  a  diagram 
for  the  equations.  This  diagram is presented  in  five  sections  in 
Figure 10. The  first  section  covers  the  first 6 elements, and  the  other 
4 sections  cover  the  remaining 13 elements  for  different  system  states 
as determined by failures in the  first 6 elements.  This  diagram  is  not 
described in detail.  However,  typical  parts  are  described so that  the 
methods  used  for  developing  the  diagram  can  be  understood. 
The  equation  for  the  first  element  (hydraulic  power)  is 
where a bar  over  a  symbol  means  the  element has failed  and  the  number 
' indicates  how  many  channels  are good  or  bad  (e.g.,  P(3HYD) denotes  the 
probability  that  all  three  hydraulic  systems  are  good). This is the 
application of the  general  equation  (Eq.  (2)) , giving  the  unreliability 
of the system as a  function  of  the  state of the  hydraulic  power. 
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Five states for the hydraulic  power  are  defined. The first is 
that all, three  hydraulic  power  supplies  are  good. The second is that any 
two  of  the  three  supplies  are good  and one is  failed.  This  event  can 
happen  in three different  ways by the  failure of any one of the three 
supplies. These  different  ways can be  combined  into one event  because 
the  unreliability of the  remainder  of  the  system is equivalent no matter 
which  supply  has  failed.  When  two  supplies fail, a  distinction  must  be 
made as to  which two have failed. As long as one primary  hydraulic 
system is still  good,  the  aircraft  can  be  flown;  however, if  both  pri- 
mary  hydraulic  systems  fail,  the  aircraft  cannot  be  flown  since  the 
primary systems  power the primary  actuators. Two events  are  thus  de- 
fined  for two hydraulic  failures: 
(1) One primary  system is good  and  the other  two  systems  have 
failed,  which  can  happen  two ways. 
(2) Only  the  utility  system is good. 
The  final  event  is  that  all  three  hydraulic  systems  have failed.
If  it  is  assumed  that all three  hydraulic  systems  have  the  same 
reliability [R(HYD)I, the  probability of the  five  events  will  be as
follows,  where Q  (HYD) = 1 - R(HYD) 
P(3HYD) = R(HYD) 3 
- 
P (2HYD,  HYD) = 3R (HYD)  2Q  (HYD) 
2 p (PC, PC, E) = 2 R  (HYD) Q (HYD) 
P (UTL, 2 z )  = R(HYD)Q(HYD)  2 
P (3H?ID) = Q  (HYD)  3 
The completeness  condition  for  these  events  can be  shown by the 
addition 
R3 + 3R2Q + 2RQ + RQ2 + Q3 = R3 + 3R2Q + 3RQ2 + Q3 2 
= (R + Q) 
= 1  
3 
where R and Q are  the  system  reliability  and  unreliability,  and R + Q = 1 
by  definition. The  mutual  exclusiveness  condition is shown by inspec- 
tion  of  each  pair.  It is impossible for all three to  be  good  and one 
to  be  bad  and so forth. 
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The conditional  unreliabilities  Q(SIUTL, 2pd) and Q(S13m) are 
1, i.e., the probability  that  the  aircraft will be lost if both  primary 
hydraulic  systems  fail is 1. In this study, however, these  have  been 
set  to 0 since this is a  failure  mode  which  would be present  in  the 
basic aircraft  before  addition of the electronic  flight-control  system, 
and thus  should not be  charged  to it. The other  three  conditional un- 
reliabilities  must  be  solved by the  repeated  application of the basic 
equation  for  the  rest  of  the  elements for the  particular  state  of  the 
hydraulic  system. 
The reason  for  computing  unreliability  instead  of  reliability 
can now be  seen.  The  first  term  will  be  the  conditional  unreliability 
of the  system  with  all  elements  good,  which  will be a very  small  number, 
multiplied by the probability  that  all  are  good,  which  will  be s. number 
very  near 1. The last  terms  will be the  conditional  unreliability  with 
elements  failed,  which  will  approach or be  equal  to 1, times  the prob- 
abilities of these  events,  which  will be  very  small. The  arrangement 
will be  very  balanced  numerically.  If  reliability  had  been  used,  the 
equation  would  have  been  the  sum  of  the  products  of  numbers  very  close 
to 1 and  the  products of very  small  numbers. This situation  would  be 
very difficult  to  handle  without  special  precautions. 
The next  element  is  the  generators.  A  typical  equation  is 
In  this case, there is only  one  generator  and  thus  there  are  only  two 
events:  the  generator is good  and  the  generator  is  bad.  There  are 
two  other  generator  equations  for  the  other  two  states  of  the hydraulic 
sys tem. 
The third element  is  the battery. The batteries  are  not involved 
if  the  generator is good. A  typical  equation is thus 
Q(S13HYD, m) = Q(S13HYD, m, 3BAT)P(3BAT) 
+ Q(S13HYD, E, 2BAT, m)P(2BATI a) 
+ Q (S 1 3HYD, m, BAT, 2 E )  P  (BAT, 2m) 
+ Q(S13HYD, a, 3=)P(3=) 
At this  point, it  should  be  obvious  how  cumbersome th notation  and  the 
equations  themselves  can  become. The conditional  probability  Q(S13HYD, 
m, 3BAT) is assumed  to  be  equal  to  Q(Sl3HYD,  GEN),  and does not  have 
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to  be computed twice. The term Q(S13HYD, m, 3m) is  1, i.e., the 
system fails if  it  loses  all  dc power. All  other  conditional  unreli- 
abilities must be  computed. 
There are two other  battery  equations  for  the  other  two  states  of 
the  hydraulic  system. The events  for  the  case  where  one  hydraulic  sys- 
tem is bad must be  rearranged  somewhat.  There  is  now a distinction 
between a battery  failure in the  same  channel  as  the  failed  hydraulic 
system or a battery  failure  in a different  channel.  If  the  battery 
fails in the  same  channel  as  the  hydraulic  failure,  the  state  of  the 
system  will be the  same as if  only  the  battery  had  failed.  The  hydrau- 
lics in that  channel  are  now  not  relevant  since  the  electrical  power 
in that  channel  has failed. If a battery  fails  in a channel  with  good 
hydraulics, it is  assumed  that  the  entire  system  has  failed,  since 
there  is  no  automatic  reconfiguration  to  single-channel  operation for 
mixed  hydraulic  and  electrical  failures.  The  system  can be  reconfigured 
manually as will be  discussed  in  Section 7. This  distinction  between 
battery-failure  channels i s  shown  in  Figure  10a by  the  subscripts. 
In  the case where  only one hydraulic  system  is  working,  the 
entire  system  has  been  reduced  to a single-channel  system, and thus 
only  one  battery  is  involved.  The  state  of  the  other  two  batteries 
is of  no  consequence.  The  rest  of  the  diagram  was  constructed  in a 
similar  fashion.  At  most  levels  there  will be conditional  unreli- 
abilities of 1 corresponding  to  failures  on  that  level  that  would 
cause  total  system  failure.  Other  conditional  unreliabilities  must  be 
computed  from  the  failure  rates  of  the  remaining  levels.  Eventually, 
at or near  the  bottom  of  the  diagram  there  will  be zeros, which  means 
that,  within  the  assumptions of  this  model,  there  are  sufficient  elements 
working  to  guarantee  the  success of the  system. 
The  equations  for  the  probability of loss of the  primary  digital 
mode  were  formed  as a subset of the  total  set of equations.  TO  obtain 
them, one  sets the  conditional  unreliabilities  to  unity  at  all  points 
in  the  system  equation  where  the  system  will  revert  to  the  bypass 
system. 
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SECTION 4 
COMPUTER  PROGRAM TO CALCULATE 
CONTROL-SYSTEMUNRELIABILITY 
A computer  program  was  written to compute  the  unreliability  equa- 
tions  developed  in  Section 3 .  The  program  is  organized  in  a  modular 
fashion  that  duplicates  the  structure of equations  defined by the prob- 
ability  model  for  the  flight-control  system.  Failure  rates  for the
calculations  are  stored  in  a  separate  data  file  to  facilitate  revisions 
without  disturbing  the  computing  program.  These  failure  rates  are sum- 
marized in Section 5 (Table 5 ) .  
The  program  provides  for  varying  flight-time  and  failure  rates in 
order to  test  the  sensitivity  of  system  unreliability  (QSystem ) to  the 
duration of the  mission  and  uncertainties  in  failure-rate  estimates. 
Program  output  is  formatted to  tabulate  the  unreliability  in  each  state 
of the model. This  permits  the  user  to  trace  critical  failure  paths 
that  contribute  to  overall  system  unreliability.  A  modification of the 
total  system  model  calculates  the  probability  that  the  primary  digital 
flight-control  system  will  fail  and  cause  reversion  to  the  bypass  system. 
Application  of  Computer  Program  to  Unreliability  Equations 
The unreliability  model  for  the  flight-control  system  is  constructed 
from  probability  state  equations  containing sums and  products of the 
probability states of each  system  element  as  described in the  discussion 
of Eq.  (2)(Section 3 ) .  The general  expression  is  a  particular  case  of 
Bayes' theorem,  which is derived  from  the  product  laws  of  probability. 
The basic  equation  is  repeated  here  in  the  form 
(8) 
i=l 
4 2  
where 
S = overall  system  unsuccessful  state 
Q(S) = probability  of  system  failure 
Ai = various  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive  states  of 
the  system  elements 
P(Ai) = a  priori  probability  that  Ai  will  occur 
Q (SIAi) = a  posteriori  probability  of S given  that  Ai  occurs 
Applying  the  general  equation we get 
The  a  priori  terms  may  be  calculated  directly.  For  example, in 
a  triplex  voting  system  where  two  out  of  three  elements  are  required 
for  system  success: 
P (A1) = RA 3 All  elements OK 
P (AZ) = 3RiQA One element failed 
P(A3) = 3RAQi Two elements failed 
P (A4) = Qi All three elements failed 
RA and QA are, respectively,  the  reliability and  unreliability  of  ele- 
ment A. In  the  general  case 
-Xit 
Ri - - e 
and 
Qi = 1 - Ri (7) 
where Xi is  the  constant  hazard  failure  rate  of  the  ith  element.  The  a 
posteriori  (conditional)  terms  must  be  derived  from  additional  equations. 
This  leads  to  a  structure of equations  whereby  the  probability  of 
the  top-level event-system failure-is  calculated by a main  program, 
4 3  
... .,.. . . .... . 
and conditional  probabilities  are  calculated  by  nested  subroutines  called 
by the main program.  Conditional  probabilities for each  equation  in 
the hierarchy  are  then  computed by further  equations. The process  con- 
tinues  until  the  conditional  probabilities for all  subsystem  states  have 
been  accounted  for. A set  of  equations  organized  in  this  manner  may be 
visualized by observing  Figure 11. This structure  allows  the  program 
to  be  written  "top-down",  whereas  the  computations  must be  performed 
"bottom-up". The subroutine  calling  procedures  automatically  perform 
all of  the  necessary  bookkeeping  necessary  to  perform  this  transformation. 
MAIN PROGRAM 
SUBROUTINE 1 
SUBROUTINE 2 
SUBROUTINE 3 
SUBROUTINE 4 
Figure 11. General  program  organization. 
Organization of the  Computer  Program 
The structure  of  the  probability  model  covers  a  large  number  of 
the unique  subsystem  states  that  could  potentially  necessitate  separate 
probability  equations.  This  situation is saved  by the  fact  that many 
system  states  are  equivalent as far  as  the  remaining  elements  are  con- 
cerned, or can be  defined  in  terms of the  system  totally  failing or
succeeding. In the  case  of  equivalent  states,  one  subroutine  called 
by several  equations can compute  the  desired  probability.  Where  a  state 
may be defined  as  leading  directly  to  overall  flight-system  success or 
failure,  we may  input  a  conditional  probability,  Q(SIAi) , of 0 or 1, 
as applicable. 
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Application  of  the  general  expression  may be illustrated by 
the following  example,  which  also  highlights  the  modular  organization 
of the  probability  equations. The top-level  event, Q(S), failure of 
flight-control  system,  is  identified by the  reliability  model  as  
function  of  the  states  of  system  elements. The first-level  equation 
(refer  to  the  discussion of  Eq. ( 3 )  in Section 3)  represents  the  anal- 
ysis of  the  hydraulic  system  states, as defined  in Table 4 .  
Table 4 .  Definition  of  hydraulic  system  states. 
Mnemonic 
3 HYD 
2 HYD, 1 
PC,  PC, UTL 
" 
UTL, 2 PC 
3 H Y D  
Description 
All  hydraulic  systems OK 
Two  hydraulic  systems OK, one 
failed 
One  primary  system OK, one 
primary  system  failed,  utility 
system  failed 
Utility  system OK, primary 
systems  failed 
All  hydraulic  systems  failed 
Nomenclature  of  Subroutines 
Each  subroutine  computes  the  probability  relationship  for a unique 
system state, and  is  labeled  by a mnemonic  to  facilitate  program  tracing 
and relating  outputs  to  specific  equations.  The  system  for  naming  the 
subroutines  is  illustrated by the  following  example. 
The  probability  of  system  failure  is  calculated  in  accordance 
with a hierarchy  of  equations,  with  those  pertaining  to  the  hydraulic 
systems  considered  first. The top-level  event,  total  system  failure, 
Q (S) , is  computed by Eq. (5') in a subroutine  labeled  "QSYSTEM" . The 
first  term in the  equation,  Q(SIA1), is the  conditional  unreliability  of 
the  system  given  that  three  hydraulic  systems  are  not  failed.  Its  value 
depends  on  the  following  two  states: 
(1) B1: Three hydraulics OK, generator OK. 
(2) B2: Three hydraulics OK, generator failed. 
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Thus 
The subroutine  computing this relationship  is  labeled "Q3HYD", and it 
is  nested  within "QSYSTEM", which  calls  it  to  obtain the value of 
Q(sIA~). 
Equation (8) contains two conditional  probability  terms. These, 
in  turn,  are  computed by nested  subroutines  as  follows: 
(1) Q (S IB1) is  computed by "Q3HGEN". 
(2) Q (S IB2) is  computed  "Q3HGEN-". *
The pattern is then  continued  until  all  states of the system have 
been  exhausted  and  all  conditional  probabilities  have  been  computed. 
Subroutines  are  nested  for  efficient  program  execution  to  minimize 
computer  search time. However,  two  special  non-nested  subroutines are 
provided  to  cover the following  general  cases: 
(1) "QBASE1"  computes  the  unreliability  of  switch and  actuation 
elements  when the primary  digital  system is used  (triplex 
or dual), or the primary  digital  system  is not used  and 
bypass is dual. 
(2)  "QBASE2"  computes  the  unreliability of switch and  actuation 
elements  when  the  primary  digital  system  is  not  used  and 
bypass is triplex. 
Figure  12  illustrates  the  flow  of  calculations  through  the  com- 
puter  program  and  corresponds  directly  to  the  equation  diagram in 
Figure loa. The  system  states  are  identified by a 19 x 27  matrix, 
and  the  conditional  probabilities  are  tabulated  with  respect  to  the 
same  coordinates. This tabulation  is  labeled "QS MATRIX" on the  com- 
puter  printout. The QS MATRIX  may  then  be  superimposed on an  equation 
diagram  and  be  used  to  trace  critical  failure  paths  for  the  flight- 
control  system. 
* 
The  formatting  ability of the  computer  precludes  use of a bar  over 
the  symbol (e.g., A) to  indicate "not A" or  "failure  of  element A", 
as  in  standard  reliability  terminology. TKefore, an underscore 
following  the symbol is  used  to  indicate "GEN" (failure  of  the generator). 
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Probability ____ ~- ~~~ ghat  the  Flight-Control  System  will 
Revert  to  the  Computer  Bypass  System 
The  probability  that  the  flight-control  system  will  revert  to  the 
computer  bypass  system  (CBS)  is a subset of the  overall  probability 
model. A modified  program  was  made by inserting  unity  at  all  points 
where  the  system  would  use  the CBS. The  following  examples  illustrate 
how  such  modifications  are  made to perforin  the  desired  calculations: 
(1) If one  primary  hydraulic  system  and  the  utility  hydraulic 
system  fail,  the  electronic  logic  will  reconfigure  the 
flight-control  system  into a simplex  string  of  elements 
operating  on  one  channel  through  the  bypass  system.  There- 
fore, by definition,  the  primary  digital  system  (PDS)  is 
not  available and  the  conditional  unreliability  for  this 
event  is  1. 
To  incorporate  this  change  into  the  program,  subroutine 
"QSYSTEM" is  modified as follows: 
(a) Subroutine  "QSIMPLEX"  is  deleted  as it no  longer 
applies. 
(b) The  conditional  unreliability  Q(SIPC, PC, UTL) is 
"
set  equal  to 1. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  conditional  unreliabilities 
Q(SIUTL, 2 E )  and Q(S13m) are 0 as  in  the  overall  system 
model  because  these  states  represent  total  hydraulic  failure 
whether  or  not  the  electronic  flight-control  system  is  used 
and, therefore,  the  incremental  unreliability  is  not  allo- 
cated  to  the DFBW system. 
(2)  In  row 7 of Figure 12, there  are  three  boxes  labeled 
"QBASE2" and  they  represent  reconfiguration  of  the  flight- 
control  system  to  bypass.  Since  these  states  indicate  that 
the  PDS  is  not  used,  the  conditional  unreliabilities  are 
set  equal  to 1, and  subroutine  QBASE2  is  deleted  from 
the  program. 
(3) Transfers  in  other  subroutines  that  indicate  reconfiguration 
to  manual  mode  are  set  equal  to 1. Examples  are  Q(SIINV, 
2 m )  in  "Q3HGEN"  and Q (S ICBE,  CBE)  in  "Q3HG-2B2INV". 
- 
Figure 13 is a revised  diagram  of  the  equations  used  to  compute 
the  probability  that  the  flight-control  system  will  revert  to  CBS. 
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SECTION  5 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  BASIC  COMPONENT  FAILURE  RATES 
Operational  failure  rates  for  system  components  have  been derived 
from  operational  experience  with  the  system,  data  collected by principal 
users  of  such  equipment,  and  standard  references  developed  for  reliabil- 
ity  prediction.  In  all  cases  it is assumed  that  each  component  has  been 
used  beyond  the "infant  mortality"  range,  where  many  design,  quality,  or 
manufacturing  faults  may  cause  premature  failure. It is  also  assumed 
that  each  component  is  within  its  useful  life.  Therefore,  failures  will 
be randomly  distributed  within  the  time  interval  under  consideration, 
and  the  failure rate  will  be  constant.  Table  5  summarizes  the  subsystem 
failure  rates  used  to  compute  the  unreliability of the  flight-control 
system. 
Table 5. Summary of failure  rates  used  to  compute  unreliability 
of flight-control  system  (failures  per lo6 hours). 
" . " ~ . . i  " ." _- "~ .
Subsystem 
Hydraulics 
Generator 
Batteries 
Inverters 
Common  BASE 
Electronics 
Primary  Digital 
System 
Pitch  Backup 
System 
Right  Pitch  Switch 
Right  Pitch  Actuator 
_ _  = __ .- ." . 
Failure  Rate I Subsystem Failure  Rate 
~~~ ~ 
125.6 Left  Pitch  Switch 
597.6 
356.8 
Left  Pitch  Actuator 
108.3 Roll  Backup  System 
192.3 
45.7 
192.3 Right  Roll  Actuator 39.3 
12.2 Right  Roll  Switch 
1522.0 
108.3 
Left  Roll  Switch 21.1 
Left  Roll  Actuator 192.3 
Yaw Backup  System 108.2 
192.3 Yaw Switch 
Yaw Actuator 192.3 
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Reliability  Prediction  Methods 
The criterion  governing  the  selection f a  data  source and the 
method of computation is that  each  failure  rate  shall  be  consistent 
with  the  others  in  terms  of  estimate  uncertainty  and the level of detail 
with  which  the  mathematical  model  of  system  unreliability  was  constructed. 
For example, if detailed  operational  records  for  a  piece  of  equipment 
were  available  over  a  significant  time  interval  covering  many  part- 
hours of operation,  then  the  failure  rate  was  computed  from  the  recorded 
data.  However,  if  these  conditions  were  not met, then  the  failure  rate 
was  computed  from  standard  references by the  parts-count  technique  given 
in  MIL-HDBK-217C. No attempt  was  made  to  estimate  component  failure 
rates by detailed  part-stress  analysis, as this  level of information  is 
not  available  and  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  detail of the  system 
unreliability  model. 
Operational  Failure  Data 
If the  failure  rate  for  a  component  is  to  be  calculated  from 
operational  experience,  then  the  following  apply: 
(1) It  is  assumed  that  failures  are  random  and  that  there is
an  exponential  distribution  of  failure  times. 
(2) Two-sided  90-percent  confidence  limits are computed as 
follows: 
* 
2 
Lower  Confidence  Limit  (LCL) = x (cr/2,2r) 2T 
Upper  Confidence  Limit  (UCL) = 2T 
where 
r = number of failures  and  determines  the  degrees of 
freedom  used  to  find  chi-square (x ) 2 
a/2 = 5th  percentile  coordinate  used  to  determine  the 
x2 value  at  the  lower  confidence  limit 
1-a/2 = 9gth  percentile  coordinate  used  to  determine  the 
x2 value  at  the  upper  confidence  limit 
T = total  number of component  part  hours 
* Failure  rates  in  NPRD-1  (Reference 9) are tabulated  with  60-percent 
confidence  limits,  whereas  predecessor  documents,  the  RADC  Notebooks 
(Reference lo),  used  90-percent  confidence  limits. 
(3) A special  case  occurs when,the part  under  evaluation  has 
had zero failures.  In  this  instance,  the  failure  point 
estimate is calculated  as  a  function  of  total  part-hours, 
and the  value is obtained  from  the  upper  single-sided 
60-percent  confidence  level  at  two  degrees  of  freedom. No 
confidence  limits  are  given  for  failure  rates  calculated  in 
this  manner. 
Predicted  Failure  Data 
Electronic  Equipment. - The  parts-count  reliability  prediction Of 
MIL-HDBK-~~~C was  used  unless  otherwise notes. This  method  is  applicable 
when  a  detailed  parts  list  including  part  stresses  is  not  available. 
The  general  expression  for  equipment  failure  rate  is 
n 
'EQUIP = Ni(XGnQ) 
i=l 
for a  given  equipment  environment,  where 
'EQUIP = total  equipment  failure  rate  (failures X 10'6/h) 
X G  = generic  failure  rate  for  the  ith  .generic  part 
(failures x 10-6/h) 
nQ = quality  factor  for  the  ith  generic  part 
Ni = quantity  of  the  ith  generic part 
n = number  of  generic-part  categories 
It  has  been  assumed  that  the  generic  failure  rates  are  based  on  an 
uninhabited  airborne  fighter (AVF) environment  unless  otherwise  noted. 
Quality  factors  are  based on: 
(1)  Microelectronics  (integrated  circuits  and op amps)  procured 
to  quality  level B-1 as  defined  in  Table 2.1.5-1 of  MIL-HDBK- 
217C. 
( 2 )  Discrete  semiconductors  procured  to JAN quality. 
( 3 )  Capacitors,  resistors,  coils, and  transformers  of  established 
reliability  types (ER) procured  to  MIL  specification  quality. 
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Nonelectronic  Equipment. - Failure rates for  nonelectronic 
equipment are generally  based on the  information  contained  in  NPRD-1, 
Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data (Reference 91,  unless  otherwise 
noted. NPRD-1 is  the  result of an extensive  data  collection  program to 
summarize  failure-rate  data  by  component  type  and  environment.  The 
data  are  presented  in  terms  of  failure  rate  per  million  part-hours or 
part-cycles,  with  upper  and  lower  statistical  confidence  limits.  Back- 
ground  information  such as number  of  records,  part-hours, or part-cycles 
is  also  tabulated. 
Computation of  Subsystem  Failure  Rates 
The probability  equations  for  calculating  system  unreliability 
are based  on  a  hierarchy  of  subsystem  dependencies  which  have  been 
previously  described. The details  of  calculating the subsystem  failure 
rates  are  discussed as follows  using  the  same  order of dependencies. 
Hydraulic  System  Failure  Rate 
An  analysis of failures  pertaining  to  the  primary  hydraulic  systems 
on all F-8 aircraft  in  service  during  calendar  year  1978 was performed. 
The details  of  such  failures  are  set  forth in a special  maintenance  data 
report  (Reference 11) submitted by  the  Navy Maintenance  Support  Office 
(NAMSO), Mechanicsburg,  Pennsylvania. 
The data  indicate  that  there  were  293  failures  associated  with  the 
primary  hydraulic  systems,  and  they  occurred  as  shown  in  Table 6. One 
in-flight  abort  was due to  internal  failure  of  the  system  pressure  trans- 
mitter, and  the other  was  due  to  a  loose  hydraulic hose. No  further 
details  are  available  about  the  symptoms  surrounding  the  latter  failure, 
but  evidently  the  pilot  was  aware  of  the  malfunction  and  turned  the 
system  off  while  in  flight. 
The 11  preflight  aborts  as  well  as  the  280  other  faults  should  not 
be  counted  against  the  in-flight  failure rate of the  hydraulic  system 
since, by definition,  system  reliability is the  probability  that  a  system 
will  not  fail  given  that  it  was  in  a  nonfailed  state  at  the  start. 
Therefore, we get  (refer to section  on  operational  failure  data) 
Total  flight  hours  for  all  F-8  aircraft in 1978 = 7,962 
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Table 6. Primary  hydraulic  system  unscheduled 
maintenance  actions  for  all F-8 
aircraft,  1978. 
T W h e n  Discovered No. 
Before  flight  (abort) 
In-flight  (abort) 
11 
2 
280 
293 
-
Percent 
0.68 
I -  95.56 99.99 
Because  there  are  two  primary  hydraulic  systems per aircraft 
Total part-hours = 7,962 x 2 = 15,924 
= - 2 = 125.6 x 10-6/h 
15,924 
2 
Information  pertaining  to  the  utility  hydraulic  system  was  not 
included  in  the NAMSO report.  However,  a  conservative  assumption  is  to 
use  the  same  failure  rates as those  calculated  above.  Therefore,  the 
125.6 x 10-6/h  value  for hHyD has  been  entered  in  both Table 5 and 
the  computer  program.  Further  research  into  other  studies on similar 
aircraft  indicates  that  these  values  are  consistent  with  experience; 
Reference  12  cites  a  failure  rate  of  140 x 10-6/h  for  typical  fighter 
aircraft  hydraulic  systems. 
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Generator  Failure  Rate 
The research  aircraft  was  retrofitted  with  a  30-volt  300-ampere 
generator (MS 90332-1)  and a  voltage  regulator (MS 19071-2). The fail- 
ure  rates for each,  in  accordance  with  Reference 9, are 489.649  and 
107.924  per lo6 hours, respectively. * Since  both  pieces  of  equipment 
must  function  in  order  to  produce d  power,  is  the sum, or 
597.6 x 10-6/h. 
x GEN 
Battery  Failure  Rate 
Figure 14 is a  partial  schematic  of  the dc power  circuit.  It 
can be  shown  that  the  battery  function  depends  upon  the  parts  listed 
in  Table 7. The major  contribution  to  the  failure  rate  in  the  dc  power 
circuit  is  from  the  battery. 
According  to  the  manufacturer,  battery  failure is a  function  of 
the  breakdown of the  barrier  material  between  the cells, which is a 
wear-out  phenomenon. A battery  of this  type  would  have to have  three 
cells fail  simultaneously  in  order  to  fail  to  perform  the  required 
function.  If it were  properly  serviced  and  checked out prior to  each 
flight,  then,  according to the  manufacturer,  the  probability  of  battery 
failure  in-flight  would  be  extremely  remote.  A  company  reliability 
study  yielding  a  mean  time  between  failure (MTBF) of 6897 hours 
( A  = 145 X was cited. 
NPRD-1  (Reference 9) gives  a  failure  rate  for  nickel  cadmium 
batteries in an  airborne  environment  that  is  based  on  8.055 x 10
operating  hours.  The  NPRD-1  value is more  conservative  and  was  used 
in  the  system  calculations.  The  failure  rates  for  the  other  compo- 
nents  were  obtained  from  MIL-HDBK-217C. 
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* *  
* The  90-percent  confidence  limits  (failures  per  lo6  hours)  for  the 
generator  are  455.506  and  525.491.  For the voltage  regulator,  they 
are  98.761  and  117.648. See  Reference 10. 
**  
90-percent  confidence  limits  are 338.079  and  359.855  failures  per 
lo6 hours.  See  Reference 10. 
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Figure  1 4 .  P a r t i a l   s c h e m a t i c  of d c  power c i r c u i t .  
Tab le  7 .  C a l c u l a t i o n  of b a t t e r y  c i r c u i t  f a i l u r e  ra te  
('BAT) * 
P a r t  F a i l u r e  Rate 
( x  10-6/h) 
B a t t e r y  
2.0 C / B  1 ( 5 0  A) 
348. a52 
356.752 T o t a l  
1.1 Zener diode 
0.1 Fuse 
2.0 C/B 2 (35 A) 
2.7 Power i s o l a t i o n  diode (70H15A) 
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Inverters 
The F-8 is equipped with three  inverters, and a  parts-count  re- 
liability  prediction  using  the  criteria  of  Eq. (9) yields an estimated 
failure rate of  45.7 x 10-6/h. Salient  factors  that  affect  the  failure 
rate estimate are: 
(1) Components  are  of  standard  commercial  quality  screened by
incoming  inspection  per  MIL-STD-105D. 
(2) A  comprehensive  in-process  inspection  and  test  program is 
utilized. 
(3) The power  supply is encapsulated  and  hermetically  sealed 
to meet  the  environmental  requirements of MIL-STD-810C  and 
MIL-E-5400Pr  Class 2, including:  altitude  (to  a  vacuum), 
high  temperature  (+lOo°C),  low  temperature  (-54OC),  temper- 
ature  shock  (-54  to  +lOO°C),  temperature-altitude  (-54  to 
7loC, 0 to  70,000  ft),  sunshine,  rain,  humidity,  fungus, 
salt fog, dust, explosion,  immersion,  acceleration,  vibra- 
tion, and  shock. 
(4) The  power  supply is designed  to  assure  adequate  heat  transfer 
when  used  under  system  parameters. 
The manufacturer  advertises  a  typical  MTBF  for  this  series of 
dc-to-400-Hz  inverters  of  55,000  hours (A = 18.18 x 10-6/h) , and  sub- 
mitted  a  report  detailing  the  computations  to  arrive  at  this  figure. 
The calculations  were  based  on  MIL-HDBK-217  (original  edition  dated 
8 August 1962). A  recalculation by CSDL in  accordance  with  MIL-HDBK-217C 
(9  April  19791,  assuming  part  stress  levels  set  forth in the  manufac- 
turer's  report  and  the  uninhabited  airborne  fighter  (AUF)  environment, 
gives  an  estimated  failure  rate of 29.025 x 10-6/h  (MTBF = 34,453  hours) .
It is  felt  that  the  difference  between  the  failure-rate  calcula- 
tions  for  this  report  and  the  vendor's  catalog  numbers  are due to  sub- 
stantial  revisions  in  the  methods  of  MIL-HDBK-217  and  refinements  in 
the  mathematical  models  of  the MIL handbook. In order  to  be  consistent 
with  other  failure  rates,  the  value  obtained by parts-count  prediction, 
which  is  a  more  conservative  number, was selected  for  the  system  cal- 
culations.  For  similar  reasons,  the  parts-count  method  was  used  to 
derive  the  predicted  failure  rates  for  the  IFU  power  supplies  (refer  to 
Table 13) . 
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Bypass and Servo  Electronics (BASE) Failure  Rates 
The BASE  units  may be partitioned  for  reliability  study  purposes 
into  logical  elements  consistent  with the data  flow  between the computer 
bypass  system  (CBS),  the  digital  computer  system  (DCS),  and the secondary 
hydraulic  servo  actuators.  Failure  rates  were  computed  by the parts- 
count  method  based on representative  circuit  diagrams,  and the results 
were  allocated  to  the  subsystems as defined by the  computer program. 
BASE  functions are partitioned as follows: 
(1) Interface  with the digital  control  system. 
(2) Common BASE electronics. 
(3) Computer  bypass  systems  for  the  pitch,  roll, and yaw axes. 
( 4 )  PDS/CBS  switches  for  each  pitch,  roll, and yaw control 
surface. 
(5) Actuation of control  surfaces  including  the  nonelectronic 
portion  of the hydraulic  secondary  servo  actuators. 
Failure - - "~ rate of  the  BASE  diqital  interface. - The predicted 
value is 50.0172 x 10-6/h  based  upon  the  parts-count  method  of 
MIL-HDBK-217C  using  schematic  diagrams  provided  by  DFRC. The result 
has  been  allocated  to  the  primary  digital  system  (PDS)  failure-rate 
calculation  (refer  to  Table 12). 
Failure- ratt.pf the  BASE  power-supply  card. - Each channel of 
BASE  has  a  power-supply  section  with  a  28-Vdc  input  that  provides  215 
and 5 Vdc  output to other  functions.  For  this  study,  the  power  supply 
is  labeled  common  BASE  electronics (CBE). The predicted failure  rate 
based  on  the  parts-count  method  of  MIL-HDBK-217C is 34.3322 x 10-6/h. 
Failure .~ rates of  BASE  pitch,  roll, and yaw bypass  systems. - 
The bypass  receives  inputs  from the  pilot's  control stick,  rudder  pedals, 
manual  trim commands, and  wing-position  analog  and  discrete  signals. 
These  signals  are  combined  and  processed  for  each axis. The processing 
network  for  each  axis is labeled:  pitch  bypass  system,  roll  bypass 
system,  and yaw bypass  system. 
A  predicted  value of 87.7106 x 10-6/h was  derived  based on the 
parts-count  method  of  MIL-HDBK-217C  using  the  manufacturer's  drawings 
for  the pitch  function. The failure  rates of the  roll  and yaw functions 
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are  assumed  to  be  the  same  based on similarity. Contributions  to  sys- 
tem  unreliability  from  nonflight-critical  functions  such as trim  or 
wing-position  discrete  signal  processing are not included. 
Failure  rates  of  BASE  PDS/CBS switches. - There are five solid- 
state  PDS/CBS  switches  within  the  flight-control  system to manage  com- 
mand  paths  for  right  pitch,  left  pitch,  right  roll,  left ro l, and  yaw. 
The predicted  failure  rate  for  each  switch  based  on  the  parts-count 
method  of  MIL-HDBK-217C is 12.2 x 10-6/h. 
Failure  rates  of  BASE  actuation  functions. - There are five 
actuation  systems  within  the  BASE  to  command  channel  equalization  and 
synchronization  and  middle-value  logic  (MVL)  operation for the  closed- 
loop  servo drive. The failure rate of  the  mechanical  components  asso- 
ciated  with  the  hydraulic  secondary  servo  actuators is added to the 
failure  rate  of  the  electronic  subsystems  to  derive  a  failure  rate  of 
each  actuation  function.  These  functions  are  identified  as:  right 
pitch  actuation  (RPA),  left  pitch  actuation  (LPA),  right  roll  actuation 
(RRA),  left  roll  actuation  (LRA),  and yaw actuation (YA). The predicted 
failure rate for each  function is 158.9994 X 10-6/h  per  MIL-HDBK-217C. 
The  failure  rate for the hydraulic  secondary  actuator  is  based 
on DFRC data, which  states 
Part-hours = 3  channels/actuator X 5 actuators/systern x 2000  h 
= 30 X lo3  h 
One hard  failure on a  servo  valve  was  recorded  during  ground test.
Therefore 
x =  1 = 33.3333 x lo-6/h 
30 x lo3 
and  90-percent  confidence  limits  are 
UCL = 158.2 x 10-6/h 
LCL = 1.7 x 10-6/h 
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The data is based on the period up to October 1978, which  covers  most 
of the  operating  experience on the  system to date. Combining the two 
estimates, we get  a  predicted  failure  rate  of  192.3327 x 10'6/h for the 
actuation  function. 
The failure rate derived for the  hydraulic  secondary  servo  actuator 
was compared to values  reported  by  other  sources  such  as: 
(1) RADC  Reliability  Notebook (FtADC-TR-69-458, Section 2) , (10) 
which gives failure  rates  in an airborne  environment of: 
Actuator , linear,  hydraulic  servo = 130.423 x 
Actuator,  linear,  hydraulic = 136 -837 x lom6 
(2) NASA Report  CR-2609,  Preliminary ... Study  for  (F8  DFBW) by 
Secord  and  Vaughn  (Reference  13),  which  cites  a  failure rate 
of 20.6 x 
The values  reported by these  sources  are  within  the  computed  confidence 
limits  based on DFRC data. The F-8  hydraulic  secondary  servo  actuator 
is a  high-reliability  component  specifically  designed  for  this  flight- 
critical  application, and it is capable  of  functioning  with  at  least 
one of three  channels  operating.  Therefore,  the  empirical  failure  rate 
was  selected  because  it  is  consistent  with  the  ground-rule  preference 
for  detailed  operational  records  over  standard  references,  and  because 
the  results do not  disagree  with  failure  rates  obtained  from  other  sources. 
Comparison of calculated  versus  observed  failure  rates  for  BASE. - 
DFRC  experience  pertaining  to BASE faults  is  presented  in  Table 8. Cal- 
culations of failure  rates  based on the  DFRC  data  are set forth  in 
Tables 9 and  10. 
~ 
A  summary  of  the  calculated  versus  observed  failure  rates  is  given 
in  Table 11. It can be  seen  that  the  observed  values  are  considerably 
larger  than  the  predicted  values.  Several  factors  may  explain  this: 
(1) The actual  F-8  hardware is an engineering  prototype.  There- 
fore, many  failures can be  expected due to design and  manu- 
facturing  difficulties and  so-called "infant  mortality" or 
"burn-in"  factors.  With  normal  learning-curve  experience, 
such  failures can be predicted  to  diminish and, in fact, 
approximately 50 percent  occurred  before the first flight. 
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(2 )  None  of the faults listed  in  Table  8  caused  a  total  channel 
failure. It is  possible  that  another  reason  €or the differ- 
ence  between  the  observed  and  predicted  values  may  lie  with 
the definition of what  constitutes  a  failure.  A  compre- 
hensive  failure-reporting  and  analysis  system  was  not  in 
place  during  the  development  of  the  BASE  electronics  prior 
to  flight  qualification. 
* 
Table 8.  DFRC experience--BASE faults. 
Before  first  f  ligh. 
Since  first  flight 
Totals 
Breakdown: 
Channel  A 
Channel  B 
Channel  C 
T 
~ " "
Number of Faults 
:ompute. 
Bypass 
Zircuit 
Voter 
Electronics 
0 
5 
5 
1 
2 
2 
Servo 
Electronics 
5 
2 
7 
Operating  Hours 
as of 11 July 1978 
* 
None of the above  faults  caused  total  channel  failure. 
Table 9. Calculation  of  bypass-circuit  failure  rate 
based  on DFRC data. 
Part 
Operating Hours Box Hours 
Hours x 3)  
(Operating 
Failures 
A 
3 5 , 526 1 , a42 C 
3 5 , 643 1 , a 8 1  B 
0 5 , 370 1 , 790 
Totals 
Failure Rate = 6/16,539 = 362.8 X 10-6/h 
6 16,539  5,513 
LCL = 158.1 x lo-6/h 
UCL = 716.5 x 10-6/h 
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Table 
Box 
A 
B 
C 
Totals 
10. Calculation of voter  and  servo  electronics 
failure  rate  based on DFRC data. 
Operating 
Hours 
1,790 
1,881 
1,842 
5,513 
~~ 
Part 
Hours 
(Operating 
Hours x 5) 
8,950 
9,405 
9,210 
27,565 
Failure Rate = 12/27,565 = 435.3 X 10-6/h 
LCL = 250 x 10-6/h 
UCL = 751 x 10-6/h 
Failures 
1 
6 
5 
12 
Table 11. Comparison of calculated  versus  observed BASE failure  rates. 
Summary  of  Values 
~" 
Calculated: 
Digital  interface 
Common BASE electronics 
Pitch, roll, and yaw bypass  systems 
(3 x 87.7 x 10-6/h) 
Primary/bypass  switches  (5 x 12.2 x 10-6/h) 
MVS/servo  actuators (5 x 159 x 10-6/h) 
Total 
Observed : 
Bypass  circuits  (3 x 362.8 x 10-6/h) 
Voter  and  servo  electronics  (5 X 435.3 X 10-6/h) 
Total 
~ ~ .. . . ~. 
Failure  Rate 
( x  10-6/h) 
50.0 
39.3 
263.1 
61.0 
795.0 
1,208.4 
(MTBF = 828  .h) 
1,088.4 
2,176.5 
3,264.9 
(MTBF = 306 h) 
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Failure  Rate  of  the  Primary  Diqital  System 
The primary digital  system (PDS)  is  comprised of three  separate 
but  identical  channels as shown by the  functional  reliability  diagram 
of  Figure 15. Each  channel  contains  a  digital  control  computer,  which 
is  a  general-purpose  stored-program  machine  containing the control-law 
and  system-redundancy  management  software. 
r 
BASE 
INTERFACE 
CPU - SENSORS - DIGITAL - 
Figure 15. Functional  reliability  diagram of one 
channel of primary  digital  system. 
The computer  communicates  with  a  specially  designed  dedicated 
interface  unit  (IFU)  that  processes  and  conditions  its  input  and  output 
signals.  Each  IFU  channel  contains  three  power  supplies,  which  convert 
28-Vdc  prime  aircraft  power to voltages  required  by  the  IFU. 
A s  previously noted, the  digital  interface  circuits  within  each 
BASE channel  are  functionally  included  within  the PDS, and their  failure 
rate  contributes  to the estimated  value  of ApDS. The  remaining  contribu- 
tions  to  the  PDS  failure  rate  are  from  the  pilot's  stick  and  pedal  sen- 
sors  and  the  circuit  breakers  in  the  central  processing  unit  (CPU)  and 
IFU  bus.  The  above  listed  contributions  to  PDS  failure  rate  are  set 
forth  in  Table  12. 
Table 12. Failure  rate of primary  digital  system (PDS). 
Part 
IFU  power  supplies: 
f15 V I  1.0 A 
5 V, 10 A 
5 VI 2.5 A 
IFU logic 
CPU 
Base  digital  interface  circuits 
Sensors 
Circuit  breakers  to  CPU  and  IFU (2 at 2.0) 
Total 
Failure Rate 
( x 1  0-6  /h) 
55.2 
37.4 
35 .3  
650.3 
689.7  
50 .0  
nil 
4.0 
1,521.9 
____ 
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Failure rate of I F U  power  supplies. - Each  IFU  channel contains 
three  power  supplies to convert  the 28-Vdc aircraft  power to voltages 
required  by  various  elements  within  the  IFU.  Using  the  parts-count 
method of MIL-HDBK-217C,  we  get  the  values  listed in Table 13. See 
the  inverters  section  for  a  discussion of the  factors  pertaining to 
calculation of these  failure rates. 
Table 13. Failure  rates Of  IFU  power  supplies. 
e 
Power Supply  Failure  Rate 
(x10-6/h) 
f15 V, 1.0 A 
37.358 5 V, 10  A 
55.156 
35.256 5 V, 2.5 A _ _ ~ _ _  .. - ~ 
Failure  rate  of  IFU logic. - The IFU  logic  considered  in  the 
failure  analysis  is  that  required to implement  only  the  direct  mode  of 
operation  of  the  Digital  Control  System as shown  in  functional  form  in 
Figure 16. The failure  rate,  calculated  in  accordance  with  the  parts- 
count  method  of  MIL-HDBK-217B, is 650.3 x 10-6/h. 
Failure  rate of  CPU. - Eight  flight  computers  have  been  used in 
conjunction  with  the F-8 DFBW program. These  are the first  units  of 
that  model  in  production. The goal in establishing  a  failure  rate to 
be  used  for this  reliability  study was to obtain  a "best estimate" of 
a  projected  value  once  the  development  problems  have  been  resolved. 
The computer is used  in  other  applications as well. Accordingly, 
the manufacturer and users  were  contacted  for  assistance in establishing 
a  reasonable  estimate  of  the  failure  rate for a  mature  production unit. 
There  have  been  numerous  corrective  action  changes made by the manufac-. 
turer  to  improve  the  reliability of the  production  units. Not all of 
these  actions were possible  with  the F-8 DFBW  computers. 
Based  upon  discussions  with  the  manufacturer  and  users,  a  conser- 
vative  MTBF  of  1450  hours (A = 689.7 X 10'6/h) was used  in  this  study. 
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Figure  1 6 .  Funct iona l   d iagram of t h e  d i r e c t  
mode o f  t h e  IFU l o g i c .  
F a i l u r e  ra te  of s e n s o r s .  - The s t i c k  and  peda l  s enso r s  w i th in  
each channel  are i n t e r c o n n e c t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  d i a g r a m  
of  Figure 17.  The success p a t h s  i n  t h i s  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  a r e :  
(1) P i t c h  and r o l l   ( s i d e  s t i c k )  . 
( 2 )  P i t c h   a n d   r o l l   ( c e n t e r   s t i c k ) .  
( 3 )  P i t c h   ( c e n t e r  s t i c k )  and yaw. 
( 4 )  P i t c h   ( s i d e   s t i c k )   a n d  yaw. 
Opera t iona l  expe r i ence  r epor t ed  by u s e r s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  f a i l -  
u r e  rate of  the sensor ,  which is a l so  used  on  the  F-111, i s  2 0 . 6  X 10-6/h 
with  upper  and  lower  90-percent  confidence limits of 3 . 7  x 10-6/h  and 
48 .9  x 10-6/h.  Using 
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Figure 17. Reliability  diagram of stick  and 
pedal  sensors  (each  channel). 
and  assuminq  t = 1 hour,  the  unreliability (0) of this  configuration 
is 424 x Therefore, the failure rate of the sensor array is 
significantly  less  than  the  failure  rates of other PDS elements, and  it 
is entered as "nil" in Table 12. 
Failure  rates of  miscellaneous  elements. - In  Figure 15, two 
circuit  breakers  are  shown  in  series  with the IFU and  CPU. These fail- 
ure  rates  have  been added to  Table 12. 
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SECTION 6 
RESULTS OF THE RANDOM-FAILURE  ANALYSIS 
The estimates  of  component  failure  rates  developed  in  Section 5 
can  now  be  inserted  into the  analysis  model  and  corresponding  program 
described  in  Sections 3 and 4. The first  half  of  this  section  gives 
the  resulting  unreliability  estimates  for  the  total  system  and  for  the 
primary  digital  control  mode.  These  results  are  given  as  a  function  of 
time  for  the  total  probability of failure  over  that  time  period,  the 
average  failure rate, and the  instantaneous  failure  rate. The sensi- 
tivity  of  the  system  unreliabilities  to  uncertainty  in  estimates  of 
input  reliabilities of the  individual  elements is also  given. 
The second  half of this  section  interprets  the  results  in  .terms 
of  how  the  final  number was generated  as a  summation  of  all  potential 
failure  combinations.  Of  particular  interest is the  identification of 
the  failure  combinations  that  make  the  largest  contribution  to  the 
total  system  unreliability. The potential  utility of this  technique 
to  analyze  system  modifications is illustrated. 
System  Unreliability  as  a  Function  of Time 
A typical  mission  for  the F-8 experimental  aircraft  is  approxi- 
mately 1 hour, and  the F-8 fuel  capacity  limits  flights  to  less  than 
2 hours. However,  missions  of  up  to 10 hours  were  considered  as  they 
could  permit  an  estimate  of  unreliability  for  a  similar  digital  flight- 
control  system  installed  in  a  longer  range  aircraft  (e.g.,  transport 
or  bomber)  or  the  same  system  performing  in  an F-8 flight with air-to- 
air  refueling. 
The primary  task  of  this  study  was  to  determine  the  probability 
of loss of  the F-8 aircraft  due  to  a  failure  of  the  flight-control 
system. The  results  are  presented  in  Table 14 and Figure 18,  and 
indicate  a  system  unreliability  of  approximately 6.4 X lo - '  for  a 
nominal  1-hour  flight. The results  are  plotted  in  a  semilog  format  as 
the  values  of Q (t)  increase  by  three decades  to 6.8 x for  a 10- 
hour  flight. The average  failure  rate  for  the  system is set  forth  in 
Table 15. 
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Table 14. System  unreliability  as a  function 
of duration  of flight. 
t 
(h) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
5.0 
10.0 
Qsystem 
1.6055 x 
6.4463 x 
1.4550 x 
2.5948 X 
5.8752 x 
1.6525 x 1 6.8161 X 1 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
DURATION OF FLIGHT (h) 
Figure 18. System  unreliability  versus 
duration  of flight. 
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Table 15. Average  failure rate of digital  flight- 
control  system as a  function of duration - 
of flight (Qsystem /t) - 
t 
(h 1 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
5.0 
10.0 
Average  System 
Failure  Rate 
(~10-~/h) 
32.1 
64.4 
97.0 
129.7 
195.8 
330.5 
681.6 
The second  task  was to determine  the  probability of failure of the 
primary  digital  flight-control  mode.  These  results are displayed  in 
Table 16  and Figure 19, which  show an unreliability of 7.8 x at 
1  hour to 7.6 x at 10 hours. Again,  because the values of 0 (t) 
increase  by  three  decades,  the  data is plotted  in a  semilog format. 
The average  failure  rate is tabulated  in  Table 17. 
Table 16.  Unreliability of digital  flight-control  mode 
as  a  function  of  duration  of  flight. 
t 
(h) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
5.0 
10.0 
*digital  mode 
1.058 x 
7.825 x 
1.758 x 
3.122 x 
7.009 X 
1.938 x 
7.661 X 
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Figure 19. Unreliability  of  digital  mode 
versus  duration of flight. 
Table 17. Average  failure  rate of digital  flight- 
control  mode  (Qdigital  mode  /t) . 
Average  Failure  Rate 
Digital  Mode 
(x10-6/h) 
~ ~~ 
3.92 
7.83 
11.7 
15.6 
2 3 . 4  
38.8 
76.6 
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System  Hazard  Rate  Function 
For  the  exponential  distribution,  the  conditional  probability 
that a device  will  fail  within  a  range of time  values  depends  only  upon 
range and not  upon position. This is a  peculiar  and  significant  prop- 
erty  of  the  exponential  distribution,  and  applies to no other  distri- 
bution. For  this  reason,  the  exponential  distribution  is  a  constant 
hazard  distribution  in  which X is  a  random  variate  representing the 
times  to  failure  of  the  device. 
A  system  comprised of redundant,  cross-linked, and  voting  elements 
does  not  exhibit  a  constant  failure  rate or hazard  function. Its failure 
rate  at  any  given  time  increases as various  members  within  it  fail or
are  voted out of the  system. 
If  we  represent  the  failure  rate by  Z(t) , then it  can be  calcu- * 
lated  by 
Z(t) = - " 1 dQ(t) R(t)  dt 
From the definition  of  the  derivative 
dQ(t) = lim Q(t + At) - Q(t) 
At+O At 
R(t),  the  probability  that  the  system  has  survived  up  to  time  t,  is 
approximately  equal  to 1 and,  therefore,  has  a  negligible  effect  upon 
the  calculations. 
Thus Z (t)  may  be  empirically  estimated  from  the  values  of  Q  (t) . 
For  the  flight-control  system,  the  values  are set forth in Table 18, 
and  indicate  a  tenfold  increase  in  the  hazard  rate  from 0.130 x 
at  t = 1 hour  to 1.40 X at  t = 10 hours. An  increment  of  At = 
0.01 hbur was found  s,uitable  for  appropriate  accuracy.  Similarly, 
Table 19 lists  the  hazard  rates  for  the  primary  digital  mode  and  indi- 
cates an  increase  from 15.7 x 10-6/h  at  t = 1 hour to  151 x 10-6/h at 
t = 10 hours.  An  increment  of  At = 0.01 hour  was  also  used. 
* 
Reference 8, p. 271. 
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Table 18. Instantaneous  failure  rates  of 
flight-control  system. 
t 
(h) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
5.0 
10.0 
0.065 
0.130 
0.196 
0.262 
0.396 
0.670 
1.400 
Table 19. Instantaneous  failure  rates  of 
primary  digital  system. 
t 
(h) 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
5.0 
10.0 
(t) 
(x10-6/h) 
7.91 
15.71 
23.50 
31.30 
46.60 
77.00 
151.00 
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Sensitivity of System  Unreliability to Failure-Rate  Estimates 
Failure  rates  used in the  probability  calculations  were  best 
estimates  based on operational  experience or standard  references  in 
accordance  with  the  criteria  set  forth  in  Section 5. 
An analysis  of  the  sensitivity of the  final  answer,  Qsystem, to 
uncertainties  in  failure-rate  estimates  indicates  that  only  three  ele- 
ments  have  a  significant  effect:  hydraulics,  inverters,  and  common 
BASE  electronics  (CBE). The results  are  presented in Table 2 0 ,  where 
the  failure  rates  for  each  subsystem  were  individually  doubled  and 
halved  to  determine  the  effect  upon  the  calculation of Qsystem. 
The sensitivity of the  unreliability  of  the  primary  digital  mode  is 
shown in Table 21.  It can be  seen  from  this  table  that  the  failure 
rate is almost  completely  dominated by  the  primary digital  system 
itself, as would  be  expected. The other  elements  have  very  little 
influence. 
Table 20.  Sensitivity  of  flight-control  system  unreliability 
to  uncertainty  of ailure-rate  estimates  (Qsystem - 
6.446 x at  t = 1 h; all  failure  rates nommal). 
r-" Subsystem 
Hydraulics 
Generator 
Batteries 
Inverters 
CBE 
Primary  digital  system 
Bypass  systems 
(pitch,  roll , yaw) 
PDS/CBS switches 
Actuation  systems 
T Qsystem With  Each X sub 
Failure  Rate X2 
( x 1 0 - 8 )  
1 2 . 8 7  
6.46 
6.46 
9 - 9 0  
9.42 
6 .46  
6 .46  
6 . 4 5  
6 .47  
'stem Adjusted as Shown 
Failure Rate x 3  1 
( x 1 0 - 8 )  
3 .23  
6 .44  
6 .44  
4.72 
4.96 
6 .44  
6 . 4 4  
6 .45  
6 . 4 4  
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Subsystem 
..., .~ 
Hydraulics 
Generator 
Batteries 
Inverters 
CBE 
Primary  digital  system 
Bypass  systems 
(pitch,  roll,  yaw) 
PDS/CBS switches 
Actuation systeins 
~ " 
Qsystem With  Each 'subsystem  Adjusted as Shown 
Failure  Rate x2 
(x10-6)  
Failure  Rate "3 1 
(x10-6)  
7 . 9 8  
7 . 8 3  
7 . 8 3  
8 . 3 0  
8 . 2 4  
2 9 . 3 2  
7 . 8 2  
7 . 8 2  
7 .82  
7 . 7 7  
7 .82  
7 . 8 2  
7 .59  
7 . 6 2  
2 . 2 4  
7 . 8 2  
7 . 8 2  
7 . 8 2  
ir_se- .-of  AnaJLs-is Technique  to  Increase  Understanding 
ofsystem Failure  Characteristics 
The analysis  technique  and  the  associated  computer  program  can  be 
used  as a powerful  tool  to  increase  the  understanding  of  the  system's 
failure  characteristics. To facilitate  easy  interpretation,  the  inter- 
mediate  results  that lead  to  the  final  number  are  printed  in a  format 
that  corresponds  to  the  diagram of the  failure  equations.  A  typical 
output is shown  in  Figure 2 0 .  This listing  corresponds  to  the  summary 
of the  equation  diagram  in  Figure 2 1 ,  including  the  row  and column. 
designations.  This  diagram  is  a  condensed  version f the  diagram  given 
in  Figure 10. 
The top  number  in  each row is the  unreliability of the  system 
for  that  particular  state  up  to  that  level. The numbers  below  each 
top  number  in  the  first  six rows are  the  individual  terms  that  are 
summed  to  get  the  top  number.  Each is the  product  of  the  probability 
of the  particular  event  defining  the  state of the  elements at that  level 
and the conditional  unreliabilities of the system  for  that  particular 
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state  of  the  system.  Figure 22 shows  the  first six levels  with  lines 
drawn  in  from  the  reliability  diagram to show how the  numbers  are  inter- 
related.  Careful  study of this  diagram can reveal  much  about  the  nature 
of the failure  process  and  the  contributions  made by each  part. 
Identification of the Largest  Contributors  to Unre,liability 
The failure  modes  that  make the  largest  contribution  to  the  sys- 
tem  unreliability  can  be  easily  traced  from  the  computer  output  as 
shown by the  highlights  in  Figure 2 3 .  At the  first  level,  hydraulics, 
the  middle  term is more  than  two  orders  of  magnitude  larger  than  the 
other  two  terms. This means  that the  greatest  system  unreliability 
will  be  when one hydraulic  system  is  failed.  System  unreliability 
for  this  state is given  in  column 16. The fact  that the unreliability 
did not  change  much  between  the  generator  level and the  inverter  level 
means  that  neither  generator  failures  nor  battery  failures  make a sig- 
nificant  contribution  to  the  system  unreliability.  This  result  is  to 
be expected,  since  the  batteries in  parallel  with  the  generator form, 
in effect, an  additional  level  of  redundancy  above  triplex,  and  thus 
will  have  a  much  lower  contribution  than  the  elements  that  are  only 
triplex. 
The terms  in  the  inverter  equation  starting  in  column  16  show 
significant  contributions  from  both  the  first  and  third  terms. The fol- 
lowing  equation  for  common  BASE  electronics is dominated  by  the  third 
term. Thus, the  whole  system  unreliability  is  dominated by the  two 
terms in  column 18 in  the  inverter  and  common  BASE  electronic  equations. 
The  major  contributors (99 percent)  to  the  unreliability  due  to 
random  failures  are  thus  two  failure  combinations.  These  are  the  fail- 
ure of one  hydraulic  system  and  the  failure  of  either  an  inverter or a 
common  BASE  electronics  element  in  one  of  the  other  two  channels.  A 
major  reason  why  these  modes  are  most  critical  is  that  virtually  all 
of a  channel  is  dependent on these power  sources so that  a  failure of 
one  is  equivalent  to  multiple  failures  of  actuation  and  sensor  elements 
The  criticality of the  electrical  power  supplies  was  recognized, 
and  thus  the  system  was  designed  to  automatically  switch  to  the  one 
renaining  good  channel  after  the  second  failure.  Also,  the  standard 
procedure  is  to  disengage  actuator  channels  after  hydraulic  failures. 
When  the  second  hydraulic  system  fails  and  is  disengaged,  and  the  good 
system  is  engaged  manually,  there  is no total  failure of  the  system. 
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HYDRAULICS 
GENERATOR 
BA'ITERIES 
INVERTERS 
COMMON 
BASE  ELEC 
PRIMARY 
DIGITAL SYS 
PITCH BYPASS 
R T  PITCH SW 
R T  PITCH  ACT 
LEFT  PITCH SW 
LEFT  PITCH  ACT 
ROLL BYPASS 
RT  ROLL SW 
RT  ROLL  ACT 
LEFT  ROLL SW 
LEFT  ROLL  ACT 
YAW BYPASS 
YAW SW 
YAW  ACT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
. -  
"1 . 2 3 4 6 6 7 
6.45E-08 
2.12E-10 6.421-08 6.11E-12 
2.lZE-IO 
2.llE-10 7.4lE-13 
1.24E-09 
t.llE-10 9.11E-10 7.ME-11 4.54E-11 
0.00Et00 
2.11E-10 
9.82E-11 1.12E-10 9.25E-13 9.54E-14 
9.82E-11 
2.56E-13 9.74E-11 5.02E-13 6.07E-14 
2.56E-13 
1.23E-14 5.64E-17 2.44E-13 1.24E-16 
3.52E-08 
1.78E-14 1.95E-13 3.52E-08 1.27E-12 
1.24E-14  1.76E-14  6.01E-10 
1.23E-14  1.78E-14  2.72E-12 
l.llE-07  l.llE-07  2.45E-05 
1.llE-07  l.llE-07  l.llE-07 
5.43E-15 
1.38E-21  1.92E-21 
1.36E-21 1.91~-2i 
1.24E-14  1.72E-14 
1.23E-14  1.71E-14 
1.54E-07 
1.llE-07  1.11E-07 
l.llE-07 1  .llE-07 
1  2  3 4 5 6 7 
9.28E-17 
4.ZOE-19 
3.79E-12 
1.71E-14 
8.5lE-07 
8.36E-07 1.35E-08 2.09E-09 
8.36E-07 
8.26E-07 8.52E-09 1.54E-09 
6.26E-07 
1.67E-07 6.59E-07 S.OZE-,lO 
2.17E-04 
3.03E-07 
1.67E-07  3.03E-07 
1.57E-07  2.93E-07 
4.09E-04 
3.85E-04 
1.M-07 
1.05E-10 
9.83E-11 
6.84E-11 
6.43E-11 
1.67E-07 
1.57E-07 
4.09E-04 2.45E-05 
1.llE-07 
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." 
10 
3.85E-04 
11  12  13 
I 
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1.71E-04 
1'.70E-04 5.28E-07 
1.94E-04 
1.93E-04 3.29E-07 
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8.83E-04  5.50E-04 
1.70E-04  9.11E-10  3.82E-07  4.54E-11  1.93E-04 3.57E-04 
3 BATTERIES 
. %. . 
1.70E-04  1.93E-06 4 INVERTERS 
7.87E-05  3.73E-11  9.14E-05  2.09E-09 1.48E-04  4.57E-05 
7.87E-05  8.17E-07 1.48E-04 
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:7E-04 
13E-07 2.17E-04  1.17E-08 
1.48E-07  8.07E-07 
1.47E-07  6. 38-10  1.27E-12  6.44E-16  1.47E-07  2.24E-10  6.59E-07  5.02E-10 
1.83E-07  1.OIE-04 
1.48E-07  5.43E-11  3.52E-08 1.27E-12 
6 PRIMARY 
DIGITAL SYS 
7 PITCH BYPASS 
33E-07 1.48E-07  1.40E-07 1.67E-07 7.57E-08 8 RT PITCH SW 
P3E-07 1.48E-07  1.48E-07  1.57E-07 7.32E-08 9 RT  PITCH ACT 
4.09E-04  3.85E-04  3.85E-04  4.09E-04 2.OSE-04 10 LEFT  PITCH SI 
3.85E-04  3.85E-04  3.85E-04 3.85E-04 1.92E-04 11 LEFT  PITCH P 
36E-07  7.OQE-11  3.39E-08 .-I2 ROLL BYPAS: 
05E-10 5.69E-11  5.69E-11  6.43E-11  1.3lE-11 13 RT  ROLL SW 
83E-11  5.69E-11  5.69E-11  6.05E-11  1.23E-11 14 RT  ROLL  ACl  
2.56E-07 
2.40E-07 
6.25E-04 
1 .WE-07  1.48E-07 
1.48E-07  1.48E-07 
3.85E-04 
1.57E-07 
I 1.48E-07 
6.40E-08 15 LEFT  ROLLS 
6.01E-08 16 LEFT  ROLL C 
3.1%-04 17 YAW BYPASS 
4.09E-04 3.851-04  5.85E-04  4.09E-04 Z.04E-04 18 YAWSW 
3.85E-04 3.85E-04  3.85E-04 . 3.85E-04  l.92E-04 19 YAW  ACT 
13  14  15  16  17  18  19 20 21 22 23 24 a 26- 27 
Figure 20. Computer analysis  results 
for F-8 unreliability.  
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Figure 21. Reduced  diagram of F-8 DFE 
unreliability equations. 
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Figure 2 2 .  Results from top l eve l s  of program. 
4 5 10  11  12  16  17  18  19 20 21  2  23 25 26  27 
1 H Y D R A U L I C S  
1  2  3 
H Y D R A U L I C S  1 ’ ~ : ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~  6 . 4 2 E - 0 8  1 6 . 1 1 ~ - 1 2  
GENERATOR 2 Z’l’E-10 
d I 
2 . l l E - 1 0   7 . 4 1 E - 1 3  
0.OOEtOO 1.71E-04  1.94E-04 
1:70E-04  5.28E-07  1.93E-04  3.29E-07 2 GENERATOR 
BATTERIES 3 8.83E-04 3.57E-04 
1 1 I 1 
INVERTERS ~ : ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~  1.12E-10  9.25E-13  9.54E-14 
I 
1.48E-04  .57E-05 
4 INVERTERS 
03 
& 
1 
9.82E-11  
‘‘“ON 5 2.56E-13  9.74E-11  5.02E-13  6.07E-14 
BASE ELEC 
1 1 1 
PRIMARY  2.56E-13  8.26E-07 
~ l c l ~ ~ ~ s y s ~  1.23E-14  5.64E-17  2.44E-13  1.24E-16 
1.48E-07 
1.67E-07  6.59E-07  5.12E-10  .47E-07  6.73E-10  .27E-11  6.44E-16  .47E-07  2.24E-10  6.59E-07  5.0ZE-10 
1 2 3 4 5 10  11  12 16 17  18  19 20  21 22 23 25 26 27 
COMMON 
BASE  ELEC 
6 P R I M A R Y  
DIGITAL  SYS 
Figure 2 3 .  C r i t i c a l   f a i l u r e   p a t h .  
The dominant  failure  modes  result  from a hybrid  situation  which 
is not autornatically accounted for in  the system. A discrete  signal 
indicating  hydraulic  system  failure  is  not  wired  into the system. Thus, 
when one hydraulic  system and one electrical  power  supply  fail,  the 
midvalue-select  and  comparison  monitors for Ap will  still be operating 
in two channels and can vote out the good channel or shut the  entire 
axis off. 
The analysis  here is conservative. The actual  unreliability  will 
be  less for two reasons. First, if there is a  failure in any  complete 
axis, and it is not at  a  critical time, the  pilot  could  manually 
switch  to  the  remaining  good  channel.  Second,  the  Ap  comparison 
thresholds  are  set  wide  such  that  the  system is lik.ely  to continue  to 
operate  normally  on  the  one  good  channel  without  the Ap  becoming  large 
enough  to  cause  a  comparison  failure  for  cruise  flight.  This  situation 
was  demonstrated  with  an  informal  experiment  using  the  F-8  "iron  bird". 
On  the  other  hand,  the Ap  threshold  could  contribute  to a situation  in 
which  the  system  continues  to  operate  normally,  and  the  pllot  will  not 
be  forced  to  switch  to  manual  mode  on  the  one  good  channel. Th  sys -  
tem  could  then  disengage  if  large  surface  motion  is  commanded  at  a 
time  when  a  manual  recovery  would  be  impossible. 
Possibig System Mgd-ifications  and  Analysis  of  a  Modified  System 
The system  could be  modified  relatively  easily  to  significantly 
reduce  these  two  largest  failure  modes. This system  would  be  modified 
by including  a  discrete  signal  in  each  channel  indicating  the  health 
of the  corresponding  hydraulic  system. This discrete  would  be  included 
in  the  logic  the  same  way  as  it  is  for  electrical  power  monitoring  dis- 
cretes, and  would  thus  cause  the  system  to  automatically  revert  to  sin- 
gle  channel  with any  combination  of  two  electrical or hydraulic  power 
failures. 
The equation  diagram  for  the  first  four  levels wou d  be  modified 
as shown in Figure 2 4 .  The results  for  the  modified system  are  shown 
in  Figure 25. The predicted  unreliability due to  random  failures  in 
a  1-hour  flight is reduced  by  two  orders of magnitude  from  the  previously 
tabulated  values. The most  significant  contributors  to  the  total  unre- 
liability can again  be traced  by  inspection of Figure 25. The primary 
failure  modes and their  percent  contributions  are  given  as  follows: 
(1) Failure of one inverter  and  failure  in one of the two 
channels with  good  inverters of both a primary  digital 
system and a  pitch  bypass  system. 
Contribution: 40 percent. 
a5 
(2) Failure  of  a  common BASE electronics  and  failure  in one of 
the  two  channels  with good CBE of both  a  primary  digital 
system  and  a  pitch  bypass  system. 
Contribution: 35  percent. 
( 3 )  Failure of one hydraulic  system  and  failure  of one of two 
remaining  actuation  channels  for  both  left  and  right  elevators. 
Contribution: 2 3  percent. 
It  can  be  seen  that  the  failure  modes  are  now more balanced.  There is 
no one  element  or  combination  of  failures  that  dominates  the  unreliability. 
No further  simple  modification  of  the  system was found  that  would  signi- 
ficantly  improve  the  system. 
The  unreliability  of  such  a  modified  system as a  function of time 
was  computed. The results  are given  in Table 22 and Figure 26. The most 
significant  characteristic  is  the  rapid  growth  in  the  failure  rate.  The 
system  is  likely  to  be  able  to  meet  the  Federal  Aviation  Regulations  (FAR) 
that  a  catastrophe  due  to  system  failure is xtremely  improbable  (Part 
25.1309, where  "extremely  improbable"  is  interpreted  as  a  failure  rate 
of per hour) for a 1-hour flight. However, the failure rate at the 
end of  a  10-hour  flight  is  two  orders  of  magnitude  larger.  This  rise  in 
failure  rate  is  typical  of  a  fixed-configuration  triplex  system.  As 
time passes  and  components fail, the  probability  that  an  additional 
failure  will  cause  complete  system  failure is greatly  increased.  It 
can thus  be  seen  that  a  basic  change  in  the  system  design  would  be 
necessary  to  meet  the  requirements  for  commercial  operation.  One 
possible  change  would  be  to  add  additional  levels  of  redundancy, so that 
even  though  the  unreliability  increased  with  time,  the  system  would  be 
so much  more  reliable  that  it  would  still  meet  the  FAR  requirements at 
the  end  of  the  required  time  period.  Another  possibility,  which  might 
produce  a  more  efficient  total  design, is a  reconfigurable  system  that 
would  replace  failed  elements  from  a  pool  of  spare  elements.  The  rate 
of growth  of  the  unreliability  could  thus  be  essentially  eliminated. 
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Figure  25. R e s u l t s   f o r  F-8 DFBW un- 
r e l i a b i l i t y   w i t h   m o d i f i e d  
system. 
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Table 22. Failure  data  €or  the  modified 
F-8 DFBW  system. 
Probability 
of Failure 
( x 1 ~ - 9 )  
- ~ _  ~ .. . . 
0 . 4  
0 . 2 8  
0 . 9 6  
2 . 2 7  
7 . 6 8  
3 5 . 7 2  
2 8 8 . 8 8  
. . . . . . . . . 
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Failure  Rate 
( X I O - ~ / ~ )  
"~ _" - 
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,Instantaneous 
Failure  Rate 
( x 1 ~ - 9 / h )  
L 
0 . 2 5  
0 . 9 5  
2 . 0 3  
3 . 6 0  
8 . 0 0  
2 2 . 0 0  
8 8 . 2 0  
FLIGHTTIME lh) 
Figure 2 6 .  Instantaneous  failure  rate of the  modified 
F-8 DFBW  system  as  a  function  of time. 
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SECTION 7 
REFINEMENT AND EXTENSION OF THE  ANALYSIS 
The reliability  analysis  forming  the  major  part of this  study  has 
accounted  only  for  random  failures  of  component  parts.  Further,  each 
failure  has  been  assumed  to  be "hard", i.e., causing  a  complete  loss of
that  element  with no effect on any other element. Also, any failure  to 
detect,  identify, and  properly  respond  to  a  fault has not  been  considered. 
In other  words,  coverage is assumed to be  perfect. The analysis is also 
static.  No  distinction  has  been  made for the sequence in which  failures 
occurred. 
This  section  covers  refinements  and  extensions to the  analysis  that 
can improve  its  accuracy. First, possible  refinements of the  analysis 
of random-failure  hazards  are  discussed,  including  the  effects  of  failure 
modes,  coverage, and failure sequence. Next, the extensions  of  the 
analysis  to  include  other  hazards  in  addition  to  random  failures  are 
discussed.  Some of the  factors  considered  are:  interaction  between 
degraded  system  performance  and  pilot  performance,  damage  hazards,  and 
software  faults.  In  most cases, these  refinements  and  extensions  can 
be  incorporated  into  the  analytical  structure  described  in  Section 8. 
The  analysis in this  section is, by nature,  much  less  precise 
than  the  random-failure  analysis  described  in  the  previous  sections. 
The  intention  here is to identify  as  many  other  factors a possible  that 
may  influence  the  actual  failure  rate. The characteristics of these 
factors  are  discussed,  and  opinions  are  expressed on their  potential 
significance. The primary  purpose of these  discussions  is  to  keep  the 
random-failure  analysis  in  the  proper  perspective. 
Effects of Failure  Modes 
The  analysis  performed so far  has  assumed  that all failures  are 
hard  failures  that  would  affect  only one element.  In most cases, this 
assumption  is  conservative.  Often,  failures  in  some of an  element's 
components  will  not  cause  complete loss of the  critical  functions of 
that  element  because  the  failures  have  occurred  in  circuits  that  are 
not  critical  to  the  element's  primzry  function. In other cases, a 
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failure  may be charged  to a component  because  its  performance is  not 
within  specifications,  even  though the component is still  able to per- 
form  its  required  €unction. Also, the sensitivity of the  circuit to 
the complete  failure of some  components  may be low  enough  that he 
required  €unctions are still  available. 
Any  refinement to account for these  less-than-total  failure  modes 
will  tend to reduce  the  predicted  value of system  unreliability. That 
probability is already  very  low  compared  to  normal  mission  requirements 
and to  the  uncertainty due to other  potential  hazards. A refinement 
of the  analysis in this  direction was considered  unnecessary,  and the 
more  conservative  analysis was allowed  to  stand. 
It was considered  more  important  to  be  sure  that  there  were  no 
failure  modes  that  would  tend  to  increase  the  system  unreliability, 
such  as  a  failure  mode of a  component  in  one  element  that  would  prevent 
Lhe  use of another  element. The circuit  that  is  most  likely  to  have 
this  type  failure  mode is the BASE primary-system-to-bypass-system 
switch,  where a failure  in one  switch  could  cause  the  failure of an- 
other  switch. Thus, additional  analysis  was  carried  out on this  circuit. 
The critical  components  in  both  the  right  and  left  pitch  switches 
are  shown  in  Figure 27. The switch  operates by simultaneously  causing 
one  transistor on each  side  to  ground  its  input,  and  the  other  transistor 
to be open, allowing  its  corresponding  input to pass. The  critical 
question  is  whether  there  are  any  failures  modes of any of the  compo- 
nents  that  can  cause  a loss of both  right  and  left  channels.  Failure 
modes of the  transistors  are  assumed to be  "fail  open" o r  "fail short", 
DIGITAL  COMMAND 
c 
1" RIGHT  ELEVATOR 
1 
ii LEFT  ELEVATOR 
ANALOG  COMMAND 
Figure 27. Critical  components of two 
digital/bypass  switches. 
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and the only  failure  mode of the resistors  is  assumed to, be "fail  open". 
A failure  modes  and  effects  analysis (F'MEA) of this circuit  showed  that 
no single  failure  state  would  affect  both  channels. 
A limited  analysis of the  rest of the system  did  not  uncover 
any  other  failure  mode  that  would  increase the unreliability  of the 
system. This is  a  reflection of the  good  design of the system  and 
cannot  be  assumed  in  general. 
The situation  where  a  failure  mode  does  cause  loss of another 
element  can be included  within  the  analysis  structure  that  was  developed 
in  Section 3 .  Situations  such  as  this  can  be  accounted  for  by  expanding 
the  number of events  defined  for  the  state of that  element.  For  example, 
failed  open  and  failed  closed  switch  failures  could  be  distinguished 
with  the  appropriate  probabilities  assigned  to  each  condition. A dis- 
tinction  could  then  be  made  in  computing  the  conditional  unreliability 
of i;he rest of the  system  on  the  basis  of  the  state of the  system 
create2 by  these  different  failure  modes. 
Effects  of  Coverage 
Coverage  is  defined as the conditional  probability  that  the  system 
will  continue  to  perform  its  required  function  given  that  a  failure 
occurs.  This  implies  that  there  are  sufficient  resources  remaining  to 
perform  the  required  functions.  Coverage  is  a  very  important  paraczter 
in a compl.ete reliability  analysis  model. It accounts  for  the  inability 
of  the  system  to  either  detect,  identify, or successfully  respond  to 
a failure.  If  a  system  must  detect  and  identify  a  failure  and  then 
reconfigure  itself  to  remove  the  failed  element or incorporate  a  spare 
unit, and  there  is  a  chance  that  this  process  will fail, the  coverage 
will  be  less  than 1. 
In  a  triplex  system,  the  coverage of a  second  failure  may  be 
different  from  the  coverage  of  a  first  failure.  Coverage  of  a  first 
failure  in  triplex  voting  systems is often  assumed  to be 1, but  even  if 
it  is  slightly  less  than 1, it  can be a  dominant  factor  (see  Reference 14). 
A review of the F-8 DFBW  system  revealed few situations  where 
coverage as a  separate  term  would  significantly  influence the estimate 
of  unreliability.  Most of the F-8 DFBW  system  is  designed  as  a  triply 
redundant  system  with  all  three  channels  permanently  wired  in  and 
selected  by  midvalue-logic  circuits.  Thus,  any  failure of these 
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circuits  to  reject a failed  signal  has  already  been  included  in the 
failure  modes of that  element.  In  most  cases,  the F-8 system  does  not 
have  separate  circuits  which  can  detect a failure  and  then  take  positive 
action to reconfigure the system on the  basis of the  detected  failure. 
There  are a few exceptions  which  will  be  discussed. 
In most  cases,  the  assumed  coverage is thus  implicit  in the con- 
figuration  of  the  basic  equations.  The  coverage  of  the  first  failure 
is  generally 1, and the  coverage  of  many  second  failures  is 0 .  In 
other  words,  when  the  second  of  the  three  channels  fails,  that  entire 
stage  is  eliminated.  For  example,  there  is  considerable  self-test  within 
each  digital  channel,  and  it  is  used  to  remove a digital  channel  from 
the  operating set. However,  this  self-test  is  not  used  to  select  between 
two  remaining  channels and allow  continued  operation on the  one good 
channel  after a second  failure; a second  failure  causes  transfer  to  the 
bypass  system. 
No plausible  scenario  could  be  identified  that  would  prevent  an 
automatic  transfer to the  bypass  system  after  the  second  digital  system 
failure  except  for a unique  set  of  simultaneous  failures.  If  one 
digital  channel  failed and the  failure  were  not  detected  by  its  own 
self-test,  then  the  detection would  be  made  by  comparison  with t e 
output  midvalue-select  circuit. A complete  system  failure  would  result 
only  if  both  remaining  digital  channels  failed  and  both  self-tests  also 
failed. The probability of these  simultaneous  events  is  negligible 
compared  with  other  sources of failure.  In  any case, if the  failure 
to transfer  occurred  at a noncritical  time,  the  pilot  could  perform  the 
transfer  manually. 
There  are  at  least  two  areas in the F-8 DFBW system  where  coverage 
could  be a factor.  It  was  assumed  in  the  random-failure  analysis  that 
the  system  would  continue  to  operate  as a single-channel  system  after 
a second  hydraulic  system  failure.  This  transfer  does  not  occur  auto- 
matically.  The  pilot  must  observe a single  hydraulic  system  failure 
light, look at  the  pressure  indicators  to  see  which  system  has  failed, 
and  then  switch  the  servo  engage  switches  to  manual  mode  in  each  axis 
for  the  one  remaining  good  primary  hydraulic  system. The analysis 
optimistically  assumed  that  the  probability  that  this  would  occur  was  1 
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TO obtain  some  measure of how  important  this  coverage  factor  can 
be, two  questions  can be asked: 
(1) How much  less  than 1 can the coverage  become  before it 
starts  to be significant? 
(2) Is this  value of coverage  plausible? 
The value  of  the  analysis  structure  that was constructed  for 
answering  these  kinds of questions can be  illustrated. The method  that 
can  be  used  to  insert  this  coverage  factor  into  the  structure is shown
in Figure 2 8 .  Values  can  be  assumed  for  coverage, and  the  effect  can 
be  measured  using  the  numbers  from  Figure 2 3 .  If  coverage  is 0, the 
unreliability of the  system  is  increased by only 50 percent. If the 
coverage is assumed  to  be 90 percent, i.e., there is one chance  in  ten 
that  the  failure  happens  at  a  critical  time or for some other  reason 
the pilot  fails  to  make the switch, the unreliability  would  only  be  in- 
creased  by 5 percent,  which  is  insignificant  relative to the accuracy 
of  the  other  numbers. 
The  actual  coverage  value  that  should  be  used  for  a  human  operator 
is  difficult  to  obtain. If this  number  were  important,  the  results of 
human  factors  research or simulations on the "iron  bird" may  be  used 
to  obtain  a  more  accurate  estimate of the  number. For this study, 
one-in-ten  seemed  to  be  excessively  large,  and  thus  it is felt  that 
this  factor can safely  be  ignored.  If the system  modifications  dis- 
cussed at the  end of Section 8 were  made,  the  transfer to a  single  chan- 
nel  would  be  automatic  and  the uman  coverage  factor  would  be  removed. 
One  area was identified  where  a  hardware  failure  could  lead  to 
coverage  of  less  than 1. Each  BASE  channel  has  a  power-supply  monitor 
that is intended  to  detect  any  failure in the dc  power  supply  (generator 
or battery), ac power  supply  (inverter),  and  its  own  internal  power 
supply  (common  BASE  electronics).  These  failure-monitoring  discretes 
are  cross-wired so that  if  these  supplies fail  in two  channels,  the 
remaining  good  channel  would  be  automatically  put  into  single-channel 
mode.  If the  monitor  circuits  failed  in  either  of  the  two  failed 
channels,  the  system would not  go into  single-channel  mode  and  the  two- 
out-of-three  voters  would  cause  the  whole  system  to  shut  off. 
The  effect  of  coverage  can  be  accounted  for by inserting  an  addi- 
tional  level  (as  shown  in  Figure 29) in the  paths  defined by  the  trans- 
fer  triangles 1, 2 ,  and 3 in  Figure 10a. The potential  impact  of  this 
addition  can  be  determined  by  tracing  the  numbers  in  Figure 30. The 
effect  of  this  modification  will  be  to  add  an  additional  term  to  the 
numbers  circled in column 25 before  they  are  transferred  to  columns 
3 and 4 .  These  factors  will  thus  not  be  significant  unless one minus 
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(1 -COVERAGE) 
Figure 2 9 .  Additional  level  to  insert  effects of lack 
of coverage of power  failures. 
the  coverage is large  relative  to  numbers  in  the  range  of  1  to 2 x 
No analysis  was performed  on this  monitor circuit, but  it  is  relatively 
sinple and  would  have  a  failure  rate  somewhere  between  the  primary/bypass 
switch  and  the  inverter (i. e., between 1 and 5 X . If this  assump- 
tion  is true, the  effect of a  coverage  failure  will  not be  significant. 
The  sensitivity  of  the  analysis  to  an  error in this  assumption  can  be 
tested by tracing  the  effect of these  error  modes  at  higher  levels.  As 
can be  seen  by the  numbers  circled  in  columns 1 to 4 in  Figure 30, the 
terms  affected by coverage  are being  added  to terms  about  two  orders  of 
magnitude  larger. A failure  in  coverage  will  not  make  any  ultimate 
contribution  to  the  system  unreliability  unless  the MTBFs of  these 
circuits  were around  100  hours,  and  they  are  at  least  two  orders  of 
magnitude  better  than  that. 
Effects  of  the  Dynamics of  the  Failure  Process 
The failure-analysis  technique  used  in  this  study  assumes  a  sta- 
tic  system. The equations  give  the  probability  that  the  system  will 
have  failed  by  the  end of the  specified  time  period,  and do not  consider 
when  the  failures  occur  or  recognize  the  order in which they  occur. A 
characteristic of  the  design  of  the F-8 DFBW  system  is  that, in almost 
all. cases, the  dynamics or order of failures is not significant. 
In most cases, the  configuration of the F-8 system is not  changed 
on the  basis of failures.  Where  there is reconfiguration,  no  particular 
added  vulnerability  is  found to exist  during the reconfiguration  time. 
The ultimate  result of a  second  failure is the same whether  it  occurs 
during the reconfiguration  time or  at any other time. 
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Figure 30. Numbers important t o  Coverage  of power f a i lu re .  
The order in which  elements  fail was also  found  not o be signi- 
ficant  in  most cases. One set of situations  was  found,  however,  where 
the sequence  would  have  an effect. These  were  the  situations  where  there 
were two failures in either the batteries  (with  a  generator  failure) , 
the  inverters, or the common BASE electronics,  and  also  a  hydraulic 
system failure.  If  both the failures  in  the  power  supplies  occurred 
before the hydraulic  system  failure,  the  system  would  automatically  be 
switched  to  single  channel  and  would  continue  to  operate  as  long 
the  hydraulic  failure was not  in  that channel. If the  hydraulic  failure 
occurred  before  the  second  power-supply  failure,  the  transfer to single 
channel would not  be  automatic  and  the  system  would  fail. 
The effect  of  the  failure  sequence  can  be  incorporated  into  the 
analysis  structure by expanding  the  events  that  define  the  state  Of 
the  failures  at  that  level,  including  sequence.  This  expansion f
events  can be  illustrated  by the  equation  for  inverters in the  case 
where  there  is  a  hydraulic  failure  (refer  to  Figure  loa;  the  inverter 
row  at  column 8). This  equation  originally had four  events  defined: 
(I) Three inverters good. 
( 2 )  Two inverters  good  with  good  hydraulics  and  the  inverter 
with  failed  hydraulics  failed. 
(3) One inverter  good  with  good  hydraulics, one inverter  failed 
with  good  hydraulics,  and  the  inverter  with  failed  hydraulics 
good or failed. 
(4) Two inverters  failed  with  good  hydraulics,  the  inverter 
with  failed  hydraulics  good or failed. 
Events 1, 2, and 4 would  stay  the same, but  event 3 would  be  divided 
into  three  events  as  follows: 
One  inverter  good  with  good  hydraulics, one inverter  failed 
with good hydraulics, and the  inverter  with  failed  hydraulics 
good. 
One inverter  good  with  good  hydraulics, one inverter  failed 
with good hydraulics, and the  inverter  with  failed  hydraulics 
failed, with one of two  inverter  failures  occurring  after 
the  hydraulic  failure. 
One inverter  good  with  good  hydraulics, one inverter  failed 
with good hydraulics, and the inverter  with  failed  hydraulics 
failed,  with  both  inverter  failures  occurring  before  the 
hydraulics failure. 
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The appropriate  probabilities can be  computed  for these events, and then 
they  would  be  multiplied  by  the  appropriate  conditional  unreliabilities 
for  the rest of the system  in  that  particular state. 
The error  caused  by not considering  this  term in the F-8 DFBW sys- 
tem  is  negligible.  The  first  event  (3a)  dominates the other  two  because 
it is  proportional  to Q of the  inverter,  while  the other two  are  propor- 
tional  to Q 2  and thus  will  be  at  least  four  orders of magnitude  smaller. 
If  the  order  of  failures had  been  important, the total  impact  on 
the equations  would  have  been  considerably  more  involved  than the one 
equation  illustrated.  Similar  equations  would  be  necessary  for  the 
batteries  and  common BASE electronics, and  several  additional  equations 
for  combinations of failures  involving  battery,  inverter,  and  common 
BASE  electronic  failures.  For  the  analysis of a  system  where  failure 
sequence  was  important,  a  reassessment  of  the  advantages  of  a  Markov 
analysis  may  be  advisable. 
Interaction  of  System  Failure  with  Pilot  Performance 
The  analysis  performed  here  does  not  take  into  account  the  pos- 
sible  effects  degraded  system  performance  might  have on pilot  perform- 
ance.  The  assumption  made  for  this  study  is  that  if  the  flight-control 
system  is  capable of controlling  the  aircraft,  the  probability  is  zero 
that the  aircraft  will  be  lost.  For  example,  it  was  assumed  that  the 
aircraft  can  be  safely  landed  with  only  one  elevator  or  with  only  the 
rudder  to  maintain  roll. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  potential  for  an  incident  in  performing 
a  critical  maneuver,  such  as  landing,  with  a  nonstandard  control  re- 
sponse is much  greater. For example,  if  a  quick-response pitch  command 
is  needed,  the  unwanted  roll  resulting  from  using  the  elevator  on  only 
one  side  could  be  hazardous.  This  increased  hazard  should be charged 
to  the  flight-control  system. 
This factor  can  be  included  within  the  model  by  inserting  the 
appropriate  numbers  for  the  final  conditional  unreliabilities  at  the 
end  of  the  equations.  For  example,  at  the  bottom  of  Figures  lob, c, 
d, and e, the  number  is  now 0 for  the  unreliability  at  the  system,  given 
that  any  minimum  combination of control  surfaces  is  available.  These 
numbers  could  be  made  somewhat  higher  than  zero  to  reflect  the  prob- 
ability of a  flight-control-induced  accident. 
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A numerical  value  for  these  probabilities  will  not be easy  to 
obtain. It  is likely to be  subjective  and  to  depend on many  factors, 
such as pilot  experience and  competence. This number  could  be sti- 
mated  by  a  survey  of  pilot  opinions  that  would  provide  a  description 
of the  expected  characteristics of the  aircraft, and  would  ask how many 
times the aircraft  would  survive if  it were landed  in this  condition 
unexpectedly by 100 pilots. This  number  could  be  estimated  more 
accurately by setting up these  conditions in a  simulator  and  injecting 
them  unannounced  with  other  disturbances  to  measure  pilot  performance. 
A  high  degree  of  confidence  many not be  attached  to  these  numbers,  but 
to  include  them  may  be  more  realistic  than  to  ignore  the  factor  completely. 
Contribution  of  Damage  to  Failure  Rate 
Physical  damage to  the  electronic  flight-control  system  can  be 
a  significant  factor  in  the  failure  rate. A preliminary  study  was  made 
that  estimated  the  failure  rate  due  to  damage  of  an  electronic  system 
in a  commercial ;lircra€t to be  in  the  range  of 10 to 10- per  hour. 
These  estimates  would  not  be  directly  applicable  to  the F-8, but  do 
indicate  that  damage  could  be  an  important  consideration. 
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No attempt  was  made  to  obtain  a  quantitative  estimate  in  this 
study of physical  damage  probabilities.  This  estimate  would  depend 
on a  detailed  study  of  how  the  system is installed  in  the  aircraft,  a 
cataloging  of  all  possible  events  that  could  cause  damage  to  the  elec- 
tronic  flight  controls,  an  estimate of the  probability  of  each  of those 
events, and  finally  an  estimate  of  the  effect  the  event  would  have on 
the  electronic  flight  control. 
A  preliminary look at  the F-8 DFBW system  indicated  that  the  ele- 
ments  most  vulnerable  to  damage  were  the  BASE  electronics  unit  and  var- 
ious  points  along  the  cables  running  from the BASE  electronics  to  the 
actuators,  particularly  those  in  the  tail. The BASE  units  are  stacked 
one  atop  the  other  in  the  left  gun bay as shown  in  Figure B.lO.  Any 
event  that  could  damage  one  box would  have  a  relatively  high  probability 
of  damaging  all  three.  Since  all  actuators  are  commanded  from  these  boxes, 
if  all  were  sufficiently  damaged,  the  aircraft  would  be  lost. Some pos- 
sible  events  that  could  damage  these  units  are  an  uncontained  failure in 
one of  the  units (e.g., a power-supply  failure  and  the  simultaneous  failure 
of  the  circuit  breaker  resulting  in  a  fire),  a  battery  explosion,  a  hydrau- 
lic leak,  and  the  loss of  the  common  access  panel  with  associated  wind or 
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rain  damage. One of the  damage  events in the  study of damage  to  commer- 
cial  aircraft was due to  hydraulic  mist  fire.  Hydraulic  fluid is not 
flammable  at  reasonable  temperatures,  but  in  one  incident t was found 
that the  mist  created  by  a  very  small  hole  was  flammable  at  room  tem- 
perature  and  the  resulting  fire  destroyed  all  cables  in  one  compartment 
of  the  aircraft. 
A quantitative  estimate €or the F-8 would require  gathering of 
damage  data  from  a  fleet of F-8 or similar  type  aircraft  flown i similar 
ways, and  then  an  analysis of how  these  events  might  have  damaged  the 
flight-control  system.  This  effort  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present 
study. 
It was assumed, based on the  preliminary  study of commercial 
damage  events,  that  damage  would  not  be  a  significant  contributor o 
the  system  with  a  failure  rate  of 6 X per  hour or greater. However, 
if the system  were  improved by  an order  of  magnitude o r  more, damage 
would  have to be  studied  seriously. 
Software  Errors 
The possibility of a  generic  fault  that  would  be  present  in  all 
versions  of  a  redundant  system  has  been  one  of  the  chief  concerns  of 
digital  flight-control  system  designers.  The  fear of this  type  of 
failure  and  the  difficulty of proving  that  it  does not exist  to  an 
acceptably  low  level  is one of the  primary  reasons  for  the  existence  of 
a  dissimilar  backup  system on the F-8 and other  fly-by-wire  systems. 
Software  errors  are  in  a  different  and  much  more  difficult to 
handle  category  than  the  random  failures  discussed  in  Section 2. Var- 
ious  techniques  have  been  proposed  to  try  to  estimate  software  reli- 
ability. (15'16) One technique  is  to  attempt to estimate the rate  at 
which  new  faults  will  appear  based on the  declining rate at  which they 
appeared  in  the  past.  Another  method  is  to  purposely  embed  errors  and 
see  how  thoroughly the system  testing  removes  these  errors. To date, 
none  of  these  techniques  have  been  developed  to  the  extent  that  they 
can  provide  a  reasonable  degree  of  confidence  that the high-reliability 
requirements  have  been  met. S o  far, the  most  promising  approach  seems 
to  be  the  use  of  very  disciplined  structured  methods of writing  the 
software in  the  first  place.  These  techniques  avoid  the  introduction 
of errors  which  become so difficult  to  detect  later. 
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The software for the F-8 DFBW was very  carefully  written,  con- 
trolled,  and  tested (see Section 5 of Reference 17). No attempt was 
made  in this analysis to apply  any of the existing  techniques to develop 
a  quantitative  estimate of the probability of a  software  failure.  The 
following  paragraphs discuss how many of the effects  of  software  faults 
could  be  inserted  into he model and what  the  extent of these  effects 
could  be for this  particular  system. 
The sensitivity of the unreliability of the  total  system  to s ft- 
ware  faults is considerably  reduced by the  existence of the  bypass 
system.  Software  faults can thus be  divided  into  three  categories. 
The faults  that  are  expected  to be most  likely  will  have  a  passive 
effect on the  total  system.  Many of the  errors  that  are  possible  would 
cause  the  computer  to  get trapped  in  a  loop,  stop  executing,  or  violate 
one of  the  many  hardware  and  software  fault-detector  devices.  This 
failure would cause  automatic  transfer  to  the  bypass  system. If a 
probability  could be estimated  for  this  type  of  error,  it  could  easily 
be  included within the  model by  adding  it  to the  probability  that 
three  primary  digital  systems  fail  due  to  random  failures.  From 
Figure 10 it  can bc? seen  that  three  failed  computers  are  equivalent 
to  two  failed  computcrs. Thus, this  category  of  software  failure  will 
have  no  influence on the  equation  unless  its  probability  is  in  the 
range of 10 to per hour, which is the probability that two dig- 
ita1  channels  will  fail. The probability  of this  type  of  software 
failure would have to  be  as  large  as 10-1 per  hour  to  influence  the 
final  total syste:.? unreliability in the  most  significant  digit. The 
amount  of  time  zccumulated on the system  with  no  failures  of  this  type 
provides  a  hiqh ciegree of  confidence  that  the  probability  of  this  fail- 
ure  is  several  orders of magnitude  smaller  than 10 per  hour. Thus, 
it  can  be  concluded  that  this  category of software  failure  will  make no
measurable  contribution. 
- 6  
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The second  category  of  possible  software  failures  which  would  be 
much  less  probable  are  those  that  are  still  passive  but  allow  the  pro- 
gram to  continue  to  operate  at  least  well  enough  to  avoid  detection by 
the  detection  devices.  This  error  would  not  be  detected by the  output 
comparison  voters,  since  all  three  computers  would  agree.  There  would 
thus be  no  automatic  transfer  to  the  bypass  system.  This  type of
failure  would be obvious  to  the  pilot  because  control  inputs  would  have 
no effect. The  immediate  reaction of the  pilot  would  be  to  manually 
transfer  to  the  bypass  system. 
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The contribution of this  type of failure will thus be the  same as 
that  of  the  first  category  with  two  additional  factors. One factor is 
the probability  that the pilot  will not recognize  the  failure  and/or 
will  not  take  proper action. The other  additional  factor is that the 
failure may  happen  at  a  very  critical  moment  such  that  manual  transfer 
could not be made in  time. The amount  of  time that would  be  critical 
is expected  to  be  only  a few seconds  per flight. Also, the probability 
that  a  pilot  would  not  react  properly is expected  to be much  less  than 
per  hour. The  probability  that  this  type  of  software  fault  could 
occur would have  to be  around 10 per  hour to  be  significant. -5 
The third  category of software  failure  which is expected  to  be 
even  less  probable is an  active  failure.  This  failure  would  cause  all 
computers  to  simultaneously  issue  a  large  command  to  at  least on  
of the  surfaces. The risk of this  type of failure is very similar  to 
the  previous  one.  The  pilot  would  certainly  be  aware of the failure 
and  would  manually  switch  to  the  bypass  system  in  most  cases.  However, 
the  aircraft  can  very  quickly  be  put  into  a  vulnerable  position,  and 
the  critical  time  will  thus  be  greater. The critical  time  during  a 
typical  flight  where  recovery  would  be  unlikely is assumed  here  to  be 
tens  of  seconds  approaching  a  minute, i. .,  an order of magnitude  greater 
than  the  previous  category. The probability of this  type  failure is 
assumed,  however,  to  be  at  least  an  order f magnitude  smaller. 
Although  the  probability  that  a  software  failure  will  occur  was 
not estimated  directly  in  this  analysis,  the  ways in which  software 
faults  could  contribute  to  system  unreliability  were  identified  along 
with  the  levels of software  failure  rates  that  would  produce  a  signi- 
ficant effect.  Experience  with  software  errors  during  the  test  program 
gives  confidence  that  the  failure  rate  will  be  well  below  those  levels 
for  this system. 
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SECTION 8 
CONCLUSIONS,  OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary  conclusion  drawn  from  this  study  is  that  the F-8 DFBW 
system has a  very  high  predicted  reliability. A conservative  estimate 
of the  probability of loss of the  aircraft due to  random  failures  is 
6.45 x for a 1-hour flight. No nonrandom hazard such as damage  or 
software  error  could be  identified  that  would  significantly  increase 
that  probability. The probability of loss  of  the  primary  digital  control 
mode  for  a  1-hour  flight  is  predicted  to  be 7.82 X 
The greatest  contributor to  the  failure  probability  was  found  to 
be  the  hybrid  situation  with  a  hydraulic  power  failure  in one channel 
and some  electrical  power  failure in another  channel.  With  a  minor 
system  modification,  the power-monitoring  logic  could  be  modified to 
cause an automatic  transfer  to  single-channel  operation  with  any  com- 
bination  of  electrical or hydraulic  power  failures.  In  this  case,  the 
probability of loss  of  aircraft  from  random  failures  can  be  reduced  to 
2.82 x 10-l' in  a  1-hour  flight. 
Although  the  probability  of loss of  aircraft  for  a  1-hour  flight 
is  very low, the  increase  in  the  failure  rate s a  function of time  is 
rapid. The failure  rate  in  the basic  system  at 10 hours  is 1.4 x 
an  increase by more  than  an  order  of  magnitude. The modified  system 
failure  rate  at  10  hours  is 8 . 8  x an  increase by more  than  two 
orders  of  magnitude.  Changes  in  the  basic  design  would  thus  be  necessary 
for  commercial  application  either by increasing  the  basic  reliability 
by  adding  additional  redundancy or by  adding  active  reconfigurations  to 
replace  failed  units and thus  keep  the  failure  rate  much  closer  to 
constant. 
As an observation on the analysis  process  itself,  the  actual  at- 
tempt  to  compute the numerical  reliability  gave  a  different  perspective 
on the  system  than the one gained by showing  that  the  system is fail- 
operational  following  any  single failure. There is a  real  danger in 
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getting  enmeshed in numerical  reliability  analysis. For this  reason, 
many  flight-control  systems,  including  the F-8, are required  to  be fail- 
operational, fail-operational/fail-safe, dual  fail-operational, etc. 
Much  of the analysis that has  been done on the F-8 DFBW system  has 
shown  that no single  failure  could  cause  a  system failure. However, 
an attempt  to  compute the actual  probability of system  failure  from 
all  component  failures and combinations  of  failures can give  a  more 
balanced  perspective on the  system  failure process. This analysis  has 
to  include  much  practical  judgment,  and  caution  must  be  exercised to 
keep  from  overrating the validity  of  the  results.  With  these  reserva- 
tions, it  is  believed  that  numerical  analysis  can  direct  efforts  to  the 
failure  situations  that  are  actually the most  important, and  avoid over- 
emphasis on obscure  failures  which do not  make any significant  contri- 
bution to  the  total  system  failure  rate. 
It  was not the  intent of this  study  to  develop  any new analysis 
tools. However,  the  unreliability  equation  diagram  turned out to  be  a 
very  powerful  and  flexible  technique  in  this  analysis. It is  not  known 
if this  technique or a  similar one has  been  used  before.  If not, it  is 
recommended  that  the  technique  be  further  investigated  to  see  if  it 
can be  of  more  general  application.  If so, the technique  could be 
further  developed so that it  could  be  more  generally  applied  and  be 
more  widely  publicized. 
The  Charles  Stark  Draper  Laboratory,  Inc. 
555 Technology  Square 
Cambridge,  Massachusetts 02139 
November 1979 
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APPENDIX A 
NASA  ADVANCED  FLIGHT-CONTROL  PROGRAM* 
The F-8 DFBW program  has  been  carried out in  two  major  phases. 
The first  phase,  which  began i  1971  and  concluded  in  1973,  successfully 
demonstrated  the  feasibility  of  using  DFBW  systems  for  the  primary  con- 
trol of aircraft. This was  accomplished by flight  testing  a  single- 
channel  DFBW  system in the  +-8  test  aircraft.  A  surplus  Apollo  guidance 
and  navigation  system  hardware  was  used  for  the  primary  flight-control 
system, and  the  basic F-8 mechanical  system  was  completely  removed. 
Forty-two  flights  were  accomplished  during  this p ase  by  six evaluation 
pilots,  and  a  total  flight  time of 58  hours  was  accumulated.  Historically, 
this was the first  recorded  flight of an  aircraft  using  a  DFBW  system as
its  primary  means  of  flight  control  with no means  of  mechanical  backup. 
The  second  phase  of  the  program  covered  the  period  1973-1330. 
The overall  Phasc I1 program  objective  was to establish  a  data  base  that 
can  be  used  to  design  and  develop  practical  DFBW  systems  for  future  air- 
craft. To accomplish  this  objective,  the  simplex  Phase I system  was 
replaced  with  a  triplex  multichannel  DFBW  system  that  uses  fully  pro- 
grammable  state-of-the-art  digital  processors  for primary  flight  control. 
The first  flight  with  the  Phase I1 system  occurred in August  1976. By 
the  end  of 1979, 73 flights  were  successfully accomplished. The flight- 
test  program has  been  successful  both in demonstrating  a  practical  DFBW 
design  concept that works and  in  developing  required  operational  pro- 
cedures. This is also the  only  airplane  primary  flight-control  DFBW 
system  currently in operation  that  does  not  employ  a  means  for  mechanical 
reversion in the  event  of ailure. 
The F-8 DFBW program is managed out of  the  Electronics  Division  of 
the  Office of Aeronautics  and  Space  Technology  (OAST) at NASA  Headquarters. 
The project office resides  at  the  Dryden Flight Research  Center  (DFRC), 
which  has  functioned as the  lead  center  during  the  entire  program.  Other 
* 
This  Appendix is an  updated  version of Section 3 of Reference 17. 
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NASA  centers  have  been  jointly involved. The Langley  Research  Center 
(LARC) has been  responsible for development of certain  advanced  control- 
law  concepts €or flight-test  evaluation of the Phase I1 system. The 
Johnson  Space  Center (JSC) has been  jointly  responsible €or coordinating 
all  shuttle-related  flight  tests. 
A summary of the  flight-test  program  accomplishments  through 1979 
is  presented  in Figure A.l. During  the 73 flights  accomplished  thus  far, 
all  control  modes  havs  been  engaged  and  evaluated  using  the  various  con- 
trol tasks  that  are listed. The various  data  generated  during  the  ac- 
complishment  of  these  flights  has  contributed  greatly in expanding  the 
technology  data  base  for  the  DFBW  controls,  and  in  accomplishing  the F-8
DFBW  program  objectives. Of  primary  significance is the  fact  that  at 
no  time  during  ground or flight  tests  of  the  flight-qualified  system 
has  a  total  digital  flight-control system  (DFCS)  failure  occurred  re- 
quiring  use  of  the  analog  bypass  system. 
NUMBER  OF FLIGHTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73 
0 TOTAL FLIGHTTIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100 h 
0 MAXIMUM SPEED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  MACH 1.2 
0 MAXIMUM ALTITUDE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12.200 m 
MAXIMUM  ACCELERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69  
NUMBEROF  PILOTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
0 CONTROL MODES EVALUATED 
- DIRECT 
- COMMAND AUGMENTATION (CAS) 
- STABILITY  AUGMENTATION ISAS) 
- AUTOPILOT: 
MACH HOLD 
ALTITUDE  HOLD 
HEADING  HOLD 
ATTITUDE  HOLD 
- RIDE SMOOTHING 
- MANUEVER DRAG REDUCTION (MDR) 
- REMOTE  AUGMENTATION  IRAV) 
- ANGLE-OF-ATTACK LIMITER 
- SIDE-STICK CONTROLLER 
0 EVALUATION TASKS 
- ROUTINE FLIGHT 
- FORMATION 
- HANDLING  QUALITIES INPUTS 
- MODERATELSEVERE TURBULENCE 
- TRACKING 
- SIMULATED S H U n L E  LANDINGS 
0 FLIGHT-TEST  VERIFICATION OF SHUlTLE  RM SOFTWARE 
0 LOW-SAMPLE-RATE EVALUATIONS 
0 EVALUATION OF ANALYTIC  REDUNDANCY  MANAGEMENT 
0 EVALUATION OF PILOT  WORKLOAD  DURING SHUlTLE  LANDING  MANEUVER 
0 ESTABLISHED HARDWARE  AND SOFTWARE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES  FOR 
DFBWSYSTEMS 
0 FIVE  IN-FLIGHT COMPUTER FAILURES - DEMONSTRATED VALIDITY OF FAIL- 
URE DETECTION  AND RECOVERY ALGORITHMS 
0 NO TOTAL SYSTEM FAILURE  REQUIRING USE OF ANALOG BYPASS SYSTEM 
Figure A . l .  Flight-test  summary. 
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APPENDIX B 
SYSTEM  REQUIREMENTS AND DESCRIPTION* 
This appendix  first  describes the  system  requirements,  both  those 
specific to this  program  and  those  more  generic  specifications  that  would 
be typical  of  an  advanced primary  flight-control  system. Next, the 
requirements  that  must be met to  qualify  the  system  for  flight  are  given. 
Finally, the system  is  described.  This  description  includes  a  brief 
overview  of  each  of  the  units  in  the  system, and explains  how they  are 
installed  in  the  aircraft  and  how  they  are  integrated  into  an  operating 
system. Particular  emphasis is  placed  on  how fault  tolerance  is  achieved 
to  provide  a  very  high  level  of  functional  reliability. 
System  Requirements 
Mission-Specific  Specifications 
The requirements  for  the  F-8 DFBW system can be  divided  into  two 
categories:  mission-specific  and  generic.  The  mission-specific  require- 
ments  (shown  in  Figure B . 1 )  are  those  determined by operational  considera- 
tions,  installation  constraints,  program  funding,  and  schedule  guidelines. 
The  system was specified  to  be  triplex,  using  government-furnished  general- 
purpose digital  computers, because a  triplex  configuration  would  present 
all  the  problems  of  multicomputer  operation  and  could  be  installed  within 
the  space  available  in  the  F-8. 
Program  funding  did  not  permit  the  procurement  of an inertial 
platform  set, as might  have  been  desirable  in  this program.  Therefore, 
aircraft-quality rate gyros  and  accelerometers  were  specified. The 
sensor  and  command  lines  were  specified  to  be  dedicated  hardwire.  Multi- 
plexing was not possible  within  program  funding. 
Experience  in  the  Phase I program  and a  state-of-the-art  assessment 
in  actuator  stabilization  resulted  in  the  specification  that  this  stabili- 
zation  be done using  analog  components,  outside of the  digital  computer, 
* 
This  appendix is a  condensed  version of Section 4 of Reference 17. 
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0 TRIPLEX  COMPUTERS/INTERFACE UNIT 
0 GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED COMPUTERS 
AIRCRAFF-QUALITY  MOTION SENSORS 
TRIPLEX:  INNER-LOOPCONTROL 
DUPLEX:  AIR  0ATA.AUTOPILOT 
NO  INERTIAL  PLATFORM 
0 NO SENSOR OR COMMAND SIGNAL MULTIPLEXING 
0 ANALOG STABILIZATION/EQUALIZATlON  OF ACTUATORS 
ASSEMBLY-LANGUAGE  PROGRAMMING 
0 INDEPENDENT ANALOG FLY-BY-WIRE SYSTEM FOR EMERGENCY BACKUP 
COMPUTERllFU  ON  CENTRAL  PALLET 
Figure B . l .  Mission-specific  requirements. 
due to  the  sample  rate  requirements  and  computational  burden. The use 
of a  secondary  actuator  to  drive  the  existing  F-8  power  actuators  instead 
of a new integrated  actuator was dictated  by  the  burden  of  requalifying 
the  primary  actuation  system  of  the F-8, including  flutter  clearance. 
Assembly-language  programming  was  specified  for  the  F-8  DFBW 
system. This was due to  the fact that a  qualified  high-order  language 
was  not  avaliable  for  the  flight  computer a  the  time  programming  was 
initiated. 
The research  nature  of  the  primary  DFBW  flight-control  system  re- 
quired an independent  dissimilar  backup  control  system. The primary 
motivation  was  to  protect  against  a  common-mode  software  error  that  would 
disable  the  entire  primary  system. 
Finally, the  available  space  in  the  F-8  required  custom  packaging. 
The  computers  and  interface  units  were  specified  to  be  mounted  in  a 
removable  pallet  assembly.  Flight-control  sensors  were  to  be  installed 
in  easily  accessible  locations. 
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Generic  Specifications 
The generic  specifications are those  that  tend to be  independent 
of  the  particular  application.  They  represent  the  fundamental  operating 
characteristics of the system.  In  the case  of  the F-8 DFBW system, 
these  requirements  were selected to both tax  the  technology  and to
represent  realistic  and  achievable  specifications  for  a  primary  flight- 
control  system. 
Overall  fault  tolerance. - The  key  system  fault-tolerance  require- 
ments can be  stated  in  the  following  manner: 
No single  fault in the primary  digital  system  shall  cause 
degraded  inner-loop  performance. 
No second  fault  in  the  primary  system  shall  result  in  a 
hazardous  situation. 
No sequence of sensor  or  display  failures  shall  result  in 
an automatic  transfer  to  the  bypass  system. 
No single  fault  in  the  primary  digital  system  shall  result 
in a  transfer  to  the  bypass  system. 
The l o s s  of two computing  channels  in  the  primary  system 
shall  result  in  an  automatic  transfer  to  the  bypass  system. 
No primary  system  fault  sequence  shall  prevent  manual 
transfer  to  the  bypass  system. 
Figure B . 2  shows  the  fault-tolerance  requirements  for  each  major 
system. Generally,  fail-operational  requirements  were  specified  for 
each  system. A  second  like  fault  in  any  system  has  differing  conse- 
quences,  depending on the  actual  device faulted. 
Primary-digital-system  generic  requirements. - The  requirements  for 
the  primary digital  system  are of  particular  interest. Figure B . 3  lists 
the major  requirements  that  were imposed  on the primary  system. The 
overall  fault-tolerance  requirement, as explained  previously,  was  fail- 
operational,  with  the  failure  of  a  second  like  major  channel  resulting 
in automatic  transfer  to  the  bypass  system. 
Single-channel  digital  operation  was not permitted  in  the  F-8 DFBW 
aircraft  because  of  the  experimental  nature  of  the  system.  Automatic 
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Figure B.2. Overall  system  fault-tolerance requirements. 
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FAULT  TOLERANCE 
TURN-ONIOFF 
FAULT  DETECTION 
RECONFIGURATION 
TRANSIENT  FAULT  RECOVERY 
IMMUNITY TO FALSE  ALARMS 
OUTPUT  COMMAND VOTING 
COMPUTER INTERCOMMUNI- 
CATION 
SYNCHRONIZATION 
CONTROL-LAW  INTERFACE 
SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
~~ 
REQUIREMENT 
~~ 
FA ILOP/FAILSAFE 
SECOND FAIL TO BACKUP 
AUTOMATIC  INlTlALlZATlON FROM 
ARBITRARY  TURN-ONIOFF SEQUENCE 
0 HARD FAILURES TO BE 
DETECTED WITHIN 200 mr 
0 HARD  FAILURE  DECLARATIONS 
TO  BE  IRREVERSIBLE 
AUTOMATIC 
FULLY RESTARTABLE IN  ANY 
CONFlGURATlONlMODE 
DESIGN TO BE HEAVILY WEIGHTED 
TO AVOID  FALSE  ALARMS 
ANALOG  VOTING  OF SURFACE 
COMMANDS 
MINUMUM POSSIBLE 
FRAMEOR MINOR  CYCLE  ONLY 
MULTICOMPUTER  STRUCTURE TO 
BE TRANSPARENT  TO  CONTROL LAWS 
FULLTIME 
FULL CONTROL SURFACE 
AUTHORITY 
FLIGHT  CRITICAL  CONTROL 
NO  MECHANICAL  REVERSION 
T IMPLICATIONS 
NO  SINGLE-CHANNEL  OPERATION 
REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES 
NO CREW ACTION  PERMITTED FOR START- 
UP 
NO PROVISION FOR REINITIALIZATION  BY 
PI LOT 
NO CREW ACTION ASSISTANCE PERMITTED 
IN  FAULT ISOLATION 
CONTINUED  OPERATION  FOLLOWING: 
0 TEMPORARY POWER  LOSS 
0 TRANSIENT HARDWARE/SOFTWARE 
PROBLEM 
NO  QUANTITATIVE  REQUIREMENT 
NO SOFTWARE VOTE OF  SURFACE 
COMMAND 
REDUCE  COMMON-MODE  ERROR SOURCES 
CONTROL  LAWS WRITTEN AS  FOR SINGLE 
COMPUTER 
MAN-RATING  REQUIRED PRIOR TO FIRST 
FLIGHT 
Figure B.3. Generic  system  design requirements. 
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initialization  from  any  arbitrary  turn on/off sequence was specified so 
as to exclude  the  crew  from  any  special action. 
The 200-millisecond  hard-failure  fault-detection  time was based 
on F-8 dynamic  response at high  dynamic  pressure  flight  conditions.  Hard 
failures  were to  be  irreversible,  with no provision for pilot  reselection. 
All reconfiguration  logic was to  be  automatic with no pilot  participation 
permitted in the  fault-isolation  process. 
The  system was to  be  fully  restartable  in  any  mode  following  a 
transient  fault.  This  meant  that  a  channel or channels  would be restored 
to normal  operation  following  unspecified  transient  faults.  There is 
always  a  problem in defining  a  transient  fault. In the F-8  digital 
system,  transient  faults  were  divided  into tw categories:  power loss 
(or apparent power loss) and  all  others. 
The  transient  survivability  times  were  defined as: 
(1)  Single-channel  external-source  power loss-no time  limit. 
(2)  Multichannel  power l o s s 4 0  milliseconds. 
( 3 )  Detected  fault,  any type-200 milliseconds. 
This  meant  that  a  single  channel was required  to  be  restored  to  normal 
operation  after  being  powered  down  for  any  indefinite  period of time. 
This requirement is also  necessary  in  order  to  be  able to turn  the 
system on. If  power was lost by two or three  channels  for  less  than 
4 0  milliseconds,  the  primary  system was to be  restored to normal 
operation  and  continue to be  in  control  of  the  aircraft.  If  this 
power loss occurred  for  more  than 40 milliseconds, the bypass  system 
was  to  effect an automatic  takeover. It should  be  noted  that  the  pri- 
mary  system was still  required  to  be  restored to normal  operation 
following  a  long  power  interruption,  even  though  command  had  been 
handed over  to  the  bypass ystem. 
For  detected  faults,  that  is,  for  conditions  where  execution  is 
apparently  continuing,  but  where an abnormal  condition  has  been  detected, 
including an internal  power  supply  fault,  the  transient  time  was 
specified  to  be 200 milliseconds.  This is based  on 10 attempts  to 
restore  normal  operation at the  nominal  20-millisecond  minor  cycle,  and 
is  the  maximum  time  a  fault  can  be  tolerated at critical  F-8  flight 
conditions. These  requirements are illustrated in Figure B . 4 .  
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EXTERNAL POWER FAILURE (BUS) 
<40 r n s  >40 mr - CONTROL  TRANSFER  TO BYPASS 
CHANNEL  A POWER 
NO POWER- ---- 
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Figure B.4. Transient  fault  survivability  requirements. 
False-alarm  immunity  was  recognized  to  be  a  critical  characteristic 
of the DFBW system. A requirement  was  imposed  that  the  system was to 
be  weighted in favor of continued  or  restored  operation  in  all  possible 
cases. It was  not  known  how  this  requirement  could be  proven  analytically, 
thus no quantitative  specification  was  given.  Actual  operating  experi- 
ence  would  give  an  insight  into  this  feature of the system. 
In the  preliminary  design it  became  apparent that  special  con- 
sideration  had  to  be  given to  the  problem  of  undetected  digital  system 
failures  occurring  in  a  sequence  that  would  cause  hazardous  commands 
to  be  generated. The solution  chosen was to require  analog  output 
voting on the  digital-system  surface  commands.  This  approach  was  taken 
to  protect  against  a  catastrophic  fault  sequence  in  a  manner  independent 
of digital  system  software or failure-detection  logic. 
In an attempt to reduce  the  possibility  of  interchannel  fault 
propagation,  it was specified  that  intercomputer  communication was to 
be kept to  an  absolute  minimum,  with  design  approaches  deliberately 
avoiding  complex  computer  intercommunications. 
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Synchronization was specified  explicitly to be  frame or minor 
cycle only. Thus  the  computers,  while  being  tightly  synchronized, would 
not be in  exact  step. This was  specified  in  order to permit  a  simpler 
interface  unit  design and.to permit a. "looser" more tolerant  system 
operation. 
The  control-law or applications  software was specified  to  be  inde- 
pendent of the  multicomputer  structure,  with  the  redundant  hardware  trans- 
parent  to  application  routines. 
Finally,  overall  system  characteristics  were specified. The  digital 
system  was  to  operate  full-time  and  in  fact  be  the  primary  (albeit 
experimental)  flight-control  system  of  the  airplane.  It  would  be  used 
during  the  first  takeoff  and  landing.  The  flight-critical  system was 
to  be  given  full  surface  authority  in all three axes. The  mechanical 
system  had  already  been  removed  during  the  first  phase  of the F-8  DFBW 
program. It would  not  be  available.  These  requirements  meant  that  the 
primary  system  would  have  to  be  fully  man-rated  and  flight  qualified 
prior  to the first flight. 
System  Description (18,191 
The basic system  configuration is shown  in  Figure B.5. The major 
components of the  F-8  DFBW  system  are: 
(1) Digital  Computers (3) (see Figure B. 6) . 
( 2 )  Interface Unit  (IFU) ( 3  independent  sections  in one chassis) 
(shown  with  the  computers in Figure B.7). 
(3) Sensor  Pallet (3 rate  gyros  on  each  axis  and 3 accelerometers 
on  each  axis for a  total  of  18  sensors)  (see  Figure B.8). 
(4)  Additional  Sensors (2 heading  and  attitude  systems, 2 angle- 
of-attack  sensors, 1 slideslip  sensor,  and 3 sensors  for 
each  pilot  control). 
(5) Cockpit  Control and  Display  (Encoder/Decoder,  Mode  and  Gain 
Panel, Annunciator Panel, Digital  Autopilot Panel, and 
Computer  Input  Panel)  (see  Figure B. 9 )  .
(6) Computer  Bypass and Servo  Electronics  System (3 Bypass and 
Servo  Electronics  (BASE)  units  and 1 status/engage  panel) 
(see Figure B. 10) . 
(7) Secondary  Actuators (5 including  right  and  left  aileron, 
right and  left  elevator,  and  rudder)  (see  Figure  B.ll). 
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Digital 
computers 
Surface commands 
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I 
I '  
Computer 
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p$g"&$ actuators 
P-k Power actuators 
F i g u r e  B . 5 .  F-8 DFBW c o n t r o l   s y s t e m   m e c h a n i z a t i o n .  
F i g u r e  B . 6 .  C e n t r a l   p r o c e s s o r   u n i t .  
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F i g u r e  B . 7 .  P a l l e t   a s s e m b l y   c o n t a i n i n g   t h e   i n t e r f a c e   U n i t   a n d  
t h r e e  c e n t r a l  p r o c e s s o r s .  
/ 
F i g u r e  B . 8 .  I n e r t i a l   s e n s o r   a s s e m b l y .  
12 0 
MODE AND 
GAINS 
ANNUNCIATOR 
F i g u r e  B.9. C o c k p i t   p a n e l s .  
COMPUTER 
INPUT 
F i g u r e  B.10. C o m p u t e r   b y p a s s   a n d   s e r v o   e l e c t r o n i c s  
s y s t e m  i n s t a l l e d  i n  a i r p l a n e .  
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F i g u r e  B . l l .  T r i p l e x   s e c o n d a r y   s e r v o - a c t u a t o r   a s s e m b l y .  
These  major  components  are  b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e d  t o  g i v e  a n  u n d e r -  
s t a n d i n g   o f   t h e  basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a n d  o p e r a t i o n  o f  e a c h  u n i t .  T h e  
p h y s i c a l  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  e q u i p m e n t  i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i s  t h e n  o u t -  
l i n e d ,   a n d   t h e   o v e r a l l   o p e r a t i o n  of t h e   s y s t e m  i s  d e s c r i b e d .   P a r t i c u l a r  
emphas i s  . is  p l a c e d  o n  t h e  f a i l u r e - d e t e c t i o n  a n d  r e d u n d a n c y  m a n a g e m e n t  
t e c h n i q u e s .  
DFBW F-8 Major Components 
Computer.  - The "101 c o m p u t e r  u s e d  i n  t h e  F-8 DFBW i s  similar 
t o  t h a t  u s e d  i n  t h e  S p a c e  S h u t t l e .  T h i s  c o m p u t e r  w a s  d e v e l o p e d   o v e r   t h e  
1972-1973 t i m e  p e r i o d .  I t  is  a g e n e r a l - p u r p o s e   s t o r e d - p r o g r a m   p a r a l l e l  
machine .  I t  w o r k s   w i t h   b o t h  16-  and   32-b i t   words .  I t  h a s  a micropro-  
grammed i n s t r u c t i o n  set  w i t h  1 4 6  t o t a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e  b o t h  
f i x e d - p o i n t   a n d   f l o a t i n g - p o i n t   o p e r a t i o n s .   T h e  "101 u s e s  a magne t i c -  
c o r e  memory w i t h   3 2 , 7 6 8   3 6 - b i t   w o r d s .   T h e   w o r d s   i n c l u d e  two p a r i t y  b i t s  
a n d   t w o   s t o r e   p r o t e c t  b i t s .  The AP-101 i s  b a s i c a l l y  o n e  f u l l  ATR (19.3 x 
25.6 x 49.8 cm)  and   weighs  2 6  kg.  I ts  pr imary   power  i s  28 Vdc and  it u s e s  
375 wat t s ;  it i s  c o o l e d  b y  i n d i v i d u a l  b l o w e r s .  
I n t e r f a c e  u n i t  ( I F U ) .  - The  IFU c o n t a i n s  t h e  e q u i p m e n t  n e c e s s a r y  
t o  p r o c e s s  a n d  c o n d i t i o n  t h e  1/0 s i g n a l s  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  d i g i t a l  f l i g h t  
compute r s .  The  IFU w a s  s p e c i a l l y  d e s i g n e d  a n d  b u i l t  f o r  t h e  F-8 DFBW 
p r o g r a m .   T h e r e   a r e   a c t u a l l y   t h r e e   e l e c t r i c a l l y   i n d e p e n d e n t  IFU c h a n n e l s ,  
1 2 2  
one  for  each processor.  Because of F-8C installation  requirements,  the 
three  channels  are  packaged  within  a  single  enclosure.  Each IFU channel 
is interfaced  with  only  the  one  processor,  and can be thought of logi- 
cally  as  part of the  processor. 
Each IFU channel  is  responsible  for  four  major  functions: 
(1) To provide  conditioning  of  input  signals,  convert  the  analog 
signals  to  digital  form,  and  provide  buffer  memory  for 
input  data. 
(2) To  process  output  signals  and  perform  digital-to-analog 
conversions. 
(3) To  provide  for  interchannel  data  transfer  between  computers. 
( 4 )  To  participate  in  fail  detection  and  redundancy  management. 
A  functional  diagram of the  IFU  is  shown  in  Figure B.12. A diagram 
showing  the  way  sensor  data  is  processed  and  transferred  between  chan- 
nels  is  shown  in  Figure B.13. 
Sensors. - There  is  a  sensor  pallet  that  was  assembled and  installed 
in  the  aircraft  specifically  for  the DFBW system. The DFBW system  also 
uses  several  other  aircraft  sensors. 
The sensor  pallet  consists  of  nine  gyros  and  nine  accelerometers. 
There  are  three  gyro  assemblies,  with three gyros in each  assembly. 
Each  gyro in an assembly  is  mounted  parallel  to one major  aircraft  axis. 
The  arrangement  for  the  accelerometers i the  same  as  for  the  gyros. 
The  DFBW  system  also  uses several  other sensors, which  are  dis- 
tributed  about  the  aircraft.  There  are  triple-linear-variable- 
differential-transformer (LVDT) stick-position  sensors  for  both  roll 
and  pitch control and also triple-LVDT  sensors  for  the  rudder  pedals. 
There  is  also  an  experimental  side-stick  controller. Thus, there  are 
triple-LVDT  force  sensors  for  both  roll  and  pitch  from  the side stick. 
The  system  receives  inputs  from  two  angle-of-attack  sensors  and  one 
sideslip  sensor. Two heading  and  attitude  reference  systems  are  used 
in  the  system.  Each  provides  three  synchro  signals: one for  pitch, 
one for roll, and one  for  heading.  Mach  inputs  are  obtained as dc 
signals  from  two  Mach  meters.  Altitude  is  obtained  as  serial  digital 
signals  from  two  altimeters. 
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Figure B.12. IFU simplified  functional  diagram. 
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There are  also  position  sensors  on  the  control  surfaces,  the 
horizontal  stabilizer  actuator,  and  the  wing. 
Pilot  control  and  display. - The  F-8  DFBW  has  four  pilot  control 
and  display  panels.  These  units  allow  adequate  visibility  and  flexi- 
bility  in  an  experimental  system.  Many  of  the  functions  would  not  be 
necessary  or  desired on a  production  system.  Each  of  the  panels  is 
interfaced  to  the IFU and  computers  by  the  encoder/decoder  unit. 
Mode  and  gain  panel (see Figure B . 9 ) :  The Mode  and  Gain  Panel 
provides  control  of  the  major  modes  of  the  system  and  allows  pilot 
control  of  selected  parameters.  There  are  separate  mode  controls  for 
each  channel: roll, pitch, and  yaw.  These  mode  switches  allow  manual 
switching  between  the  digital  and  analog  systems.  With  the  digital 
system  there  is  also  the  choice  between  the  Direct  Mode  and  augmented 
modes. The Direct  Mode  gives  a  direct  connection  between  the pilot
controls  and  the  aerodynamic  control  surfaces. 
In the  pitch channel, there  is  simple  stability-augmentation (SAS)  
mode  and  a  more  highly  augmented  command-augmentation (CAS) mode. 
There are also  lateral-direction SAS modes. The mode  switches  are 
lighted  to  indicate  which  mode  is  active.  These  lights  indicate the 
mode  both  when  it is manually  selected or when  it  changes  automatically 
due  to  system-detected  faults. 
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D i g i t a l  a u t o p i l o t  p a n e l  (see F igure   B .9 ) :   The   D ig i t a l   Au top i lo t  
Panel  is ve ry  similar t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  a u t o p i l o t  c o n t r o l  p a n e l s .  It  has  
a magnet ica l ly  la tched  engage  swi tch  and  mode s w i t c h e s  f o r  a l t i t u d e  h o l d ,  
Mach hold,   and  heading. I t  a l s o  h a s  a t u r n  c o n t r o l  s w i t c h .  
Annunciator   panel  (see Figure   B .9) :  The Annunciator   Panel  i s  
capable  of  d i sp lay ing  20 s e p a r a t e  i n d i c a t i o n s ;  f o u r  o f  t h e  i n d i c a t o r s  
have a s w i t c h   f o r  reset. These   d i sp l ays   i nc lude :  
(1) Hardware-Detected  Failures:  Channel A Fa i l ,   Channe l  B F a i l ,  
Channel C F a i l .  
( 2 )  Sof tware-Detec ted   Rese t tab le   Fa i lures :  T r i m ,  Downmode, 
Se l f -Tes t .  
( 3 )  Sta tus   and   Sof tware   Detec ted   Fa i lures :  A Temp, B Temp, C Temp, 
P RAV, R RAV, Y RAV, Flap,  A i r  Data, Alpha ,  Center  S t ick ,  
S i d e  S t i c k ,  Rudder  Pedal. 
Computer i npu t   pane l  (see Figure  B . 9 ) :  The  Computer Input   Pane l  
a l l o w s  t h e  p i l o t  t o  i n i t i a t e  preprogrammed  sof tware  funct ions.   These 
i n c l u d e   t h e   c o n t r o l   o f   a n   e x t e n s i v e   p r e f l i g h t  test  p r o g r a m .   I n   f l i g h t ,  
c o n t r o l - s y s t e m  o p t i o n s  c a n  a l s o  b e  s e l e c t e d .  The  panel  has  two thumb- 
wheel   swi tches   to  select  the  program.  The  selected  program is  d i sp layed  
on a t h r e e - d i g i t  d i s p l a y .  The  program is  i n i t i a t e d  when t h e  E n t e r  b u t t o n  
i s  p res sed .  
Encoder/decoder  uni t .  - The Encoder/Decoder  Unit  provides  the inter-  
face   be tween  the   cont ro l   and   d i sp lay   pane ls   and   the  IFU. Although  housed 
i n  one c h a s s i s ,  t h e  u n i t  c o n t a i n s  i n d e p e n d e n t  c h a n n e l s  f o r  f a i l u r e  p r o -  
t e c t i o n .  
Computer  bypass  and servo electronics  system (CBS) . ( 2 0 )  - The CBS 
c o n s i s t s  of t h r e e  p a r a l l e l  B y p a s s  a n d  S e r v o  E l e c t r o n i c s  (BASE) u n i t s  a n d  
a s t a tus / engage  pane l .  A diagram  of   the BASE u n i t  i s  shown i n  F i g u r e  
B . 1 4 .  I t  c o n t a i n s  a n a l o g  c i r c u i t s  f o r  i n p u t  s i g n a l  c o n d i t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  
s u r f a c e  commands from t h e  d i g i t a l  s y s t e m  and f o r  d i r e c t  i n p u t  o f  p i l o t -  
c o n t r o l   p o s i t i o n   s e n s o r s   f o r   t h e   c o m p u t e r   b y p a s s   c i r c u i t .  I t  a l s o  con- 
t a i n s  s w i t c h e s  t o  select  e i t h e r  t h e  d i g i t a l  o r  b y p a s s  commands.  The 
s e l e c t e d  commands from each uni t  are c rosswi red  in to  midva lue - se l ec t  
c i r c u i t s .  A comparison  monitor   between  the  midvalue  selected  and  the 
l o c a l   c h a n n e l  command i s  u s e d  f o r  f a u l t  d e t e c t i o n .  The BASE u n i t  a l s o  
c o n t a i n s  a l l  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c s  n e c e s s a r y  b o t h  t o  c l o s e  t h e  s e r v o  l o o p  on 
t h e  a c t u a t o r s  u s i n g  a p o s i s i o n  f e e d b a c k  s i g n a l  a n d  t o  p r o c e s s  t h e  d e l t a  
p r e s s u r e  (Ap) s i g n a l s  from t h e  a c t u a t o r  u s e d  f o r  e q u a l i z a t i o n  a n d  f a u l t  
d e t e c t i o n .  
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Figure B.14. Simplified F-8 DFBW computer  bypass and servo 
electronics  system  block diagram. 
The BASE  unit  contains  discrete  logic  circuits  which  implement 
much  of  the  fault  detection  and  redundancy  management  for  the  final 
test of  the  digital  commands,  the  bypass  circuits,  the  servo  electronics, 
the  actuators, and  the  electrical  power. 
The status/engage  panel  shown  in  Figure B.15 provides  engage 
switches  for  each  channel of each  actuator (15 in  all). Each  actuator 
can be  in the OFF, AUTO, or MANUAL  mode. The normal mode is AUTO, which 
allows  automatic  engagement  and  redundancy  management  by the system. 
The first  channel  switched  to  the  MANUAL  mode is operated as a  dedicated 
single-channel  system  and  the  other  two  channels are locked  out. This 
feature  was  originally  intended  for  preflight  diagnostic  purposes,  but 
also  serves  as  a  "last  resort"  configuration  in  the  event of loss of 
two  analog  channels. The status/engage  panel  also  contains  the  control 
for  extensive  self-test of the CBS system. 
Figure B.15. Status/engage  panel. 
Secondary  actuator. - The  secondary  actuator is triply  redundant  and 
is capable of providing a  single fail-operational/fail-neutral force- 
sharing  operation  for  any  two  similar  nonsimultaneous  failures. The 
actuator  has  three  independent  electrohydraulic  channels.  Each  channel 
incorporates  the  following  features  and  components: 
(1) Independent  hydraulic  fluid  supply. 
(2) Two-stage  electrohydraulic  flapper  nozzle  servo  valve  to 
control  the  actuator  motion. 
(3) Solenoid  valve  to  port  pressurized  fluid  to  the  servo  valve 
and to  the  actuator  chambers. 
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Engage  valve,  which by  being engaged  (energizing of  the 
solenoid  valve)  allows  the  servo  valve  to  port  pressure 
into  the  actuator  chambers,  and by being  disengaged  (de- 
energizing  of  the  solenoid  valve)  puts  the  actuator  into 
a  bypass  mode  preventing  hydraulic  lock. 
Pressure  transducer  for Ap sensing,  failure  detection,  and 
channel  synchronization. 
LVDT  for  position  output  sensing  and  feedback-loop  closure. 
A schematic  diagram of the  servo  actuator  is  shown  in  Figure B.16 
and a  more  detailed  schematic  of  the  electrohydraulic  servo  valve  is 
shown in  Figure B.17. 
The  servo  actuator  has  been  designed  to  assure  that  all  failures 
are  detected  and  that  no  single  failure  will  cause  hydraulic  lock.  Any 
Passive  failure in  the  electrohydraulic  servo  valve  is  detected  by  the 
fact  that  a  null  bias  is  built  into  the  valve's  first  stage. A current 
of  10  Percent of full  value is required,  to  hold  the  valve  at  null.  If 
there is any  failure  in  the  coil or  electrical  connections,  the  null  is 
not  held  and a Ap is  generated  which  is  detected  in  the  servo  electronics 
and  causes  the  channel  to  be  shut  off. The system "ON" solenoid  is 
electrically  fail-safe.  If  there  is  any  electrical or coil  failure,  the 
valve  will  shut,  disabling  that  channel  to  a  passive  condition.  If  there 
is a  mechanical  failure,  such  as  a  broken  spring,  the  valve  could  remain 
open  when  it  should  be  closed  because  of  some  other  failure.  However, 
the  actuator  will  still  operate,  though  with  reduced  performance,  because 
the  other  two  channels  can  overcome  any  irregularity  in  the  failed  channel. 
Moreover,  experience  shows  that  this  kind  of  mechanical  failure  is  ex- 
tremely  rare. 
Hydraulic  lock  is  normally  prevented by the  engage  valve.  When 
the  engage  solenoid  shuts  off  hydraulic  pressure  or  pressure  is  lost 
for  any  other  reason,  the  engage  valve is moved by a spring  to  the  bypass 
condition.  If  the  spring  in  the  engage  valve  breaks,  the  channel  could 
be  locked  by  the  electrohydraulic  servo  valve  also  being at null. This 
condition is prevented  because  the  second-stage  servo  valve  is  also 
spring  biased;  if  hydraulic  pressure is lost,  this  valve  will  move 
hard  over  and  prevent  lock. 
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Figure B.16. Phase I1 hydraulic  schematic,  triplex 
redundant  secondary  servoactuator. 
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F i g u r e  ~ . 1 7 .  Phase 11 two-s t age   e l ec t rohydrau l i c  
s e rvo  va lve .  
I n s t a l l a t i o n  
The Phase I1 DFBW system i s  i n s t a l l e d  i n  a Navy F-8C a i r c r a f t ,  
which i s  s i n g l e  e n g i n e  a n d  s i n g l e  s e a t ,  a n d  is  capable  of supe r son ic  
f l i g h t .  I t  h a s  a t w o - p o s i t i o n   v a r i a b l e   i n c i d e n c e  wing f o r   r e d u c i n g  
f u s e l a g e  a t t i t u d e  d u r i n g  t h e  l a n d i n g  a p p r o a c h .  The m o d i f i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
a i r c r a f t  f o r  t h i s  program were a l l  i n t e r n a l ;  t h e r e  were no b a s i c  s t r u c -  
tu ra l   o r   aerodynamic   changes .  The major change was the  removal   of   the  
mechanica l   cont ro l   l inkages .   The   on ly   o ther   changes  were t h e  a d d i t i o n  
o f  t h e  f l i g h t - c o n t r o l  s e n s o r s ,  e l e c t r o n i c s ,  a n d  a c t u a t o r s .  
The  loca t ion  of  the  major elements  of  the system is  shown i n  
F igu re  B.18. The three   computers   and   the  IFU are mounted  on a p a l l e t  
t h a t  was shown i n  F i g u r e  B . 7 .  The p a l l e t  i s  i n s t a l l e d  j u s t  b e h i n d  t h e  
c o c k p i t  a t  t h e  t o p  of t h e  f u s e l a g e .  The  computer  bypass  and  servo  drive 
e l e c t r o n i c s  a r e  mounted i n  t h e  lower l e f t  s i d e  of the  fuse l age  beh ind  
the  cockp i t .  The  encode r /decode r  un i t  i s  mounted i n  t h e  n o s e  t o  m i n i m i z e  
t h e  w i r e  r un   l eng ths .  The   gyro   and   acce lerometer   sensor   pa l le t  is l o c a t e d  
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n e a r  t h e  c e n t e r  o f  g r a v i t y  i n  t h e  b e l l y  of t h e  a i r c r a f t .  The angle- 
o f - a t t a c k  a n d  s i d e s l i p  s e n s o r s  are l o c a t e d  on a boom i n  t h e  f r o n t  of 
t h e  a i r c r a f t .  The   s econda ry   ac tua to r s  are l o c a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p r i m a r y  
a c t u a t o r s  a n d  e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n n e c t  t o  t h e  same p o s i t i o n  as  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
'mechanica l  l inkage .  
Cockpit  panels 
Pallet  assembly  -computer 
and  interface unit 
Autopilot  Secondary  actuators ( 5 )  
Mode 
gain 
\ 
Encoderldecoder 
Computer bypass system Sensor pallet -gyros 
and servodrive  electronics and accelerometers 
Figure  B.18. F-8 DFBW hardware  e lements .  
Electrical  power t o  t h e  f l i g h t - c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  is  obtained from 
three  independent  buses ,  which  are supp l i ed  by a dedica ted  engine-dr iven  
dc  generator .   Each  bus i s  backed  up  by a 40-ampere-hour b a t t e r y .   T h e s e  
b a t t e r i e s  c a n  power t h e  f u l l  d i g i t a l  s y s t e m  f o r  60  minu tes  in  the  even t  
of a g e n e r a t o r  f a i l u r e .  The b a t t e r i e s  are i s o l a t e d  f r o m  e a c h  o t h e r  by 
d iodes  and  c i r cu i t  b reake r s  and  supp ly  power whenever t h e i r  v o l t a g e  ex- 
ceeds  the  vo l t age  on  the  buses .  A b a t t e r y  i s  always  on  an  individual  
bus   wi th   no   swi tch ing   involved .  The f l i g h t - c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  i s  n o t  con- 
n e c t e d  t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  a i r c r a f t  power sys t ems  excep t  fo r  ac power,  which 
i s  needed fo r  t he  compute r  and  pa l l e t  b lowers  and  a t t i t ude  and  Mach sen- 
s o r s .  A ram a i r  tu rb ine  can  be  dep loyed  i f  necessa ry  to  supp ly  emergency  
ac power fo r  t he  b lowers .  The re  i s  a n  i n v e r t e r  i n  e a c h  c h a n n e l  t h a t  
supp l i e s  26 -vo l t  400-Hz power f o r  t h e  p i l o t - c o n t r o l  i n p u t  s e n s o r s  and t h e  
a c t u a t o r  p o s i t i o n  f e e d b a c k  s i g n a l  s e n s o r s .  
T h r e e  s e p a r a t e  h y d r a u l i c  power s u p p l i e s  a r e  u s e d  f o r  t h e  t h r e e  
c h a n n e l s  o f  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  a c t u a t o r s .  Two o f  t h e s e  are t h e  e x i s t i n g  
s y s t e m  f o r  t h e  two channels   o f   the   p r imary  power a c t u a t o r s .  The t h i r d  
i s  t h e  u t i l i t y  s y s t e m  u s e d  f o r  l a n d i n g  g e a r ,  s p e e d  b r a k e s ,  etc.  One 
of t h e  h y d r a u l i c  s y s t e m s  c a n  b e  powered in  emergenc ie s  by t h e  r a m  a i r  
t u r b i n e .  
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System  Operation 
A diagram of the  total  system  was  given  in  Figure 9. The pri- 
mary  means  of  flight  control is through  the  triplex  digital  system. 
This system is responsible for: 
(1) Fault detection  and  redundancy  management of the computers 
themselves  and  their  associated  IFUs. 
(2) Data processing,  fault  detection,  and  redundancy  management 
of the input sensors. 
(3) Computation  of  the  appropriate  control-law algorithm. 
( 4 )  Production  of  the  four  necessary  analog  surface  position 
commands. 
The BASE units  are  responsible  for: 
(1)  Midvalue  selection  and  comparison  monitoring  of  the  surface 
commands  from  the  digital system. 
(2) Signal  conditioning,  fault  detection, and  redundancy  manage- 
ment  of the analog  backup  computer  bypass  channel. 
( 3 )  Switching  from  primary  digital  commands  to  bypass  commands. 
( 4 )  Closing the servo  loop,  fault  detection, and  redundancy 
management  of  the  actuators. 
(5) Fault  detection  and  redundancy  management  of the electrical 
power. 
The  redundancy  management of the  hydraulic  power  is  manual. 
The following  subsections  describe  the  software  in  the  digital 
system,  the  fault  detection a d  synchronization of the  computers,  the 
sensor  data  processing  and  redundancy  management,  and  the  operation of 
the BASE system. 
Software  organization. - The  approximate  memory  allocations for the 
major  program  elements  are  shown  in  Figure B.19. The  software is exe- 
cuted as a  sequence  of  minor  cycles,  which  are  initiated by a timer 
interrupt  generated  within  the  computer,  causing  the  program  to  stop 
doing  whatever  it was doing  and  begin  executing  the  basic  minor-loop 
program. The nominal  time  period  for  the  minor  loop  is 20 milliseconds. 
This time  can  be  varied  for  experimental  purposes;  however,  most  of  the 
basic  program functions are performed within 20 milliseconds. Some 
outer-loop  control  computations  are  partially  performed  within  each 
minor cycle so that  the  whole  function is completed  in an integral  num- 
ber  of  minor cycles, forming  a  major  cycle.  The  sequence of execution 
of  the  program  elements  is  given  in  Figure B.20. 
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Operating  system  and computer 
4 
Control laws 
Sensor  redundancy mansgemen 
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Figure B. 19. Software memory a l l o c a t i o n .  
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Figure B.20 .  Software  sequence  and  timing  during  one  minor 
cycle:   three  channels ,   d i rect  modes. 
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Computer  fault  detection and  synchronization. - The first  step in 
ensuring  the  proper  operation  of  a  digital-processor-based  flight-control 
system  is  to  assure  that the  computers  are  working  properly.  Once 
full  confidence can be  placed  in  the  computers,  their  significant  pro- 
cessing  power  can  be  used  to  monitor  faults  in  the  rest  of  the  system. 
Fault  detection  can be divided  into  two  different  categories. One 
is  self-test,  where  a  unit  performs  tests  to  determine  its  own  health. 
The  other  category  involves  monitoring  or  testing by other  units. Fault 
detection in both of these  categories is performed  in a hierarchy of 
different  levels.  Faults  are  detected on as low  a  level as possible. 
However,  for  faults  that  cannot  be  detected on a  low  level  and  for 
protection  against  any  failure  of  the  lower  level  techniques,  higher 
level  tests  are  used. The total set of tests  is  designed so that  each 
test  complements  the  others;  together,  the  tests  are  able  to  cover the 
entire  system  and  assure the requires  level  of  system  integrity. 
The  computers in the  F-8  DFBW  system  are  tested  at  several  levels 
by  both self-testing  and  external  monitoring.  These  tests  are  performed 
both  by special  hardware  and  software. 
Self-test:  Each  computer/IFU channel  determines  its  own  condition 
by  using hardware  built-in  test  equipment  (BITE)  and by software  self- 
test  programs. The computer  BITE  detects  faults  in  the  execution  of 
instructions, loss of power,  parity  errors  in  memory,  and  failure  of  a 
go/no-go counter to  be  reset. The go/no-go  counter is reset by a 
software  command.  Thus,  this  test  will  detect  any  kind  of  hardware  or 
software  problem  that  will  keep  the  program  from  completing  its  basic 
computation  cycle in the  proper time. Problems  detected by this  test 
include  the  program  getting  caught  in  a  continuous  loop  or  branching 
to the wrong part of the  memory. 
The  BITE in the  IFU  channel  tests  for  timeout,  oscillator 
failure,  and  power  failure.  The  timeout  assures  that  the  IFU  performs 
its basic operations  within  certain  maximum  time limits. 
There  are two categories  of  response  to  the  detection  of  a  BITE 
fault. Certain  faults  such as loss of  power  are  potentially  transient, 
and it is desirable to  attempt  to  regain  normal  operation.  This is 
achieved  by  requesting  a  restart,  which  will  be  discussed  later. 
Because  other  faults  are  considered  to  be  permanent,  a  signal is 
generated to declare  permanent  failure  of  a  channel. 
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The other methods  used by the  computer for.determining its  own . .  
-health are self.-test software routines. There.are two self-test  rou- 
tines. One routine is continually run during  flight.  The  other  rou- 
tine is run only.after an initial program  load of the computers. This 
routine  includes all flight tests  plus  certain other,tests that  could 
not be  performed  during  normal  operation  without  disrupting  normal 
operation.  These  routines are designed  to  test the central  processor 
unit  and  memory  functions  with  a  detection  error  confidence of 95  per- 
cent. 
The  computer/IFU  channel  also  uses  special  circuits  in  conjunc- 
tion  with  software  programs  to  test  the  input  and  output  interfaces. 
The  analog  command  signal,  certain  discrete  bits,  and  bits  within 
the  serial  data  words  going  to  the  encoder/decoder  are  wired  back  into 
the  computer. Software  routines  in  the  computer  check  these  wrap- 
around inputs  and  compare  them  with  what the output should  have been. 
This  test  checks  the  critical  output  interface  hardware  and  a  majority 
of the  input  interface hardware. 
Synchronization: The hardware  and  software  self-test  monitors  in 
each  computer/IFU  channel  will  detect  the  majority  of  all  possible  failures, 
and, if a  failure is detected,  will  produce  a  signal  causing  that  channel 
to  be  disregarded. It is now possible  to  connect the three  computers 
together so that  they can monitor  each  other to detect  faults  that  may 
not  be  caught by the hardware and  software  self-test.  The  first  step 
toward achieving  simultaneous  operation  of the computers in the F-8 DFBW 
system  is  to  synchronize  them so that they  are  performing  the  same 
operations at very  nearly  the  same  time.  Synchronization  is  necessary 
to cause  data to be  read  from  the  sensors  at  the  same  time,  allowing 
fault  detection by comparison  of  redundant  sensors.  The  synchronization 
of  computations is also  important  to  allow  comparison  of  the  analog 
command  outputs  from the computer.  This  comparison is performed  in the 
BASE analog  electronics. 
Another  important  task  performed  by  the  synchronization  is  computer 
fault  detection.  One of the best  ways  €or  each  computer  to  determine 
the'health of  the  other two is by their  ability tu come into  synchron- 
ization. The computers are synchronized by a  program  in  each  computer, 
which  sends  discrete  signals  to  each  of  the  other  two  computers 
(Figure B.21). The computers  are  synchronized when the program  reads 
and  verifies the discretes  it  has  received  from  the  other  computers. If, 
after  a  short wait to  allow  for  skew  between  processors,  one  computer 
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fails to synchronize  with  the  other two, the two remaining  computers 
exit the sync  program  and  continue  normal  processing. This synchron- 
ization  occurs  only  at  the  beginning  of  each  minor  cycle.  These 20- 
millisecond  cycles  are  begun  within 10 to 50 microseconds of each  other. 
L7- l  Computer A Computer E Computer  C 
r L 
Figure ~ . 2 1 .  Synchronization  discretes. 
Cross-channel  monitoring:  If  the  computers can be  successfully 
synchronized,  the  next step in  their  monitoring  of  each  other is to 
transfer  data  among  themselves.  This  transfer is done  through  the 
buffer  memories in each IFU channel, and  consists  of  six  data  words. 
The transferred  data  includes  an  identification  of  the  computer  channel, 
the  computer's  minor  cycle  count,  the  mode  it  is in, and its  assessment 
of  the  failure  status  of  the  other  two  computers.  Failure  to  receive 
data  from  a  synchronized  computer  for 10 successive  cycles  results  in  a 
"hard  fail"  declaration  and  that  computer  cannot  be  used  again.  Failure 
to  receive  data  from  a  nonsynchronized  computer  results  in  the  declara- 
tion of a "soft fail" and enables  inclusion of this  computer in the 
operating set when  its  sync  discretes  and  data  appear.  If  a  computer's 
data  is not properly  identified  for 10 successive cycles, a  hard  fail 
is  declared.  If  a  computer's  cycle  count  and  mode do not agree  with 
those  of  the  other  two  computers, it  requests  a  restart. 
Restart:  Restart  is  requested by a  computer  for  a  number  of  reasons 
including : 
(1) Freshstart-initial power up. 
(2) Power disruption. 
( 3 )  Crosslink fail-1/0 or data. 
( 4 )  Software  program  and/or  computer  BITE  detected errors. 
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Whenever  a  restart is requested,  the  three  computers, by way of 
the  crosslink,  exchange  enough  data  to  guarantee that they are in  agree- 
ment. This transmission  includes  the  choice of the computer  considered 
to have  valid  data  and  the  data  to  be  used by the  offending computer. 
The  data  exchanged is 9 4  16-bit  words,  and  includes  such  items as 
sensor  and  discrete  failure  history  and  control-law  parameters. 
To  prevent  continuous  restart  requests  caused  by  a  failure in th
system,  each  computer  maintains  a  count  of all restart  requests.  If the 
number of restart  requests  made by any  computer  exceeds  a  prescribed 
tolerance,  that  computer  is  declared  hard  failed  and its requests are 
subsequently  ignored. The entire  restart  process takes approximately 
8 milliseconds  from  recognition  of  request  to  resynchronization. 
Failure voting: It is  necessary  for  two  computers to agree  before 
a  third can be  declared  failed.  If  the  self-test  software or hardware 
in  a  channel  declares  itself  failed,  that  channel is inhibited  from 
voting on the  other  computers. A logical  diagram of the  hardware  within 
an  IFU  channel  that  implements  this  process is shown in Figure B . 2 2 .  
The output  signal  which  declares  a  channel  failed s sent  to  the BASE 
and causes  that  channel  to  switch o the  analog  channel. 
- No computer  activity 
IFU clock failure 
Computer A I F U  power failure 
Hard-fail declaration 
from C 
Hard-fail declaration 
- Set  channel A failure - 
Fail discrete for channel B Channel B hard-fail declaration-- T~ 
channel B 
Channel C hard-fail declaration 
channel C 
To 
Figure B . 2 2 .  Functional  diagram of fault  detection 
hardware  in  IFU  (shown  for  channel A) . 
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Sensor  da ta  process ing  and  redundancy  management. - The d a t a  from 
a l l  redundant   sensors  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  each  computer.  The d a t a  is  pro- 
cessed by redundancy management (RM) programs,  which are per formed in  
two phases .  The o n l y  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r s t  p h a s e  i s  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  b e s t  
estimate o f  t h e  a c t u a l  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  m u l t i p l e  
s e n s o r  i n p u t s ,  a n d  p r o v i d e  t h i s  d a t a  f o r  u s e  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l - l a w  compu- 
t a t i o n s .  The second   phase   pe r fo rms   f au l t   de t ec t ion   and   i den t i f i ca t ion ,  
a n d  c o n t r o l s  t h e  r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  select l o g i c  u s e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
phase.  
A t y p i c a l  t r i p l e x  RM a lgo r i thm is  shown i n  F i g u r e  B . 2 3 .  The 
f i r s t  p h a s e  b e g i n s  a s  a midvalue select  mode, changes  to  an  ave rag ing  
a l g o r i t h m  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  h a r d  f a i l u r e ,  and f i n a l l y  d e g r a d e s  t o  a 
d e f a u l t  o u t p u t  v a l u e  a f t e r  t h e  s e c o n d  f a i l u r e .  A h a r d - s e n s o r   f a u l t  is 
dec la red  by the second phase when a s e n s o r  d i f f e r s  from t h e  s e l e c t e d  
va lue  by an amount g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  a l l o w a b l e  t o l e r a n c e  f o r  a given 
number (N) of   consecu t ive   pas ses .   Fa i lu re - s t a tus   l og ic   mon i to r s   t he  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  t r a c k i n g  t e s t  a n d ,  t h r o u g h  h a r d - f a i l  f l a g s ,  c a u s e s  t h e  
mode o r  f u n c t i o n  u s i n g  t h a t  s e n s o r  t o  b e  i n h i b i t e d .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  
s h o u l d  t h e  e n t i r e  r o l l - r a t e - g y r o  set  be l o s t ,  t h e  r o l l  s t a b i l i t y  aug- 
mentation  system (SAS) would  be i n h i b i t e d .   I n  some cases ,   annunc ia t ion  
is g i v e n  t o  t h e  p i l o t  when a n  e n t i r e  s e n s o r  se t  has  been  lo s t .  The 
f i r s t  f a i l u r e s  of s e n s o r s  i n  a t r i p l e x  set  a r e  n o t  a n n u n c i a t e d  t o  t h e  
p i l o t .  
Operat ion of  t h e  BASE u n i t s .  - Each BASE u n i t  r e c e i v e s  t h e  f o u r  
a n a l o g  s u r f a c e  p o s i t i o n  commands from a c o r r e s p o n d i n g  d i g i t a l  c h a n n e l  
( re fer  t o   F i g u r e  9 ) .  The u n i t   a l s o   r e c e i v e s  a v a l i d   d i s c r e t e   ( F i g -  
u r e  B . 2 2 )  from a l l  t h r e e  c h a n n e l s .  I f  two o f  t h e  t h r e e  d i g i t a l  c h a n n e l s  
h a v e  v a l i d  d i s c r e t e s  a n d  h a v e  v a l i d  s u r f a c e  commands, t he  p r imary  d ig i -  
t a l  mode can be engaged using the Mode and  Gain  Panel.   This mode p u t s  
d i g i t a l / b y p a s s  s w i t c h e s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  e a c h  a c t u a t o r  i n  t h e  d i g i t a l  
p o s i t i o n .  T h e r e  a r e  f i v e  o f  t h e s e  c i r c u i t s  i n  e a c h  u n i t  f o r  l e f t  and 
r i g h t  e l e v a t o r ,  l e f t  and r i g h t  a i l e r o n ,  and  rudder.  A t y p i c a l  c i r c u i t  is 
shown i n  F i g u r e  B . 2 4 .  The swi t ch  ou tpu t s  go t o  a midvalue select  cir-  
c u i t  i n  t h a t  c h a n n e l  a n d  are a l s o  c r o s s - w i r e d  t o  t h e  o t h e r  two channels .  
The se lec ted  midvalue  is fed  back  in to  the  bypass  sys t em to  p rov ide  
synchroniza t ion  so t h a t  i f  t h e  d i g i t a l / b y p a s s  s w i t c h  i s  cha rged ,  t he re  
w i l l  be  no  t r ans i en t .  
The se l ec t ed  midva lue  i s  compared w i t h  t h e  s i g n a l  from t h a t  
c h a n n e l .   I f   t h e   d i f f e r e n c e   e x c e e d s  a se t  va lue ,   t he   co r re spond ing  
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FAILURE  AND  OTHER 
~ SWITCHING 
LOGIC AND  ACTUATORS 
j r  CHANNELS 
f 
DCS COMMAND 
CBS COMMAND 
~ 
" t - 
MIDVALUE 
5 SELECT A 
TOSERVO 
LOGIC 
ELECTRONICS 
4 
FROM 
TO B FROM 
B& C  C 
Figure  B.24. BASE s w i t c h i n g   a n d   s e l e c t i o n   l o g i c .  
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switch is charged  to  the  bypass  position. The synchronization  process 
is  still  active so that  the  switched  channel  follows  the  signals  from 
the  other  two  channels  that  are  still operating. The  results of the 
comparison  are  also  cross-wired  to  the  other two channels. If the 
comparison  fails on two of the three  channels for 40  milliseconds,  all 
channels of that  axis  are  switched  to  bypass,  and  synchronization is 
disabled. The BASE units  also  switch  all  axes of all  channels to bypass 
if two  of  the  three valid discretes  from the digital  channels  are  lost 
for 40 milliseconds. In the  bypass mode, the  comparitors and  voters 
are  still  active so that  if  two  of  three  comparisons  fail  in any  actu- 
ator channel,  that  channel  is disabled. 
The output  from  the  midvalue  select  circuit  goes  to  the  actuator 
control  electronics as shown  in  Figure B.25. The actuator is controlled 
by a  servo  loop  using  a  shaft-position  feedback  signal  from  an  LVDT. 
The  signal  from  a Ap transducer  across  the  actuator  piston  for  that 
channel  is  also  fed  back  along  with  the Ap's from  the  other  two  channels. 
These  Ap's  are  fed  into  a  midvalue-select  circuit.  The  midvalue  selected 
is  fed  back  into  the  servo  loop as an  equalization  signal  to  minimize 
the  low-frequency force  fight  that can occur  in  high-pressure-gain  sys- 
tems as a  result of slight  trim  mismatches. 
I 
Fault 
status 
Deadband 
limiter 
A p  lequalized) 
Position  command 
Actuato 
Servo- 
amplifier 
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status  Pilot 
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Fiaure B.25. Schematic  diaaram of sinale  channel 
m 
of 
~ 
secondary act;ator and servo  electronics. 
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The selected  midvalue  of Ap is also  compared  with  the  value for
that  channel. If it is outside  a set limit,  the  engage solenoid is 
disabled,  supply  pressure is dumped  to  return,  and  a  bypass  path  around 
the piston'in the  failed  channel is opened. Faults are  annunciated  in 
the  cockpit, and reset  capability is provided  to the pilot. A second 
failure  in the same  actuator  causes  that  actuator  be  turned  off. 
Mechanical  centering  springs  move  the  disabled  actuator  to  a  safe  static 
position. The Ap comparison  limits  are set to  be  relatively  wide. A 
passive failure may not be  detected,  particularly if the good  Ap's are 
small  due  to  small  control  commands.  Hardover  faults  will  be  detected, 
however. , 
Each BASE unit also  contains  power-monitoring  circuits  for  its 
own  power supply, and thus  also  for  the  input  dc  and  ac  power  supplies. 
A power-supply  failure  will  disable  that  channel. The power  monitor 
signals are also  cross-connected  to the other  two  channels. If failures 
are  detected  in  two of the three  channels,  the  remaining good  channel 
is  forced  into  single-channel  operation,  and  the  two out f  three  voters 
are  disabled.  Any  actuator  channel can also  be  put  into  single-channel 
operation by the MANUAL switch  position,  which  also  disables  two out of 
three  voters. 
142 
APPENDIX C 
ACRONYMS 
ARM 
ATR 
BASE 
BITE 
CARS RA 
CAS 
CAST 
CBE 
CB S 
C I P  
CPU 
DADS 
D/A 
DCS 
DFBW 
DFCS 
DFRC 
DG 
FAR 
FDL 
FIFO 
FMEA 
FMET 
FTMF' 
IFU 
ILS 
I/O 
JSC 
ana ly t i ca l  r edundancy  management 
a i r  t r a n s p o r t  r a c k i n g  
bypass  and  se rvo  e l ec t ron ic s  
b u i l t - i n  tes t  equipment 
compute r - a ided  r edundan t  sys t em re l i ab i l i t y  ana lys i s  
command augmentation system 
complementary  ana ly t ic  s imula t ion  technique  
common BASE e l e c t r o n i c s  
computer   bypass   (and  servo  e lectronics)   system 
computer  input  panel  
c e n t r a l  p r o c e s s i n g  u n i t  
d i g i t a l  a i r  d a t a  s y s t e m  
d i g i t a l - t o - a n a l o g  
d i g i t a l  computer  sof tware :  d ig i ta l  computer  sys tem 
d i g i t a l   f l y - b y - w i r e  
d i g i t a l  f l i g h t - c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  
Dryden Fl ight  Research  Center  
d i r e c t i o n a l  g y r o  
Federa l  Avia t ion  Regula t ions  
F l i g h t  Dynamics Laboratory 
f i r s t - i n / f i r s t - o u t  
f a i l u r e  modes and e f f e c t s  a n a l y s i s  
f a i l u r e  modes  and e f f e c t s  t e s t  
f a u l t  t o l e r a n t  m u l t i p r o c e s s o r  
i n t e r f a c e  u n i t  
ins t rument  landing  sys tem 
inpu t /ou tpu t  
Johnson Space Center 
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LARC 
LCL 
LPA 
.LFW 
LVDT 
MDR 
M P X  
MTBF 
MVL 
MVS 
NAMSO 
NASA 
OAST 
PDS 
P I N D  
QA 
QMR 
RAV 
R/A 
RM 
RPA 
RRA 
SAS 
TMR 
UCL 
VG 
YA 
Langley Research Center  
lower  conf idence  l i m i t  
l e f t  p i t c h  a c t u a t i o n  
l e f t  r o l l  a c t u a t i o n  
l i n e a r  v a r i a b l e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t r a n s f o r m e r  
maneuver  drag reduct ion 
m u l t i p l e x e r  
mean t i m e  b e t w e e n  f a i l u r e  
midd le  va lue  log ic  
midvalue select  
Navy Maintenance Support  Off ice  
Nat ional  Aeronaut ics  and Space Adminis t ra t ion 
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology 
p r i m a r y  d i g i t a l  s y s t e m  
p a r t i c l e - i n d u c e d  n o i s e  t e s t i n g  
q u a l i t y  a s s u r a n c e  
quadruple modular redundancy 
remote augmentat ion vehicle;  remotely augmented vehicle  
r a d i o  a l t i t u d e  
redundancy management 
r i g h t  p i t c h  a c t u a t i o n  
r i g h t  r o l l  a c t u a t i o n  
s t a b i l i t y  a u g m e n t a t i o n  s y s t e m  
t r i p l e  modular redundancy 
upper  confidence l i m i t  
v e r t i c a l  g y r o  
yaw a c t u a t i o n  
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